Southington '84 Associates v. Silver Dollar Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 15338,15338
• Citation: 237 Conn. 758,678 A.2d 968
• Parties: SOUTHINGTON '84 ASSOCIATES v. SILVER DOLLAR STORES, INC., et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 968

678 A.2d 968

237 Conn. 758

SOUTHINGTON '84 ASSOCIATES v. SILVER DOLLAR STORES, INC., et al.

No. 15338.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 29, 1996.

Decided July 16, 1996.

Francis X. Drapeau, Rockville, for appellant (plaintiff).

Joseph R. Crispino, Southington, for appellees (defendants).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, NORCOTT and KATZ, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court had the authority to render judgment awarding money damages greater than the amount stated in the demand for relief attached to the plaintiff's complaint. We conclude that it had such authority.

The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, Southington '84 Associates, the lessor of commercial property in Southington Caldor Village, brought this action against the defendants, its tenant, Silver Dollar Stores, Inc. (Silver Dollar), and Louis M. Ursini, president of Silver Dollar, as guarantor of the lease for breach of contract for the failure to pay rent. In compliance with General Statutes § 52-91 ¹ and Practice Book § 131, ² the plaintiff annexed to its complaint a statement that the amount "in demand is more than Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) but less than $15,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs." (Emphasis added.) The defendants filed a special defense claiming that the construction project in front of an adjoining property was so disruptive to Silver Dollar's business that it violated its right to quiet enjoyment, thereby relieving the defendants of the obligation to pay rent. Because the defendants failed to appear for trial, the trial court, Langenbach, J., entered a default against them. See Practice Book § 351.

Thereafter, pursuant to Practice Book § 365 et seq., the case was tried to the court as a hearing in damages. Although neither defendant had filed a notice of defenses pursuant to Practice Book § 367, at the hearing in damages Ursini argued that he had signed the guarantee as president of Silver Dollar, and not in his individual capacity, and both defendants argued that the plaintiff had breached the lease by permitting renovations elsewhere in Southington Caldor Village that violated Silver Dollar's right of quiet enjoyment and interfered with its business. The trial court rejected both defenses, finding that Ursini had signed the lease in his individual capacity and that the renovations to other sections of the shopping center did not so disrupt the traffic flow as to cause significant financial loss to Silver Dollar. Finally, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff had attempted to mitigate the damages caused by the defendants' breach. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff against both defendants. The court computed damages as follows: losses to the date of the judgment in the amount of $22,144.03, and losses from the date of the judgment to the end of the contract period in the amount of $128,529.98. After allowing a credit to the defendants for their security deposit in the amount of $4085.44, the court awarded the plaintiff $146,588.57. ³ Although the defendants were made aware, during the hearing in damages, that the plaintiff was seeking money damages in excess of the amount stated in the demand for relief attached to the complaint, they did not object to the amount being sought on the basis that it exceeded that demand. ⁴

The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, challenging the trial court's rejection of its two defenses as well as its finding regarding mitigation. Southington '84 Associates v. Silver Dollar Stores, Inc., 39 Conn.App. 608, 608 n. 1, 665 A.2d 920 (1995). The Appellate Court labeled the issues raised as factual and, consequently, summarily rejected them. Id., at 608, 665 A.2d 920. Although the parties waived oral argument, following its own examination of the record the Appellate Court asked for supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the trial court had the authority to render judgment for an amount in excess of the amount stated in the demand for relief attached to the plaintiff's complaint. Id., at 608-09, 665 A.2d 920. Reasoning that the case was controlled by Davis v. Naugatuck, 15 Conn.App. 185, 543 A.2d 785 (1988), the Appellate Court concluded pursuant to Practice Book § 4185, ⁵ that it was plain error for the trial court to have awarded damages in excess of $15,000 and, accordingly, reversed the judgment as to damages and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to modify the judgment "so that it totals no more than $15,000 plus costs." Southington '84 Associates v. Silver Dollar Stores, Inc., supra, at 610, 665 A.2d 920.

