Southern Ry. Co. v. Williams

CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
Writing for the CourtDOWDELL, J.
Citation38 So. 1013,143 Ala. 212
Decision Date09 February 1905
PartiesSOUTHERN RY. CO. v. WILLIAMS.

38 So. 1013

143 Ala. 212

SOUTHERN RY. CO.
v.
WILLIAMS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 9, 1905


Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; Wm. W. Wilkerson, Judge.

Action by Allen Williams, as administrator of Sam Williams, deceased, against the Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

S. P. Bradley and Bowman, Harsh & Beddow, for appellee.

DOWDELL, J.

The appellee, Allen Williams, as administrator, sued the Southern Railway Company to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of plaintiff's intestate, one Sam Williams. The complaint contained five counts; the first four being predicated upon simple negligence, and the fifth upon intentional wrong. With this last count we have nothing to do, since no questions are raised on it. In each of the first four counts it is averred that the injury complained of occurred at the crossing of the defendant's railroad tracks with the tracks of another and different railroad. In the first and third counts the alleged negligence is averred as follows: "* * * And negligently crossed or allowed said train to run into or against a train upon the track of said other railroad at said crossing, so that said trains were derailed," etc., whereby, as a proximate consequence, etc., plaintiff's intestate, etc., was killed. In the second and fourth counts the alleged negligence is stated as follows: "* * * And the defendant negligently failed to cause said train to come to a full stop within 100 feet of said crossing, or negligently caused or allowed said train to proceed before the way was clear, and as a proximate consequence thereof said train collided with another train upon said crossing," etc., whereby, as a proximate consequence, etc., the plaintiff's intestate was killed. In the first and second counts it is averred that at the time of the alleged negligent act of the defendant, causing the injury complained of, the plaintiff's intestate "was near by, but not upon, the railroad upon which defendant was operating said train as aforesaid," etc. In the third count it is averred that the said injury was inflicted "while he [plaintiff's intestate] was in the act of crossing, or about to cross, the said railroad upon which defendant was operating said train as aforesaid"; while in the fourth count the averment is, "while he [plaintiff's intestate] was engaged in or about crossing the railroad upon which the defendant was operating said train as aforesaid." To the several counts of the complaint demurrers were interposed by the defendant, and the same were overruled by the court. Thereupon the defendant filed pleas numbered from 1 to 8 inclusive. Demurrers were sustained to the fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth. A trial was then had upon issue joined upon the other pleas, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the same being without conflict, the trial court, at the request of the plaintiff in writing, gave the jury the general charge, with hypothesis to find for the plaintiff, and refused a like charge requested by the defendant in its favor; also, the general charge as to each of the counts separately, except as to the fifth count, and as to which the general charge was given in favor of the defendant. Other charges were refused to the defendant, but they do not call for our consideration, not being insisted on in argument. As but one question is insisted on in argument by counsel for appellant, we need not consider the rulings of the court on the demurrers to the complaint and the pleas separately. The one question insisted on was sought to be raised by the demurrers, and on charges requested to the jury.

The facts, as shown by the undisputed evidence, were as follows: The defendant operated a railroad which intersected or crossed the Louisville & Nashville Railroad; the latter road running north and south, and the former east and west. Plaintiff's intestate was walking along a path on the east side of, and parallel with, and close to, the track of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, and going north to his place of business at the [38 So. 1014] Birmingham Fertilizer Works, which were located near the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, north of the crossing of the two railroads. When plaintiff's intestate approached the crossing, a freight train of the Louisville & Nashville, going north, was making the crossing; and, continuing his journey along the path, he passed over the track of the defendant company, and, according to the varying estimates of witnesses, had gone anywhere from 15 to 50 feet beyond defendant's track, when a train on defendant's road, going from west to east, ran into the Louisville & Nashville train, cutting the same in two parts, demolishing one of the cars, and derailing and turning...

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19 practice notes
  • Merchants' Bank v. Sherman, 1 Div. 403
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • December 16, 1926
    ...T.C.I. & R. Co. v. Smith, 171 Ala. 251, 255, 55 So. 170; Dwight Mfg. Co. v. Holmes, 198 Ala. 590, 73 So. 933; So. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 143 Ala. 212, 217, 38 So. 1013." The relation of privity of the parties and the declared purpose of the statute or public policy in the premises is that one......
  • Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jones
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • November 21, 1907
    ...to the plaintiff because she was a trespasser, no action will lie, for the duty must be to the person injured. So. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 143 Ala. 212, 38 So. 1013; O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N. D. 554, 75 N.W. 919, 41 L. R. A. 677. On the facts of the case and the principles of law ad......
  • Parchman v. Mobile & O. R. R. Co., 25437
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • May 24, 1926
    ...See, also, Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jones, 153 Ala. 157, 45 So. 177, following the decision in Southern Ry. v. Williams, 143 Ala. 212, 38 So. 1013. Furthermore, the prima-facie statute, section 1645, Hemingway's Code, does not apply in this case. The loaded car struck an empty c......
  • Alabama Power Co. v. Bass, 7 Div. 790
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • December 6, 1928
    ...zone of danger arising from collisions resulting from operating street cars at an excessive rate of speed. Southern Ry. Co. v. Williams, 143 Ala. 212, 38 So. 1013; A.G.S.R.R. Co. v. Chapman, 80 Ala. 615, 2 So. 738; Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Camp, 201 Ala. 4, 75 So. 290. The counts held def......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
19 cases
  • Merchants' Bank v. Sherman, 1 Div. 403
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • December 16, 1926
    ...T.C.I. & R. Co. v. Smith, 171 Ala. 251, 255, 55 So. 170; Dwight Mfg. Co. v. Holmes, 198 Ala. 590, 73 So. 933; So. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 143 Ala. 212, 217, 38 So. 1013." The relation of privity of the parties and the declared purpose of the statute or public policy in the premises is that one......
  • Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jones
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • November 21, 1907
    ...to the plaintiff because she was a trespasser, no action will lie, for the duty must be to the person injured. So. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 143 Ala. 212, 38 So. 1013; O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N. D. 554, 75 N.W. 919, 41 L. R. A. 677. On the facts of the case and the principles of law ad......
  • Parchman v. Mobile & O. R. R. Co., 25437
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • May 24, 1926
    ...See, also, Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jones, 153 Ala. 157, 45 So. 177, following the decision in Southern Ry. v. Williams, 143 Ala. 212, 38 So. 1013. Furthermore, the prima-facie statute, section 1645, Hemingway's Code, does not apply in this case. The loaded car struck an empty c......
  • Alabama Power Co. v. Bass, 7 Div. 790
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • December 6, 1928
    ...zone of danger arising from collisions resulting from operating street cars at an excessive rate of speed. Southern Ry. Co. v. Williams, 143 Ala. 212, 38 So. 1013; A.G.S.R.R. Co. v. Chapman, 80 Ala. 615, 2 So. 738; Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Camp, 201 Ala. 4, 75 So. 290. The counts held def......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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