Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School Dist. v. Labor Relations Com'n

Decision Date03 June 1982
Citation386 Mass. 414,436 N.E.2d 380
Parties, 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3618, 4 Ed. Law Rep. 1228 SOUTHERN WORCESTER COUNTY REGIONAL VOCATIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Jean Strauten Driscoll, Boston, for defendant.

James F. Cosgrove, Worcester, for plaintiff.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

We granted the Labor Relations Commission's (commission) application for further appellate review to set out the legal standard and burden of proof which should govern unlawful discharge cases arising under G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a )(1) & (3). 1 We also consider the remedial powers of the commission pursuant to G.L. c. 150E, § 11. We hold that the commission may determine that a discharge violates G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a )(1) & (3), if it is proved that the employee would not have been discharged but for his protected activity. In addition, we think that the employee must bear the ultimate burden of persuading the commission that his discharge was unlawful. We also hold that the remedial powers of the commission include the power to direct a school committee to reinstate a teacher even if the reinstatement means that a teacher will attain tenure. 2

We summarize the facts: Serving the towns of Auburn, Charlton, Dudley, Oxford, Southbridge, and Webster, the Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School District (district) has operated the Bay Path Vocational High School (school) since December, 1972. Joseph Gorman is the superintendent-director. The Bay Path Vocational Association (association) is the teachers' exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining.

The last contract between the district and the association expired on August 31, 1974. By mid-August, a draft of a proposed agreement covering the 1974-1975 school year was prepared. On September 6, 1974, the teachers rejected the draft of the proposed agreement. After this rejection, negotiations between the association and the district broke off. In an earlier action arising out of these circumstances, the commission concluded that the district had unlawfully refused to negotiate with the association. Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School Dist., 2 M.L.C. 1488 (1976). We affirmed that decision. Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School Dist. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 377 Mass. 897, 389 N.E.2d 389 (1979). 3

During the 1974-1975 school year, the district employed ninety-five teachers. Fifteen had tenure; eighty did not. Superintendent Gorman recommended that the school committee not reappoint eleven nontenured teachers for the 1975-1976 year. Following the superintendent's recommendation, the Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational District School Committee (committee) voted, at their March 3, 1975, meeting, not to reappoint these eleven teachers. 4 Six teachers, Robert Bourke, Richard Clark, George Lorkiewicz, Norman Mercier, Norman Proulx, and E. Joseph McKeon, filed complaints with the commission.

At the same meeting, the committee voted to reappoint Stephen Yurek, the president of the association, but postponed consideration of the reappointment of Maryann Yurek, his wife. On April 7, 1975, the committee voted not to reappoint Maryann Yurek. However, in July, 1975, the committee reversed these decisions. The committee voted to reappoint Maryann Yurek and to terminate Stephen Yurek. Stephen and Maryann Yurek also filed complaints with the commission.

The commission issued a consolidated complaint, charging that the district's action concerning these eight nontenured teachers violated G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a )(1)-(4). Hearings began in September, 1975, and concluded in December, 1977. In December, 1978, the commission ruled that the district had committed unfair labor practices and ordered the teachers reinstated with back pay, and without prejudice to the teachers' seniority and tenure rights.

Pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14, the district appealed to the Superior Court. A judge of the Superior Court affirmed the commission's decision and ordered the district to comply with its provisions. Again, the district appealed. The Appeals Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the commission. 5 See Southern Worcester County Regional Vocational School Dist. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, --- Mass.App. ---, Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh. (1981) 1308, 422 N.E.2d 791. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, upholding the commission's finding that the district violated G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a )(1) & (3), and ordering that the teachers be reinstated.

1. Standard for discharge cases arising under G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a)(1) & (3). On appeal, the district claims that the trial judge erred in upholding the commission's decision because it was based on the wrong legal standard and burden of proof. In its decision, the commission employed the dominant motive, or "but for," test. In addition, the commission followed the allocation of the burden of proof used in our sex discrimination cases. See School Comm. of Braintree v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 377 Mass. 424, 429-430, 386 N.E.2d 1251 (1979); Smith College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 229-230, 380 N.E.2d 121 (1978); Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 136-139, 355 N.E.2d 309 (1976). Thus, the commission applied the legal standard and burden of proof which we subsequently held should govern unlawful discharge cases. See Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, --- Mass. ---, --- - ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2183, 2185-2186, 428 N.E.2d 124.

In that case, we concluded that the commission could find a discharge unlawful under G.L. c. 150A, §§ 3, 4(1), 4(3), only if it found "that the employee would not have been discharged but for his protected activity.... If, however, a lawful cause would have led the employer to the same conclusion even in the absence of protected conduct, the discharge must not be disturbed." Id. --- Mass. at --- - ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) at 2185-2186, 428 N.E.2d 124. We believed that this "but for" test strikes an "equitable balance among the interests at stake; the employer is not forced to accept an unsatisfactory employee, and a union organizer is subject to discipline to the same extent as other employees." Id. --- Mass. at ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) at 2187, 428 N.E.2d 124.

Having chosen the "but for" test, we then set out the allocation of the burden of proof in unlawful discharge cases under G.L. c. 150A, §§ 3, 4(1), 4(3). Id. --- Mass. at ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) at 2186, 428 N.E.2d 124. We followed "the pattern established in our sex discrimination cases; the employee must bear the ultimate burden of persuasion, but may rely on a prima facie showing to shift to the employer a limited burden of producing evidence." Id. --- Mass. at ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) at 2186, 428 N.E.2d 124.

To establish a prima facie case, an employee need not introduce direct evidence of unlawful motive such as anti-union statements. "The presence of an anti-union motivation by an employer is a factual matter which the (commission) may resolve upon circumstantial evidence from the record as a whole." 6 Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So.2d 108, 119 (Fla.App.1977). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Singer Co. v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 172, 179-180 (8th Cir. 1970); Ridgely Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C.Cir.1975).

However, if the employer has stated a lawful reason for its decision and produces supporting facts, the prima facie case is rebutted. Thereafter, "the burden of persuasion remains with the employee, who must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the asserted lawful reason was not the real reason for the discharge." Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, --- Mass. ---, ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) 2183, 2190, 428 N.E.2d 124. This allocation of the burden of proof preserves employer discretion in matters outside the province of the commission. Id. --- Mass. at ---, Mass.Adv.Sh. (1981) at 2191, 428 N.E.2d 124.

The legal standard and burden of proof set out in Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, supra, should govern unlawful discharge claims arising under G.L. c. 150E, § 10(a)(1) & (3). This approach strikes an "equitable balance between the rights of an employer whose duty ... is to promote the efficiency of public services through its public employees, and the rights of a nontenured public school teacher to be secure in his employment, free from discrimination due to his union activity." Pasco County School Bd. v. Florida Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So.2d 108, 117 (Fla.App.1977).

2. Substantial evidence. The district argues that the commission's decision should be reversed, because it was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

General Laws c. 30A, § 1(6), defines "(s)ubstantial evidence" as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." "This does not permit a court to treat the proceeding as a trial de novo on the record which was before the administrative board. A court may not displace an administrative board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 488 (71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456) (1951)." Labor Relations Comm'n v. University Hosp., Inc., 359 Mass. 516, 521, 269 N.E.2d 682 (1971). The commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

All eight teachers presented evidence that they were active members of the association whose involvement was known to Gorman or members of the school...

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