Southern Ry. Co. v. Bates

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: THOMAS, J.
• Citation: Southern Ry. Co. v. Bates, 194 Ala. 78, 69 So. 131 (Ala. 1915)
• Decision Date: 23 April 1915
• Docket Number: 834
• Parties: SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. BATES.

69 So. 131

194 Ala. 78

SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. BATES.

No. 834

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 23, 1915

Rehearing Denied June 3, 1915

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; W.W. Haralson, Judge.

Action by W.M. Bates against the Southern Railway Company for injuries while on its premises. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Transferred from the Court of Appeals of Alabama under section 6, Act April 18, 1911 (Gen.Acts 1911, p. 450).

Count 2 is as follows: After describing plaintiff and defendant, and stating the time and place, it avers plaintiff went upon the cotton platform of defendant at its depot at Leighton, Ala by consent and invitation of defendant's servants or agents, and when he started to leave said platform he stepped upon the front steps leading from said platform, and they fell with plaintiff. Then follows catalogue of injuries suffered. And plaintiff avers that his injuries resulted from and were proximately caused by defendant in permitting or allowing said steps to be and remain insecurely and defectively attached to said platform.

The demurrers raise the proposition that the complaint shows that plaintiff was a trespasser at the time of the accident, and charges no more than simple negligence, and that it does not appear that plaintiff's injury was due to any breach of duty which defendant or his employé owes plaintiff, or that he was at a place and in a position where the law imposed upon defendant the duty of keeping its premises in a safe condition for his protection.

The following charges were refused to defendant:

(1) The affirmative charge.

(5) Under the undisputed evidence in this case, plaintiff was unlawfully upon defendant's premises, and defendant owed him no duty, except not to injure him wantonly or intentionally.

(Y) Plaintiff in no event can recover anything more than a nominal amount for the loss of his time and expense attending his illness.

(Z) No authority given to use said platform would bind the company to keep said steps in good condition for one who was not there for business in connection with the company, or in connection with the shipment of cotton or other freight.

(U) If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff went upon the platform to talk with Mr. Lindsey on the invitation of Mr. Lindsey as to a land transaction with Mr. Starkey, and defendant had no connection with that transaction, then plaintiff was not there on any express or implied invitation of defendant, and as a matter of law defendant had the right to request plaintiff to leave the platform.

Lawrence E. Brown, of Scottsboro, for appellant.

Milo Moody, of Scottsboro, and S.S. Pleasants, of Huntsville, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

Appellee went from Scottsboro with one Starkey to see a Mr. Lindsey, a merchant and cotton buyer at Leighton, in regard to the purchase of some land. Lindsey was on the platform erected and maintained by appellant near its combination freight and passenger depot, where he was engaged in marking and weighing his cotton delivered for shipment over appellant's railroad; and he requested appellee to come onto the depot platform, to talk with him of a business matter as he shipped his cotton. The cotton platform was about five feet high and was entered upon by one set of steps. By these steps appellee and Mr. Starkey ascended; and after speaking with Lindsey appellee started from the platform, and, as he placed his right foot on the top step, the steps gave way and he was thrown to the ground, sustaining serious physical injury.

A large quantity of cotton was handled, before and at the time, out of Leighton, and all of it was shipped by way of appellant's railway line. The delivery was upon this platform, and when appellant's agent was notified that cotton was ready for shipment, he came from his office at the depot, checked over the cotton, and issued to the shipper bills of lading therefor. The witness King, in response to the question by the plaintiff, "Tell the jury how the platform was used; what was it used for?" answered:

"To weigh cotton; to buy cotton on. We frequently buy cotton on the platform. *** I saw Mr. Lindsey that day buying cotton on the platform and getting it ready for shipment. Permission was not gotten from any one because all the cotton that went upon that platform was to be shipped. The bill of lading was gotten from the agent in the office in the depot. He would come out on the platform and count the cotton if he thought it was necessary. The public generally went on that platform to weigh cotton."

