Southern Ry. Co. v. Renes

• Decision Date: 22 April 1915
• Docket Number: 54
• Citation: 192 Ala. 620,68 So. 987
• Parties: SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. RENES.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

68 So. 987

192 Ala. 620

SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. RENES.

No. 54

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 22, 1915

On Rehearing, June 3, 1915

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; John H. Miller, Judge.

Action by John E. Renes against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Transferred from Court of Appeals under Acts 1911, p. 450, § 6.

Count 1 is as follows:

"Count 1. The plaintiff claims of the defendant $3,000 as damages, for that heretofore, on the 5th day of March 1913, plaintiff's minor son, Willis Renes, died in Philadelphia, Pa., and, heretofore, to wit, on the 6th day of March, 1913, plaintiff, being in said Philadelphia, caused said corpse to be sent to Washington, D.C., on the same train on which plaintiff traveled from said Philadelphia to Washington, and plaintiff paid to the defendant, who was a common carrier of passengers and of corpses, two full fares for the transportation by the defendant of himself and said corpse on the same train from said Washington to Birmingham Ala., and said corpse was tendered to defendant after plaintiff had paid said fares and in time for defendant to have taken and carried said corpse from said Washington to said Birmingham on the same train on which plaintiff was carried by defendant from said Washington to said Birmingham and defendant received said corpse under and by virtue of the payment of said fares, which plaintiff had paid, and undertook to carry same promptly to said Birmingham, but defendant did not carry said corpse promptly to said Birmingham, and as a proximate consequence thereof said corpse was not carried on said train upon which plaintiff left said Washington for said Birmingham, and plaintiff was caused to leave said train upon which he was being carried by defendant from said Washington to said Birmingham a long distance short of said Birmingham, to wit, at Charlotte N.C., where the plaintiff awaited said corpse, and plaintiff was put to great trouble, inconvenience, and expense in or about waiting for said corpse at said Charlotte, N.C., and to great trouble, inconvenience, and expense in or about bringing said corpse from said Charlotte to said Birmingham, and to great trouble, inconvenience, expense, vexation, annoyance, and harassment and great mental pain and anguish in or about the delay of said corpse, and in or about said corpse not being upon the same train upon which plaintiff left said Washington, and was prevented from showing the marks and tokens of respect and affection for his said deceased son, and was delayed a long time in getting said corpse to said Birmingham, and to his wife, the mother of said son, and suffered great mental pain and anguish, and great humiliation, vexation, harassment, and annoyance, and the funeral of said corpse and the burial thereof was greatly delayed.

"Plaintiff avers that defendant negligently conducted itself in or about carrying said corpse from said Washington to said Birmingham, and as a proximate consequence of said negligence plaintiff suffered said injuries and damage."

In support of this complaint complainant testified substantially as follows: His son died in a Philadelphia hospital, and he took passage with the corpse from the West Philadelphia station at 1:25 p.m. March 6th over the Pennsylvania Railroad on a train designated as the "Birmingham Special." Plaintiff bought two tickets just alike, for himself and the corpse, and the agent told him that this train would go straight through, and would arrive at Birmingham, his destination, at 4:45 p.m. the next day, and that the corpse would go through without changing cars. Plaintiff arrived at Washington about 5:30 or 6 p.m. and did not change cars, and his train left Washington over the Southern Railway in 10 or 15 minutes. As it was pulling out he saw a coffin on a truck standing on the ground, and, suspecting it was his son, he informed the conductor, who reported to him that his son's corpse was not on the train. He told plaintiff he would telegraph about it from Alexandria, Va., which he did, and then told plaintiff to get off at Charlotte, N.C., and wait for the coffin. Plaintiff got off at Charlotte about 5 a.m. next morning, and about 8, or 3 hours later, the corpse arrived, and was transferred in about half an hour to a local train to Atlanta, on which plaintiff accompanied it. At Atlanta they transferred to another train, and reached Birmingham somewhere near 11 p.m. March 7th. It appears that, if the Birmingham Special on which plaintiff embarked at Philadelphia had gone through on schedule time, it would have reached Birmingham at 4:45 p.m. March 7th. It appears also that plaintiff left Washington on the second section of Southern Railway train No. 29, and, had his journey not been interrupted, he would have reached Birmingham at 8:10 p.m. March 7th. By written instructions given for defendant the trial judge practically limited the damages recoverable to plaintiff's delay and lost time on the journey and mental suffering resulting from a temporary separation from the corpse. Defendant requested the affirmative charge. There was judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $1,000.

Stokely, Scrivner & Dominick, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Harsh, Beddow & Fitts, of Birmingham, for appellee.

SOMERVILLE J.

The gravamen of the complaint is that the defendant was negligent in transporting the corpse of plaintiff's son from Washington to Birmingham, in that it was not carried to its said destination on the same train with plaintiff, as was agreed to be done. This breach of duty is predicated on the allegation of the complaint that the "corpse was tendered to defendant after plaintiff had paid said fares and in time for defendant to have taken and carried" it on the same train upon which it carried plaintiff.

The fact that a through passage is sold over a receiving and connecting line does not show such a relation between the lines as to render the terminal line prima facie liable for any breach of contract or duty on the part of the receiving line. M. & W.P.R. Co. v. Moore, 51 Ala. 394; K.C., M. & B.R. Co. v. Foster, 134 Ala. 244, 255, 32 So. 773, 92 Am.St.Rep. 25; So. Ex. Co. v. Saks, 160 Ala. 621, 49 So. 392.

"The...