The plaintiff petitioned this court for certification to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which we granted, limited to the following issue: "Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that it was plain error to render judgment in an amount in excess of the statement re amount in demand?" Southington '84 Associates v. Silver Dollar Stores, Inc., 235 Conn. 937, 937-38, 668 A.2d 375 (1995). We conclude that, absent unfair surprise or prejudice to the defendants, the trial court was not bound by the amount in that statement and that, consequently, the trial court did not commit plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court. ⁶

The plaintiff contends that by limiting its claim for damages to the amount in the demand for relief, the Appellate Court has, in effect, resurrected the ad damnum requirement that once served to limit the trial court's jurisdiction and that was eliminated nearly twenty years ago by the legislature, and that the Appellate Court has concomitantly undermined the arbitration and fact-finding programs created by the legislature. We agree.

We begin with a discussion of the history of the statement of the demand for relief, the purpose of that statement and the limitations it imposes on the plaintiff, if any. At the same time that the legislature adopted a uniform court system, vesting in the Superior Court the power to entertain all actions except those in which the Probate Court had original jurisdiction; General Statutes § 51-164s; ⁷ it also enacted No. 77-497 of the 1977 Public Acts, ⁸ which amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 52-91 and thereby eliminated the ad damnum requirement because it was no longer needed as a basis for limiting a particular court's jurisdiction in rendering a judgment. See Holmquist v. Spinelli, 139 Conn. 429, 431-32, 94 A.2d 621 (1953) (amount in demand as disclosed by complaint determined whether jurisdiction was in Superior Court or in Court of Common Pleas); Bridgeport Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Bouniol, 89 Conn. 254, 261, 93 A. 674 (1915) (same); see also Thomas v. Katz, 171 Conn. 412, 415, 370 A.2d 978 (1976) (damages awarded cannot exceed amount of ad damnum).

In 1982, the legislature created fact-finding and arbitration programs in civil litigation; Public Acts 1982, No. 82-441; ⁹ and in 1983, the legislature again amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 52-91 to require a plaintiff to attach to the complaint a demand for relief in order to assist our trial courts in identifying cases that were eligible for the newly enacted fact-finding and arbitration programs. Public Acts 1983, No. 83-144 (P.A. 83-144). ¹⁰ Unlike the previous ad damnum requirement, however, the statement contemplated by the amended § 52-91 does not require the plaintiff to state the exact amount being sought. To comply with the amended statute, a plaintiff need only state which of the three categories applies to the case: less than $2500; $2500 or more, but less than $15,000; or $15,000 or more. ¹¹ See footnote 1. These categories correspond to the eligibility requirements for the fact-finding and arbitration programs that had been created by legislation prior to P.A. 83-144. ¹² See General Statutes §§ 52-549n and 52-549u. ¹³ Thereafter, the rules of practice were amended to reflect those statutory changes. See Practice Book § 546D (trial court may refer to fact finder any contract action "in which money damages only are claimed, which is based upon an express or implied promise to pay a definite sum, and in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars"); and Practice Book § 546N (court may refer to arbitrator "any civil action in which the damages, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs"). ¹⁴

The plaintiff contends, and we agree, that if we were to conclude that General Statutes § 52-91 and Practice Book § 131 limit the amount of recovery, plaintiffs would be compelled to over inflate their demands for relief to choose the "$15,000 or more" option, so as to avoid the risk that a subsequent judgment for that amount might be set aside in accordance with the Appellate Court's prior opinion in this case. As a consequence, many cases that would otherwise qualify for arbitration and fact-finding programs would never be properly labeled and identified. The important goal of judicial economy that underlies these programs would, therefore, likely be undermined. ¹⁵

We recognize that Practice Book § 313 states that, in personal injury cases tried to a jury, the amount of the verdict cannot exceed the amount demanded. ¹⁶ This rule recognizes the difficulty a jury may have in placing a value on an injury. Although that provision is clearly inapplicable to this contract action adjudicated as a hearing in damages, it is useful as a point of contrast because, had the legislature and the judges of the Superior Court wanted to apply this kind of limitation to all awards, they were aware of how to accomplish that goal. See Plourde v. Liburdi, 207 Conn. 412, 416, 540 A.2d 1054 (1988) ("the use of different words [or the ...