Southern Union Co. v. Lynch

• Decision Date: 18 June 2004
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 02-405S.
• Citation: 321 F.Supp.2d 328
• Parties: SOUTHERN UNION COMPANY d/b/a New England Gas Company, Plaintiff, v. Patrick LYNCH, in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, and The Bureau of Pipefitters and Refrigeration Technicians, Fire Protection Sprinkler Contractors and Journeypersons, Sprinkler Fitters, Sheet Metal Contractors and Journeypersons, Sheet Metal Workers, and Oil Heat Contractors, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

321 F.Supp.2d 328

SOUTHERN UNION COMPANY d/b/a New England Gas Company, Plaintiff, v. Patrick LYNCH, in his capacity as Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, and The Bureau of Pipefitters and Refrigeration Technicians, Fire Protection Sprinkler Contractors and Journeypersons, Sprinkler Fitters, Sheet Metal Contractors and Journeypersons, Sheet Metal Workers, and Oil Heat Contractors, Defendants.

C.A. No. 02-405S.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

June 18, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert P. Brooks, W. James McKay, Michael D. Chittick, Jeffrey K. Techentin, Adler Pollock & Sheehan, Providence, RI, for plaintiff.

Anne T. Turilli, Joseph R. Gaeta, Office of the Attorney General of RI, Providence, RI, Valentino D. Lombardi, RI Division of Labor and Training, Cranston, RI, for defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

SMITH, District Judge.

The State of Rhode Island (State) requires that all pipefitters possess a "PJF/Natural Gas Service Journeyperson II, Ltd." license (License) to perform any pipefitting work in a residence within the State. Plaintiff New England Gas Company (NEG or Plaintiff), a public utility company that provides natural gas services to Rhode Island residents, performs work on gas lines that are located both inside and outside its customers' homes. In this case, Plaintiff challenges the State's right to require NEG's employees to obtain a License in order to perform certain job functions that take such employees into customers' homes.

Before the Court are the following motions: (1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) NEG's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (3) Defendants'"Motion to Dismiss" Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c); and (4) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Based on Abstention, or in the Alternative for Certification of Questions of State Law. On October 10, 2003, the Court heard oral argument on these motions and requested that the parties submit omnibus memoranda summarizing all of their respective contentions. These were filed on November 10, 2003. For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses Counts II and III without prejudice on Eleventh Amendment grounds and grants summary judgment for Plaintiff as to Count I.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges that it has an exclusive franchise with respect to natural gas delivery in Rhode Island and is regulated by the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (PUC), and the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (DPUC). The Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT), an agency of the State, maintains that workers performing certain activities in the natural gas system in Rhode Island must obtain the License, which is set forth in the "Pipefitters Act," R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-27-1, et seq. The DLT's Rules and Regulations describe the License in these relevant terms:

Limited to installing headers and reconnection of gas service to existing equipment and related piping. Service work on natural gas burners and service of appliances and warm air heating equipment, which are fueled by natural gas.... Applicants for a [License] must show proof of completion of a trade sponsored program or a trade related program offered by a recognized college. All programs must be approved by the [DLT]. The minimum formal training period for the [License] shall be two hundred and twenty (220) hours of combined classroom and laboratory technical training, approved by the [DLT].... The [License] is limited to service work on natural gas burners — not to exceed 500,000 BTU's residential, and 500,000 BTU's commercial.

Pl. Omnibus Mem. at Ex. A, p. 20.

In May 2002, Defendants sued in Rhode Island Superior Court, Providence County, to enjoin Plaintiff's employees from operating without the License, see Whitehouse v. Southern Union Co., C.A. No. 02-2329, but that action (for reasons the parties do not make clear) was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice.

In August 2002, new regulations were promulgated under the Act, Plaintiff asserts on an emergency basis and without public notice and comment (New Regulations). The New Regulations expressly require Plaintiff's workers to obtain the License.

Plaintiff claims: (I) federal preemption of the Pipefitters Act by certain provisions of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60101, et seq. (NGPSA), and the USDOT's regulations thereunder, 49 C.F.R. § 192; (II) state preemption of the Pipefitters Act by Rhode Island's Public Utilities Commission Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 39-1-1, et seq.; (III) exemption under a provision of the Pipefitters Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-27-29; (IV) invalidity of the New Regulations under the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-3; (V) violation of the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution; and (VI) invalidity of the Pipefitters Act for vagueness. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as to all Counts, but Counts IV, V, and VI were dismissed by stipulation without prejudice because the State has enacted new regulations which make these Counts moot. This leaves Counts I, II, and III for resolution.

II. Standards of Review

Both parties move for summary judgment, Defendants in toto and Plaintiff in part. Defendants also move for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) and on theories of Eleventh Amendment immunity and abstention. The Court must apply different standards of review to each set of motions.

Rule 56(c) states that a party shall be entitled to summary judgment

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002); Mesnick v. General Electric Co., 950 F.2d 816, 820 (1st Cir.1991); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990).

By contrast, in reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion, a court must accept all of the non-movant's well-pleaded factual averments as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988); see Int'l Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, 928 F.2d 480, 482 (1st Cir.1991). The court may not grant a Rule 12(c) motion unless it appears beyond a doubt that the non-movant can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim or defense which would entitle the movant to prevail thereon. Rivera-Gomez, 843 F.2d at 635; see Int'l Paper Co., 928 F.2d at 482-83.

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and various federal abstention doctrines and other theories of justiciability immunize Defendants from this lawsuit. These questions necessarily antecede an examination of the merits of Plaintiff's preemption claims.

A. The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Rule

The Eleventh Amendment¹ "renders a State `immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State,' unless the State expressly waives the immunity or Congress abrogates it." De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir.1991) (citations omitted). The Plaintiff has not contested that the State is the "real, substantial party in interest" in this case. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945). There consequently is no dispute that this lawsuit, although nominally against Attorney General Lynch in his official capacity and two State agencies, is "against the State" for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See O'Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41, 47 n. 5 (1st Cir.2000) (in the absence of any argument to the contrary, court assumed that state agency was an arm of the state).

As noted at the outset, Counts II and III of the Complaint advance state law-based theories and request injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the theory undergirding Count I, federal preemption, raises a federal question. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), the Supreme Court held that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prohibits federal courts from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law. This jurisdictional bar applies where, as here, state law claims have been brought into federal court utilizing this Court's supplemental jurisdiction. Id. at 121, 104 S.Ct. 900. It also "applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought." Id. at 100, 104 S.Ct. 900 (citing Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27, 54 S.Ct. 18, 78 L.Ed. 145 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as well as at law, the [Eleventh] Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual against a State.")).

Notwithstanding the statements in Fiske and Pennhurst, Plaintiff alleges that neither Pennhurst nor any subsequent First Circuit authority explicitly extends the Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional bar to private actions against states for declaratory relief. Pl. Omnibus Mem. at 48. Therefore, Plaintiff asks this Court to apply the Pennhurst rule only insofar as Counts II and III request injunctive relief.

It is true that neither the First Circuit nor the Supreme Court has expressly addressed, in anything other than dicta, the application of the Pennhurst rule to actions for declaratory relief. Pennhurst itself...