Southern Title Research Company v. King
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | BARNS, PAUL D., Associate |
| Citation | Southern Title Research Company v. King, 186 So.2d 539 (Fla. App. 1966) |
| Decision Date | 23 May 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 281.,281. |
| Parties | SOUTHERN TITLE RESEARCH COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. Jimmie KING, a/K/a Jimmy King, and Almetta King, His Wife, et al., Appellees. |
Samuel L. Heller, or Johnson & Heller, Ft. Lauderdale, for appellant.
Elton H. Schwarz, Stuart, for appellees.
BARNS, PAUL D., Associate Judge.
This is an appeal by the original plaintiff to a suit to quiet title. From a final summary decree, on motion made by the defendants, granting affirmative relief, the plaintiff brought this appeal. We affirm.
The appellant's assignments of error consist of four pages, but in effect it has designated only two judicial acts as error, viz., (1) the setting aside and vacating of a summary final decree in favor of the plaintiff, and (2) the granting of the summary final decree in favor of the defendant — Kings.
On February 17, 1964, the Southern Title Research Company, appellant-plaintiff (being the grantee in a tax deed issued by the clerk of the circuit court on September 9, 1963, based on tax certificate #14), brought a suit to quiet title against King, the owner at the time of the issuance of the tax deed, and Howard Miller, a mechanic's lien claimant. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and plaintiff filed a motion for summary final decree. The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff's motion for summary final decree on April 14, 1964, which motion was not defended.
Prior to the commencement of quiet title suit, Southern Title brought a dispossessory proceeding against King for possession of the property (under § 194.54, F.S.A.), which action was not defended, and a writ for possession to Southern Title was issued on January 27, 1964, and executed on January 28, 1964, by placing Southern Title in possession.
On May 15, 1964, Southern Title effected a sale of the property to Louise D. Lewis at a sales price of $6,900.00, 10% of which was paid in cash and the balance evidenced by a purchase money mortgage given in exchange for a warranty deed, the transaction being consummated on May 25, 1964.
Thereafter, on May 29, 1964, King's attorney served a motion to vacate the summary final decree of April 14, 1964, quieting title in Southern Title, which motion was granted by an order of June 22, 1964, setting aside the final decree for reasons of mistake and excusable neglect, after taking testimony.
WAS IT ERROR TO VACATE PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY FINAL DECREE OF APRIL 14, 1964?
The motion to vacate plaintiff's summary final decree was filed and served on May 29, 1964, which is 45 days after its entry but within the time permitting an appeal. Among other matters, a basic factor for vacating the summary final decree was that (a) On March 22, 1961, the defendant King went to the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Martin County to redeem all outstanding tax certificates on the real property which is the subject of this suit. He paid the clerk $63.95 and received a receipt certifying his redemption of certificate #43, dated June 1, 1960. There was also outstanding at that time certificate #14, dated June 1, 1959, for which the sum of $51.66 would have been necessary for redemption.
Another basic factor for vacating plaintiff's summary final decree was that (b) the holder of said tax certificate #14 subsequently filed it with the clerk's office and brought about a sale of the property on September 2, 1963 (Labor Day). At the sale plaintiff herein was the purchaser. Defendant appeared at the courthouse that afternoon, but, as it was a legal holiday, the clerk's office was closed. Defendant returned on September 3, 1963, and sought to redeem the property. Notwithstanding the fact that the tax deed had not been issued, the clerk refused to permit redemption. Subsequently, on September 9, 1963, a tax deed was issued to plaintiff and filed and recorded in the office of the circuit court.
The substantive law applicable to the situation as stated in the preceding paragraph (as stated by the chancellor) seems to be as follows:
Section 194.02(1), Florida Statutes (1963), F.S.A., specifically provides that redemption may be made after sale and before a tax deed is issued. The affidavit of the clerk shows that application was made by defendants for redemption after sale and before the deed issued. Accordingly, it appears that the clerk's office erred twice in this matter, once, when it failed to find the second outstanding tax certificate and permit its redemption at the time the other certificate was redeemed in 1961, and, secondly, when it refused to permit redemption after the tax deed sale and before the issuance of the tax deed.