Witness was then asked, "To what extent was that platform used along about that time by the public?" and he answered:

"We weigh and mark all the cotton handled at that point on that platform. *** I don't know how many people I saw on the platform that day Bates was injured; my recollection is that it was a pretty busy day. Lindsey was there buying cotton, and I was there buying cotton, and there were three or four others, and a big day like that there is a good many men on the platform. Sometimes we have a dozen, sometimes maybe 40; a busy day like that, there might have been 30 or 40 men, and there might not have been more than 20."

The evidence further showed that it was and had been the custom to place cotton on the platform for shipment, and that the agent only checked up the cotton and issued bills of lading therefor, when the same was ready for shipment; that Mr Bibb, appellant's agent at Leighton, was on the platform "loading cotton nearly every day"; and one witness stated that:

"During the cotton season the agent was on the platform several times a day. He would come up the steps."

The last-mentioned witness also testified that not very long before Bates was hurt the agent helped witness down off that platform and told him the steps were loose, to look out; that on the day of appellee's injury the steps were broken loose from the platform and just set up there, and had been that way several days.

The evidence showed that many wagons had approached the platform in the delivery of cotton, during the season, before the accident in question, and that they frequently ran against the steps and knocked them loose from the platform, and that at the time of the accident the steps were not fastened to the platform with sufficient security to prevent them from falling when appellee stepped upon them.

The appellant offered a diagram, made a part of the bill of exceptions, showing that this shipping platform was located 100 feet from the main depot and along its tracks, that it was 75 by 100 feet in area, and that it was approached on one side by the railroad track, and on the other by the street or public road. This structure was a part of the depot facilities for receiving and shipping cotton over appellant's road. The evidence is without conflict that Mr. Bibb, the agent of the railway company at the time of the accident, was not on or about the platform where Mr. Bates was injured.

Was appellee, at the time of the injury, a trespasser, or was he a person for whose protection and safety, while a visitor, the company was bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the maintenance of its premises?

There was no error in overruling defendant's objections to the several questions asked the witness King. An owner may, without protest or objection, permit his premises to be used by the public so long and in such manner as that they may reasonably presume that he will give some warning or notice of any change in the condition thereof which would render unsafe a continuance of such use. If, under such circumstances, and with knowledge of the same, he should place or leave some dangerous structure or instrument or defect in the way, building, platform, or premises so used, from which he might reasonably apprehend danger or injury to those accustomed to such use, he could not claim exoneration from liability in case injury should occur. The law imposes a duty on him to keep his premises in a safe and suitable condition for those who are permitted to come there. Harriman v. Railway Co., 45 Ohio St. 11, 12 N.E. 451, 4 Am.St.Rep. 507; Bellefontaine v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399, 98 Am.Dec. 175; Barry v. N.T.C. Co., 92 N.Y. 289, 44 Am.Rep. 377; Davis v. C. & W. Co., 58 Wis. 646, 17 N.W. 406, 46 Am.Rep. 667; Bransom v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638, 50 Am.Rep. 193; 1 Addison on Torts, 511; Thompson on Neg. 305; Graves v. Thomas, 95 Ind. 361, 48 Am.Rep. 727; Campbell v. Boyd, 88 N.C. 129, 43 Am.Rep. 740.

The rule is illustrated by many English courts, and it may be well to examine some of them. The decision in the early case of Corby v. Hill, 4 C.B. (N.S.) 556, 562, is placed on the ground of an implied invitation. And it is noteworthy that Willes, J., suggesting the necessary averments in a declaration in such cases, wholly omits any mention of an invitation, implied or otherwise. The justice concludes his opinion by the statement:

"The defendant has no right to set a trap for the plaintiff. One who comes on another's land by the owner's permission or invitation has a right to expect that the owner will not dig a pit thereon, or permit another to dig a pit thereon, so that persons lawfully coming there may receive injury."

In the later case of Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503, it is said that:

"A more accurate and satisfactory ground of recovery, embracing all cases of implied invitation, is to be found in the proposition that whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary prudence would recognize that, if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to these circumstances, he might cause danger or injury to the person or property of the other, a duty

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