Southern Ry Co v. Clift, 107
| Decision Date | 04 December 1922 |
| Docket Number | No. 107,107 |
| Citation | 67 L.Ed. 283,43 S.Ct. 126,260 U.S. 316 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. CLIFT |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. John D. Welman, of Evansville, Ind., and Alexander Pope Humphrey, of Louisville, Ky. (Messrs. L. E. Jeffries, of Washington, D. C., Edward P. Humphrey, of Louisville, Ky., and L. C. Embree, of Princeton, Ind., of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
[Argument of Counsel from page 317-318 intentionally omitted] Mr. T. Morton McDonald, of Princeton, Ind., for defendant in error.
The case is concerned with a statute of Indiana under which judgment was obtained against the railway company upon a claim for damage to property which it received for transportation within the state.
A motion is made by defendant in error to dismiss the writ of error; this court, it is contended, being without jurisdiction. The grounds of the motion are specified as follows: (1) The judgment, at the time the transcript was filed, had not become final. (2) It did not decide any federal question.
To sustain the first ground, it is said, that under the law of the state, within 60 days after the termination of the case by the Supreme Court, 'either party may file a petition for a rehearing.' From this it is deduced and contended that the successful as well as the unsuccessful party in the action may file a petition for rehearing, and that until the expiration of the time for the exercise of the right the judgment does not become final. The contention is curious. Legal procedure is a facility of rights, and rights achieved, its purpose is done. A successful litigant does not need the delay and provision of a rehearing. He has more efficient and enduring relief. His affiction may be solaced by not enforcing the victory which is the cause of it. The contention of defendant in error is so obviously untenable that further comment upon it would be the veriest supererogation.
In support of the second ground it is pointed out that the judgment to which the writ of error is directed was rendered on a second appeal and that the court decided that the decision 'on the first appeal is the law of the case.' It is hence asserted that it was res adjudicata and precluded dispute, and that therefore the decision rested upon an independent ground, not involving a federal question, and broad enough to maintain the judgment. For this Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Ellis, 144 U. S. 458, 464, 12 Sup. Ct. 724, 36 L. Ed. 504, is cited. That case does not determine this one. That case was constrained by the law of the state; such constraint does not exist in the present case. The constitutional question involved was considered and decided. The prior ruling may have been followed as the law of the case, but there is a difference between such adherence and res adjudicata. One directs discretion: the other supersedes it and compels judgment. In other words, in one it is a question of power, in the other of submission. Remington v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 198 U. S. 95, 99, 25 Sup. Ct. 577, 49 L. Ed. 959; Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436, 444, 32 Sup. Ct. 739, 56 L. Ed. 1152. The court in the present case, as we have said, considered the constitutional question presented and decided against it, and to review its decision is the purpose of this writ of error. The motion to dismiss is denied.
The merits of the case are concerned with the validity of a statute of the state of Indiana passed in 1911 (Acts 1911, c. 183), providing for the presentation of claims for loss or damage to freight transported wholly within the state.
A section of the act requires the claimant to present his claim within four months, and another section (section 3) prescribes the action and the time of action of the railroad company. It is as follows:
'That every claim for loss of or damage to freight transported wholly between points within the state of Indiana may be presented to the agent of the carrier who issued the receipt or bill of lading therefor or to the freight agent or representative of such carrier at the point of destination, or to any freight agent of any carrier in whose possession such freight was when lost or damaged, and when so presented shall be paid or rejected by such carrier within ninety days therefrom, and if neither paid nor rejected in whole or in part within such time, such claim shall stand admitted as a liability due and payable to the full amount thereof against any such carrier, and may be recovered in any court having competent jurisdiction.'
The assignments of error assail the quoted section as offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and in...
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Mobil Oil Corporation v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Civ. A. No. 71-230.
...law of the case is one of discretion, and the Court is convinced that departure is justified here. See Southern Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319, 43 S.Ct. 126, 67 L.Ed. 283 (1922). But in so departing the Court will not impose hundreds of thousands of dollars of penalty upon Mobil which ......
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Slowinski v. Valley Nat. Bank
...and compels judgment. In other words, in one it is a question of power, in the other of submission." Southern Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319, 43 S.Ct. 126, 127, 67 L.Ed. 283 (1922). "Law of the case" therefore operates as a discretionary rule of practice and not one of law. United Stat......
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Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers International Association 28 v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
...United States v. A.S. Kreider Co., 313 U.S. 443, 445-446, 61 S.Ct. 1007, 1009, 85 L.Ed. 1447 (1941); Southern R. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319, 43 S.Ct. 126, 127, 67 L.Ed. 283 (1922); Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912); 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas,......
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...an earlier appeal in the same case. Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 56 L.Ed. 1152;Southern Railway v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319, 43 S.Ct. 126, 67 L.Ed. 283;Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U.S. 103, 59 S.Ct. 420, 83 L.Ed. 515; Cochran v.......
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Table of Cases
...Ed. 2d 450 (1976): 21.3(1)(a) Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S. Ct. 895, 6 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1961): 24.8(1), 24.8(4) S. Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 43 S. Ct. 126, 67 L. Ed. 283 (1922): 27.3(2) Stewart v. Smith, 534 U.S. 157, 122 S. Ct. 1143, 151 L. Ed. 2d 592 (2001): 22.3(2) Strickland ......
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§ 27.3 State Court Judgment Must Be Final
...is not a prerequisite for seeking Supreme Court review. The decision of the Washington Supreme Court is final. S. Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 318-19, 43 S. Ct. 126, 67 L. Ed. 283 (1922). If a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the state Supreme Court by any party, or if the court......