In Golden v. Grady, 1948, 160 Fla. 348, 34 So.2d 877 at page 879, the Supreme Court stated:
"* * * when the owner of an interest in land applies in good faith to the proper officer to pay his taxes and is prevented from doing so by the mistake, wrong, or fault of the officer, such an attempt is equivalent to tender, at least so far as to invalidate any subsequent sale of the property for such taxes."
Again in Helseth v. Cleveland Trust Company, Fla. 1950, 49 So.2d 91, the court held that where owners made a bona fide effort to pay their taxes, were at all times diligent in doing so, and would have done so at the time in question except for the mistake of the taxing officer, a tax deed would be cancelled on condition that reimbursement be made to the tax deed grantee of the amounts paid out for taxes, clerk's fee in securing the tax deed, paving, and other improvements on the property.
The Kings are of the Negro race; the husband is a mechanic and can read some, but he depends upon his wife for the full import of written matter. He attempted to redeem his property from the tax sale before the tax deed was issued, and, when he was told by the clerk of the circuit court that he had "lost his property", he accepted her statement and fully relied upon it because of her office and official position, until he was referred to his present attorney to whom he exhibited his tax receipt received from the clerk of the circuit court and who then discovered the true state of facts as cited in (a) and (b), supra.
Section 192.48(1), F.S.A., provides that former owners of land lost by the Murphy Act "shall have and are hereby allowed a period of one year from the time a deed of any such lands by the trustees of the internal improvement trust fund is recorded * * * to bring suit to recover said land * * * or to set aside sale by the said trustees * * *." Paragraph (2) of said section 192.48 applicable to other tax sales provides:
"The provisions of this section shall apply to any deed hereafter executed pursuant to any tax foreclosure or tax forfeiture to satisfy a tax lien and to any deed executed by the state, county, municipality, drainage district, or other taxing unit conveying or purporting to convey any real estate, title to which is claimed pursuant to any tax foreclosure, tax forfeiture, or any other proceeding to satisfy a tax lien, in the same manner and to the same extent as this section applies to a deed executed by the trustees of the internal improvement trust fund as referred to in subsection (1) hereof."
Rule 1.38(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A., provides for relief from a final decree on motion for reasons of "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial or rehearing * * *." This rule requires that, when relief is sought by motion for these reasons, it shall be made "within a reasonable time", but not later than "one year" (Emphasis added.)
The language of our Civil Procedure Rule 1.38(b) is taken from Rule 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the federal courts have construed the federal rule 60(b) to permit the court, under appropriate circumstances, to reopen final judgments in the absence of a timely motion under the ten-day rule permitting motions for new trial or rehearing. When the motion is made within the time permitted to appeal, this factor adds weight to a motion otherwise showing merit. In Sleek v. J.C. Penney Company, 292 F.2d 256 at page 258 (3d Cir.), the court states:
Relief from judgments under our Rule 1.38(b), as under Federal Rule 60(b), depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion as applied to the facts and circumstances. In McDowell...
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...36, 23 So. 591 (1898) concerns the issue of whether service of new process was required on an appeal; and Southern Title Research Company v. King, 186 So.2d 539 (Fla.4th DCA 1966) involves the question of whether one who purchased real property before the time for an appeal expired would be......
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Taylor Indus. Constr., Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co.
...an appeal expires. If an appeal is taken, the action is still pending until final disposition.") (citing Southern Title Research Co. v. King, 186 So.2d 539, 544-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966)). Taylor's Motion to Require Additional Security was filed only 15 days after the final judgment was entere......
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...expired or if an appeal has been taken the action remains pending until a final determination of the appeal. Southern Title Research Company v. King, Fla.App.1966, 186 So.2d 539. Rilcoff v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 1942, 50 Cal.App.2d 503, 123 P.2d 540. An appeal is not the com......