Southern Ry. Co. v. Jackson County
| Decision Date | 25 July 1914 |
| Docket Number | 763 |
| Citation | 66 So. 570,189 Ala. 436 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. JACKSON COUNTY. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; W.W. Haralson, Judge.
Action between the Southern Railway Company and Jackson County. Judgment for the county, and the company appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Lawrence E. Brown, of Scottsboro, for appellant.
Bouldin & Wimberly, of Scottsboro, for appellee.
In the case of Gunter v. Hackworth, 62 So. 101, it was ruled, on the facts here exhibited, that the indebtedness of Jackson county is in excess of the limitations imposed by section 224 of the Constitution of 1901; and, further, that that county could not under those limitations incur any additional debt even for the erection of a courthouse which was necessary for county uses.
As stated by counsel in brief, the sole question presented by this appeal is: Can a county in this state, which has exceeded the debt limit placed upon it by the Constitution levy special taxes, in excess of the authorized general tax of one-half of one per centum, for the purpose of erecting a courthouse, and constructing public roads?
The authority to do so, if it exists, must be consistent with section 215 of the Constitution, which is as follows:
"No county in this state shall be authorized to levy a greater rate of taxation in any one year on the value of the taxable property therein than one-half of one per centum provided, that to pay debts existing on the 6th day of December, 1875, an additional rate of one-fourth of one per centum may be levied and collected which shall be appropriated exclusively to the payment of such debts and the interest thereon; provided further, that to pay any debt or liability now existing against any county, incurred for the erection, construction or maintenance of the necessary public buildings or bridges, or that may hereafter be created for the erection of the necessary public buildings, bridges or roads, (a) any county may levy and collect such special taxes not to exceed one-fourth of one per centum, as may have been or may hereafter be authorized by law, which taxes so levied and collected shall be applied exclusively to the purposes for which same were so levied and collected."
It will be observed that the special taxes thus authorized are for two purposes only: (1) To pay debts then (1901) already existing; and (2) to pay debts incurred in future for the objects specified.
The tax levies which appellant here challenges are not made for the payment of debts existing before the adoption of the Constitution of 1901; and, of course, they could not constitutionally be made for the payment of debts created after the debt limit of the county was reached.
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