Southern Railway Company v. Gadd

• Decision Date: 11 May 1914
• Docket Number: No. 645,645
• Citation: 58 L.Ed. 1099,233 U.S. 572,34 S.Ct. 696
• Parties: SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. W. O. GADD
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

233 U.S. 572

34 S.Ct. 696

58 L.Ed. 1099

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v W. O. GADD.

No. 645.

Argued April 15, 1914.

Decided May 11, 1914.

Messrs. Caruthers Ewing and L. E. Jeffries for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 572-575 intentionally omitted] Mr. John L. Stout for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant in error on this record sued the railway company, the plaintiff in error, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered through its negligence. The cause of action was expressly based upon the employers' liability act, it being averred that at the time of the injury the plaintiff, as an employee of the defendant, was assisting in the actual movement of interstate commerce transportation in which the defendant company was then engaged. The case is here on error prosecuted by the railway company to a judgment of the court below affirming a judgment of the trial court upon a verdict. 207 Fed. 277.

In Chicago Junction R. Co. v. King, 222 U. S. 222, 56 L. ed. 173, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 79, it was held that as the pleadings in that case based the right to recover upon an act of Congress, the safety appliance law, there was power in this court to review the judgment of a circuit court of appeals,—an authority which carried with it the duty to consider and pass upon all questions for decision in the case, even although they might not concern the interpretation of the act of Congress upon which the suit was based. But while thus ruling, it was nevertheless declared that, as questions of common-law negligence not involving the interpretation of the statute fell within the classes of questions which, under the distribution of judicial power made by the act of 1891 [26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 488] (re-expressed in the Judicial Code) were determinable by the circuit court of appeals in last resort, where such questions were brought here from a circuit court of appeals because they arose in a suit under the statute, and which for that reason alone could come here, whilst considering we would not reverse as to such questions unless it clearly appeared that error had been committed. Besides establishing this rule, it was further said that, in disposing of such questions, we would not feel it our duty to re-state the case and re-expound the principles applicable to its decision below, but would, as a general rule, leave those subjects where the circuit court of appeals had left them, and

The employers' liability act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322, as amended April 5, 1910, 36 Stat. at L. 291, chap. 143, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1324 would hence content ourselves with merely expressing our ultimate conviction of the case as formed after an adequate examination of the record. The principles announced in the King Case were subsequently expressly reiterated and applied in Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Moore, 228 U. S. 433, 57 L. ed. 907, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580, and Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Brown, 229 U. S. 317, 57 L. ed. 1204, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840, 3 N. C. C. A. 826. And in both of these latter cases it was recognized that the ruling in the King Case was equally applicable to cases brought here from the circuit court of appeals on the ground that the relief sought was based on the employers' liability act where the cause of action arose since the adoption of the Judicial Code.

Coming to the case made by this record, although, as we have said, it is manifest that the cause of action was based upon the employers' liability act, we are of the opinion that it presents for decision no question concerning the interpretation of that act, since all the questions which require to be decided merely involve considerations of general law depending in no sense upon the particular significance of the employers' liability act. Under these conditions it is apparent that the case is absolutely controlled by the King Case, and we therefore content ourselves with saying that, as after an adequate examination of the record we find no ground whatever affording a clear conviction that error was committed, affirmance must follow.

This disposes of the entire case; but as it is insisted that two propositions which it is asserted involve the meaning of the employers' liability act arose upon the record and require to be decided, we come not to decide the propositions, but to point out the absolute want of merit in the contention that they arose on the record for decision. The first contention is based upon the refusal of a request made by the defendant to take the case from the jury by a peremptory instruction. Granting that, in its ultimate analysis, the request involved an appreciation of the employers' liability act, nevertheless we are of opinion that the absolute want of merit in the proposition, in view of the state of the proof, caused the request, intrinsically considered, to be so unsubstantial and frivolous as not to furnish any support for the contention that its refusal raised a question concerning the interpretation of the statute.

The second contention rests upon the assumption that the court below affirmed a...