Southern Ry. Co. v. Pruett

• Decision Date: 15 November 1917
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 900
• Citation: 77 So. 49,200 Ala. 675
• Parties: SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. PRUETT.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

77 So. 49

200 Ala. 675

SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. PRUETT.

7 Div. 900

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 15, 1917

Appeal from City Court of Anniston; Thomas W. Coleman, Jr., Judge.

Action by Mrs. W.A. Pruett against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Transferred from the Court of Appeals under Act April 18, 1911, p. 449, § 6. Reversed and remanded.

The case is stated in four counts. The first alleges that she was negligently informed by defendant's waiting woman that the west-bound train was the proper train for her to take. The second alleges that defendant's flagman negligently failed to inquire her destination, thereby negligently setting her aboard the wrong train. The third count alleges that after she discovered that she was on the wrong train defendant's employés refused to stop said train. The fourth is practically the same as the third. Plaintiff is a white woman about 25 years old, who went to Anniston from Jacksonville, Ala., and in attempting to return to Jacksonville that afternoon boarded the Southern Railway train going west instead of her train going to Jacksonville both trains reaching the station at the same time, and both being on time. Plaintiff testified that she had a conversation with the colored maid at the station who waits on the ladies, and that this colored maid told her in reply to a question that the train she took was her train, and that as she boarded the train, a man in uniform was standing near of whom she asked if that was a place to get on, and he replied, "Yes," and told her to turn to the right that when the conductor came to take up her ticket, she discovered she was on the wrong train, and notified the conductor and flagman both to stop the train and let her off but that they refused, and carried her on to Pell City, where she disembarked, and after an hour or two boarded the train coming back to Anniston, riding on a pass issued to her by the conductor of the west-bound train. She reached Anniston about 10 o'clock at night, and spent the night in the depot, and went on to Jacksonville the next morning. She testified the depot was not well heated. and that she suffered from cold during the night; that she had been well and strong before, but had not been well since that night. The maid at the depot testified that she had been employed by the Louisville & Nashville and had nothing to do with the Southern Railway. She testified further that the train to Jacksonville was a short local train with a small engine due at 3:55 p.m., while the other train was a long train with a large engine due at the same time, and that the trains were easily distinguished by any one who knew anything about them. The members of the crew of the train testified that they knew nothing about a passenger boarding their train to Jacksonville, until the conductor went to take up the tickets; that the west-bound train was a Birmingham special, and not scheduled to stop at any point between there and Pell City. The conductor on the east-bound train which brought plaintiff back to Anniston testified that he gave plaintiff a dollar and told her to use it either for hotel fare or taxi fare back to Jacksonville; that he introduced plaintiff to an employé of the Southern Railway Company who lived at Anniston; that he knew him to be a gentleman who would look after her in Anniston, and escort her to any place she desired to go. It is further shown that this train arrived at 7:45 p.m., and left at 7:48. It is without dispute that there were at least four respectable hotels in the city of Anniston at which plaintiff could have obtained lodgings for the night at prices ranging from 50 cents to a dollar; that one of these was just across the street from the depot; and that street cars ran from the depot to the hotels at regular intervals.

Knox, Acker, Dixon & Sterne, of Anniston, for appellant.

P.F. Wharton and T.C. Sensabaugh, both of Anniston, for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

The case made is well stated in brief by counsel for appellant. The reporter will set out the appropriate matter from the brief to constitute a statement of the facts.

Common carriers are responsible to their passengers as for injuries and damages suffered, proximately resulting from the negligence of the agents of the carrier while acting within the line and scope of their authority; but the carrier is not so liable as for injuries or damages suffered by the passengers, if such proximately result from the negligence or any willful act of the passenger. Notwithstanding the high degree of care which the law imposes upon common carriers, it does not hold them liable to passengers as for injuries and damages which are self-inflicted by the passengers. The maxim, "No one shall profit by his own wrong," finds illumination by such cases.

Railroads, the usual common carriers in this country, are not required by law to stop at times and at all stations for the reception or the emission of passengers It is therefore common knowledge that railroads may operate through trains which stop only at large or important towns and stations. Passengers are therefore under the duty to inquire and ascertain whether or not a particular train upon which they desire to travel stops at their desired destination; and if without such inquiry they board a train which does not stop at the desired station, they have no right to require the train to make their desired stop. Their misfortune is the result of their own negligence. But they may ride to the station nearest to their destination, at which the train does stop, paying the proper fare to such station of scheduled stop. If, however, the passenger does inquire of the proper agent for information as to whether or not the train he boards stops at his desired destination, and by such information he is misled to take the wrong train, he is not without remedy, because he is then not at fault, and may recover the damages suffered in consequence of the negligence or mistake of the carrier's agent. Mr. Hutchinson thus states the passenger's remedy in such cases:

"Where, however, he is misled by the acts or statements of the company or its agents into taking a train which does not stop at his destination, he is not without remedy. He cannot, indeed, insist that the conductor shall violate his instructions and stop the train at the place in question, nor can he insist upon remaining on the train after learning that it will not stop. His remedy in such a case is to leave the train and seek transportation by some other means, and then to recover of the company damages for the injury he has sustained by its breach of contract. He has not the right, however, though erroneous notions in this regard seem very generally to prevail, to aggravate his injury by refusing to leave and making the application of force necessary for his removal. He is now wrongfully upon the train, and whatever force is reasonably necessary and proper to eject him he himself invites, and he cannot recover damages for an injury thereby sustained, though he is still entitled to protection against unnecessary and wanton violence." Carriers, vol. 2 (3d Ed.) pp. 1228, 1229, § 1060.

These rules have been reaffirmed by this court in the cases of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Maxwell, 190 Ala. 47, 66 So. 669; McGhee v. Reynolds, 117 Ala. 413, 23 So. 68; Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carmichael, 90 Ala. 19, 8 So. 87, 9 L.R.A. 388; Manning v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 95 Ala. 392, 11 So. 8, 16 L.R.A. 55, 36 Am.St.Rep. 225; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Cornelius, 6 Ala. App. 386, 60 So. 740. This court, in Carmichael's Case, supra (90 Ala. 24, 8 So. 89 ), speaking through Stone, C.J., said:

"Railroads have the undoubted power to prescribe rules for the running of their trains. They not only have the power, but their highest duty demands that they exercise it. On this depend the safety of passengers, the safety of trains, and the preservation of vast property interests. The immense power and capacity of railroads for evil, as well as for good, render it of supreme importance that regulations be observed, and that trains run strictly on

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