Southern Ry. Co v. Russell

• Decision Date: 15 June 1922
• Citation: 112 S.E. 700
• Parties: SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. RUSSELL.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

112 S.E. 700

SOUTHERN RY. CO.

v.RUSSELL.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

June 15, 1922.

Error to Law and Equity Court of City of Richmond.

Action by one Russell, Trustee, etc., against the Southern Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff after an appeal by defendant from a judgment for plaintiff rendered in a Civil Justice's Court, defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Munford, Hunton, Williams & Anderson, of Richmond, for plaintiff in error.

H. W. Goodwyn, of Richmond, for defendant in error.

BURKS, J. This action originated in a warrant in the civil justice's court of the city of Richmond. The civil justice's court rendered a judgment against the railway company for $100 and the costs, from which judgment the railway company appealed to the law and equity court of the city of Richmond. In the latter court there was a trial de novo before a jury, and a verdict and judgment against the railway company for $90 and interest and costs. To that judgment the writ of error in this case was awarded.

The action was to recover for damages to a carload of watermelons shipped from a point in Georgia to the consignees in Richmond, Va. The rights and liabilities of the parties, therefore, are not affected by section 3926 of the Code, applicable to shipments originating in this state. The watermelons arrived in bad condition, and in order to recover it was necessary for the plaintiff to show, either directly or indirectly, that they were received in good condition. This he undertook to do by showing that they were delivered to the initial carrier in good condition. If they were so delivered, there was a presumption that they were in like good condition when received by the delivering carrier, and it was liable notwithstanding the provisions of the Carmack Amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8604a, S604aa).

In Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Whitnack Produce Co. (April 10, 1922) 257 U. S.—42 Sup. Ct 328, 66 L. Ed. —, it is said:

"While this court has not expressly approved it, we think the common-law rule, supported both by reason and authority, is correctly stated in section 1348, Hutchinson on Carriers (3d Ed.):

" 'A connecting carrier, who has completed the transportation and delivered the goods to the consignee in a damaged condition or deficient in quantity, will be held liable in an action for the damage or deficiency, without proof that it was occasioned by his fault, unless he can show that he received them in the condition in which he has delivered them. The condition and quantity of the goods when they were delivered to the first of the connecting carriers being shown, the presumption will wise that they continued in that condition down to the time of their delivery to the carrier completing the transportation and making the delivery to the consignee, and that the injury or loss occurred while they were in his possession.' * * *

"The petitioner insists that this common-law rule conflicts with the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 595, which requires issuance of a through bill of lading by initial carrier and declares it liable for damages occurring anywhere along the route, as interpreted and applied by this court. But we find no inconsistency between the amendment or any other federal legislation and the challenged rule. Properly understood, Charleston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597, especially relied upon, gives no support to the contrary view. * * *

"Here there is no question of conflict between a state statute and any federal policy; and nothing in the words of the amendment indicates a legislative purpose to abrogate the accepted common-law doctrine concerning presumption. The suggestion that by imposing additional liability upon the initial carrier the amendment provides an adequate remedy for shippers and thereby removes the necessity forany presumption against the terminal one and impliedly abrogates the rule, is unsound. There are adequate reasons why shippers should have the benefit of both; and we think Congress so intended."

The plaintiff filed the affidavit of the consignor, as authorized by section 3 of an act of Assembly approved March 16, 1918. Acts 1918, p. 467, c. 291. This act amended a previous act of March 24. 1914. Acts 1914, p. 426, c. 250. The only difference between these two acts is that the act of 1914 permitted the use of the affidavit only where the amount involved did not exceed $25, and the act of 1918 increased the amount involved to $300. The section permitting the use of the affidavit was first inserted in the statute by the act of 1914, but this act was itself an amendment of an act approved February 29, 1908. Acts 1908, p. 143, c. 116. The validity of the last-mentioned act is in no way assailed, but, on the contrary, is expressly admitted. The use of the affidavit in the instant case is authorized solely by virtue of section 3 of the act aforesaid of 1918.

