Southern Railway Company v. United States

• Citation: 32 S.Ct. 2,56 L.Ed. 72,222 U.S. 20
• Decision Date: 30 October 1911
• Docket Number: No. 28,28
• Parties: SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. UNITED STATES
• Court: United States Supreme Court

222 U.S. 20

32 S.Ct. 2

56 L.Ed. 72

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 28.

Argued and submitted March 9 and 10, 1911.

Decided October 30, 1911.

Mr. Alfred P. Thom for plaintiff in error.

Assistant Attorney General Fowler and Mr. Henry E. Colton for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 21-23 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a civil action to recover penalties for the violation in specified instances of the safety-appliance acts of Congress. 27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174, 32 Stat. at L. 943, chap. 976, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1143. The government prevailed in the district court, and the defendant sued out this direct writ of error.

Briefly stated, the case is this: The defendant, while operating a railroad which was 'a part of a through highway' over which traffic was continually being moved from one state to another, hauled over a part of its railroad, during the month of February, 1907, five cars, the couplers upon which were defective and inoperative. Two of the cars were used at the time in moving interstate traffic, and the other three in moving intrastate traffic; but it does not appear that the use of the three was in connection with any car or cars used in interstate commerce. The defendant particularly objected to the assessment of any penalty for the hauling of the three cars, and insisted, first, that such a hauling in intrastate commerce although upon a railroad over which traffic was continually being moved from one state to another, was not within the prohibition of the safety appliance acts of Congress; and, second, that, if it was, those acts should be pronounced invalid, as being in excess of the power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Constitution. But the objection was overruled (164 Fed. 347), and error is assigned upon that ruling.

The original act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174), imposed upon every common carrier 'engaged in interstate commerce by railroad' the duty of equipping all trains, locomotives, and cars used on its line of railroad in moving interstate traffic, with designated appliances calculated to promote the safety of that traffic and of the employees engaged in its movement; and the 2d section of that act made it unlawful for 'any such common carrier' to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line of railroad any car 'used in moving interstate traffic,' not equipped with automatic couplers capable of being coupled and uncoupled without the necessity of a man going between the ends of the cars. The act of March 2, 1903 (32 Stat. at L. 943, chap. 976, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, p. 1143), amended the earlier one and enlarged its scope by declaring, inter alia, that its provisions and requirements should 'apply to all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce, and in the territories and the District of Columbia, and to all other locomotives, tenders, cars, and similar vehicles used in connection therewith.' Both acts contained some minor exceptions, but they have no bearing here.

The real controversy is over the true significance of the words 'on any railroad engaged' in the first clause of the amendatory provision. But for them the true test of the application of that clause to a locomotive, car, or similar vehicle would be, as it was under the original act, the use of the vehicle in moving interstate traffic. On the other hand, when they are given their natural signification, as presumptively they should be, the scope of the clause is such that the true test of its application is the use of the vehicle on a railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce, and not its use in moving interstate traffic. And so certain is this that we think there would be no...