Southern Ry. Co. v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 07 May 1941
• Docket Number: No. 11609.,11609.
• Citation: 119 F.2d 85
• Parties: SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. STEWART.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

119 F.2d 85 (1941)

SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. STEWART.

No. 11609.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

April 14, 1941.

Rehearing Denied May 7, 1941.

Walter N. Davis and Arnot L. Shepard, both of St. Louis, Mo. (Wilder Lucas, of St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellant.

Charles M. Hay and William H. Allen, both of St. Louis, Mo. (Charles P. Noell, of St. Louis, Mo., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GARDNER, SANBORN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

GARDNER, Circuit Judge.

This was an action brought by the original appellee, Mary Stewart, widow of James R. Stewart, deceased, and the administratrix of his estate, to recover damages for injuries to and the alleged wrongful death of her husband while in the employ of appellant railroad company as a switchman. After the appeal had been perfected and was pending in this court, appellee Mary Stewart died, whereupon Clarence A. Stewart, as administrator of the estate of James R. Stewart, was substituted as appellee.

The action is bottomed upon the alleged violation of the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., and is brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Title 45 U.S.C.A. § 51. At the time of the accident resulting in the injury to and death of James R. Stewart, he was in the employ of the Southern Railway Company, a common carrier, as a switchman, working as a member of a switching crew in the yards of the defendant at East St. Louis, Illinois, and it is conceded that at the time of receiving his injuries he and the railway company were engaged in interstate transportation. It will be convenient to refer to the parties as they were designated in the lower court.

While engaged in coupling up certain cars on track 12, Stewart's arm was crushed by impact between the couplers of two cars which he was attempting to couple. He died two days later as the result of such injury. It was charged by the plaintiff that the defendant had violated the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, by furnishing on its line cars used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars. In addition to its general denial, the defendant pleaded affirmatively that the action had been compromised and settled for the sum of $5,000 and that plaintiff had executed a release and that the Probate Court of St. Clair County, Illinois, had made and entered its order approving such settlement. By way of reply, plaintiff admitted that the settlement had been made and had been approved by the Probate Court and that a release had been signed but that such settlement was procured by means of fraud and duress.

At the close of all the testimony defendant moved for a directed verdict upon substantially the following grounds: (1) There was no substantial evidence showing or tending to show that the defendant was guilty of any actionable negligence or want of duty as charged in the petition; (2) there was no substantial evidence that any want of duty of the defendant was the proximate cause of the fatal injury received by plaintiff's intestate; (3) it appears that plaintiff secured from the Probate Court of St. Clair County, Illinois, an order authorizing a settlement by her of all claims and demands on account of injuries to her deceased husband for the sum of $5,000, pursuant to which she had in fact settled and satisfied all claims and executed a release, and the order and judgment of the Probate Court of St. Clair County, Illinois, was not subject to collateral attack and was binding upon the plaintiff; (4) there was no substantial evidence showing or tending to show that the defendant, its agents or servants, were guilty of any actionable fraud or duress in procuring such settlement. The motion was denied and the court sent the case to the jury upon instructions to which certain exceptions were saved by the defendant. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $17,500, and thereafter defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, upon the grounds set out in the motion for a directed verdict and the further ground of error in the charge to the jury, besides other grounds not now material. The motion was denied and from the judgment entered defendant prosecutes this appeal.

We reversed on the ground that the court erred in instructing the jury, and remanded the case for a new trial. Southern Railway Co. v. Stewart, 8 Cir., 115 F. 2d 317. Both parties petitioned for a rehearing. The plaintiff, in its petition for rehearing, contended that the lower court had not erred in instructing the jury, while the defendant urged in its petition, that we should have sustained its contention with reference to the alleged error of the lower court in refusing to grant its motion for a directed verdict, contending that there was no substantial evidence that the deceased attempted to open the coupler knuckles by using the pin lifter, an appliance provided to operate the automatic coupler, before going between the ends of the cars which he was attempting to couple, and that there was no evidence that the coupler was defective. Upon reargument, defendant asserts two errors of the lower court: (1) The court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict, and (2) the court erred in instructing the jury on the questions of defendant's duty and proximate cause. On this reargument the question of the insufficiency of the evidence is brought sharply to our attention, and in our view of the record, it will only be necessary to consider that question.

The statute prohibits a common carrier from using or hauling "any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars." 45 U.S.C.A. § 2. The test of compliance with these requirements is the operating efficiency of the appliances with which the car is equipped. When a violation of the act is alleged as the basis of a cause of action for damages, the question is not simply whether the coupling device as originally installed conformed to the statutory requirements, or whether the carrier has exercised proper care in keeping it in condition to function efficiently, nor whether the equipment is defective in a general sense through the negligence of the carrier. It is generally held that a violation of the statute is shown by proof that cars upon a fair trial failed to couple automatically by impact. Neither of the parties here question these generally applicable tests. Having them in mind, we shall refer to the proof.

These couplers weigh some forty pounds each. When functioning properly, they will couple automatically by impact when either one or both couplers are open, but they will not couple automatically when both knuckles are closed. As one faces the end of a car properly equipped with automatic...