The judgment in the civil justice's court was rendered August 20, 1919, before the Code of 1919 took effect. There was an appeal to the law and equity court of the city of Richmond, where the case was tried de novo and a verdict rendered April 15, 1920, after the Code took effect. But the enactments of the session of 1918, so far as they vary from or conflict with the Code, are deemed to be subsequent to the Code. Section 6568 of the Code. The act of 1914 was carried into the Code as section 3928, but with some changes in the phraseology and omitting the clause with reference to the affidavit. The rights and liabilities of the parties, therefore, are determinable by the act of 1918, which amended the act of March, 1914.

It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that the act of 1918 violates section 52 of the Constitution of this state, declaring that "no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." It is conceded in the petition for the writ of error that "the sole question involved is whether the court erred in permitting the plaintiff to introduce in evidence an affidavit for the purpose of showing the condition of the shipment when it was delivered to the initial carrier. The answer to this question depends upon the constitutionality of" the act aforesaid of March 16, 1918. It is conceded also that, as this is an amendatory act, if the title of the original act is sufficient to embrace the matters covered by the provisions of the act amendatory thereof, it is unnecessary to inquire whether the title of the amendatory act would of itself be sufficient. Iverson Brown's Case, 91 Va. 762, 21 S. E. 357, 28 L. R. A. 110. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire whether the title of the original act or of the amendatory act is sufficient The titles of these several acts are as follows:

1908. "An act to regulate the time and manner in which common carriers doing business in this state shall adjust and pay just freight charges, and claims for loss or damage to freight and claims for storage, demurrage and car service."

1914. "An act to amend and re-enact an act entitled an act to regulate the time and manner in which common carriers doing business in this state shall adjust and pay just freight charges, and claims for loss or damage to freight and claims for storage, demurrage and car service, approved February 29, 1908."

1918. "An act to amend and re-enact an act to regulate the time and manner in which common carriers doing business in this state shall adjust and pay just freight charges and claims for loss or damage to freight, and claims for storage, demurrage, and car service, approved March 24, 1914."

As practically the same descriptive language is used in all three acts, we need only inquire: Is the title of the original act of 190S broad enough to cover the provisions of section 3 of the amendatory act of 1918?

We have so often laid down the rules for the construction of the language of section 52 of the Constitution that there is practically nothing left to be said on the subject.

In Town of Narrows v. Giles County, 128 Va. 572, 582, 583, 105 S. E. 82, 85, one of the latest cases on the subject, it is said:

"The constitutional provision was never intended to hamper honest legislation, nor to require that the title should be an index or digest of the various provisions of the act, and it is rare that the generality of the title is a valid objection thereto. The fact that many things of a diverse nature are authorized or required to be done in the body of the act, though not expressed in its title is not objectionable, if what is authorized by the act is germane to the object expressed in the title, or has a legitimate and natural association therewith, or is congruous therewith, the title is sufficient. This subject is fully discussed by Judge Riely in Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Va. 762, 21 S. E. 357, 28 L. R. A. 110. See, also, Ingles v. Straus. 91 Va. 209, 21 S. E. 490; Commonwealth v. Willcox, 111 Va. 849, 69 S. E. 1027: Commonwealth v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 118 Va. 261, 87 S. E. 622; Cochran v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 801. 94 S. E. 329; Luchesi v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 872, 94 S. E. 925, and cases cited. Furthermore, if there is doubt as to the sufficiency of the title, the doubt must be resolved in favor of its sufficiency, as courts will not declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional unless it is plainly so. City of Roanoke v. Elliott, 123 Va. 393, 96 S. E. 819. and cases cited. Of course the title must not be made a cover for surreptitious or incongruous legislation, nor be such as to mislead the Legislature or the people, but should fairly state the general subject covered by the body of the act. Powell v. Supervisors, 88 Va. 707, 14 S. E. 543.

Subject to these limitations, the generality of the title...