Southport Little League v. Vaughan

• Decision Date: 28 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-9912-CV-882.,49A02-9912-CV-882.
• Citation: 734 N.E.2d 261
• Parties: SOUTHPORT LITTLE LEAGUE, Appellant-Defendant, v. Steven VAUGHAN and Rebecca Vaughan, and Parents and Natural Guardians of M.V. and J.V., M.V., b/n/f Steven Vaughan and Rebecca Vaughan, and J.V., b/n/f Steven Vaughan and Rebecca Vaughan, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

734 N.E.2d 261

SOUTHPORT LITTLE LEAGUE, Appellant-Defendant, v. Steven VAUGHAN and Rebecca Vaughan, and Parents and Natural Guardians of M.V. and J.V., M.V., b/n/f Steven Vaughan and Rebecca Vaughan, and J.V., b/n/f Steven Vaughan and Rebecca Vaughan, Appellees-Plaintiffs.

No. 49A02-9912-CV-882.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

August 28, 2000.

Shannon L. Robinson, Kelley, Belcher & Brown, Bloomington, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Debra H. Miller, James R. Fisher, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge

The Southport Little League (the "Little League") appeals the jury verdict in favor of Steven Vaughan and Rebecca Vaughan individually, and as the parents and natural guardians of M.V. and J.V. (collectively referred to as "the Vaughans"), claiming that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and judgment on the evidence. We affirm.

Issues

The Little League raises the following restated issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court properly denied the Little League's motion for summary judgment and judgment on the evidence; and

2. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the doctrine of imputed knowledge.

Facts and Procedural History

The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that the Little League is an organization which provides youths with the opportunity to play supervised and organized baseball against other youths.¹ The Little League was formed and operates under the by-laws and charters of the Little League International. In addition, the Little League is locally operated and managed by a board of directors. The Little League owns real estate which has been converted to baseball fields for Little League games and practice. Furthermore, the Little League is primarily staffed by volunteers from the local community. Adult volunteers typically become involved through community service and their children's involvement and participation in Little League baseball. In 1992, the Little League did not conduct criminal background checks of its adult volunteers.

Kent Simmerman had been a volunteer for the Little League since 1979. Simmerman originally became involved with the Little League during his children's participation. Simmerman continued to volunteer for the Little League after his children outgrew their eligibility to play. In the spring of 1992, Simmerman retained the positions of equipment manager,² vice-president, board member, and member of the executive committee of the board of directors with the Little League. While acting as an official of the Little League, Simmerman was authorized to wear a cap that said "Southport Little League" and a shirt that said "Southport Little League Official."

As the equipment manager, Simmerman was also in charge of fitting youths with baseball uniforms. Simmerman personally fitted youths with baseball uniforms behind locked doors in an equipment shed owned by the Little League which was located near the baseball field. Typically, Simmerman was the only adult present during these fittings. Because Simmerman was on the executive committee of the board of directors, Simmerman had a key to the equipment shed³ which housed baseball equipment and uniforms.

J.V., age nine and M.V., age eleven, played Little League baseball. Both of the youths met Simmerman through their participation in Little League baseball, and knew that he was a Little League official. In the spring of 1991, M.V., along with four or five other youths, tried on baseball uniforms in the Little League's equipment shed. Simmerman, who was fitting the boys with uniforms, pulled down M.V.'s underwear and viewed M.V.'s genitalia as he was helping M.V. take off his pants. On a separate occasion when M.V. was being fitted with a baseball uniform, Simmerman pulled out the waistband M.V.'s baseball pants and his underwear and looked at his genitalia. Also, in the spring of 1992, Simmerman, dressed as a Little League official, approached M.V., who was at the Little League baseball field watching J.V.'s game, and asked M.V. to accompany him to the equipment shed for aid in retrieving some equipment. Simmerman later molested M.V. in the equipment shed.

In the spring of 1992, J.V., along with other youths, tried on baseball uniforms in the Little League's equipment shed. After J.V. put on a pair of baseball pants, Simmerman pulled out the waistband of the pants along with the waistband of J.V.'s underwear and looked at his genitalia. On a separate occasion in the spring of 1992, Simmerman, dressed as a Little League official, approached J.V. who was at the Little League baseball field watching M.V.'s game, and asked J.V. to accompany him to the equipment shed. Simmerman later molested J.V. in the equipment shed.

Consequently, the State charged Simmerman with two counts of child molesting, Class C felonies. Simmerman later entered a plea of guilty.⁴ On June 11, 1993, the Vaughans filed a complaint against the Little League for the wrongful acts on the basis of vicarious liability and negligence.⁵ The Little League subsequently filed with the trial court a motion for summary judgment, which was denied following a hearing. Consequently, the Little League filed a motion to reconsider with the trial court, a motion which was later denied by the trial court.

A jury trial was conducted on the Vaughans' complaint. At the close of the Vaughans' case-in-chief, the Little League moved for judgment on the evidence. The trial court later denied the Little League's motion for judgment on the evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of M.V. against the Little League, awarding him $225,000.00 in compensatory damages. The jury also awarded J.V. the sum of $225,000.00 against the Little League. In addition, the jury awarded Steven and Rebecca Vaughan $0.00. On June 17, 1999, the trial court entered the following entry with respect to the damage award:

judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs, Steven and Rebecca Vaughan and against the Defendant, Southport Little League, in the sum of zero dollars ($0.00), and that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff, [M.V.] and against the Defendant, Southport Little League, in the sum of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($225,000); and that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff, [J.V.] and against the Defendant, Southport Little League, in the sum of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($225,000).

R. 720. Subsequently, the Little League filed a motion to correct errors, a motion which the trial court later denied. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

I. Respondeat Superior

Respondeat superior is the applicable tort theory of vicarious liability. The doctrine of respondeat superior creates liability for a principal where it otherwise would not exist. Stump v. Indiana Equip. Co., Inc., 601 N.E.2d 398, 403 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992), trans. denied. The doctrine has its origin in public policy and justice. Id. According to the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer, who is not liable because of his own acts, can be held liable "for the wrongful acts of his employee⁶ which are committed within the scope of employment." Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind.1999). An employee is acting within the scope of his employment when he is acting, at least in part, to further the interests of his employer. Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Liability will attach where an employee acts partially in self-interest but is still "partially serving his employer's interests." City of Fort Wayne v. Moore, 706 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind. Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. However, simply because an act could not have occurred without access to the employer's facilities does not bring it within the scope of employment. Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 457.

An employer can be vicariously liable for the criminal acts of an employee. Gomez v. Adams, 462 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). The proper test is whether the employee's actions were at least for a time authorized by his employer. Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr., 547 N.E.2d 244, 250 (Ind.1989). However, if it is determined that none of the employee's acts were authorized, there is no respondeat superior liability. City of Fort Wayne, 706 N.E.2d at 607. Furthermore, acts for which an employer is not responsible are those done on the employee's own initiative with no intention to perform it as part of or incident to the service for which he is employed. Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 247. If some of the employee's actions were authorized, the question of whether the unauthorized acts were within the scope of employment is one for the jury. Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 457. However, if none of the employee's acts were authorized, the matter is a question of law. Id.

II. Summary Judgment

The Little League first contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 638 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this court must determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the law has been correctly applied by the trial court. Cloverleaf Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Eaton, 641 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). A trial court's grant of summary judgment is "clothed with a presumption of validity," and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the trial court erred. Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993). Nevertheless, this court must carefully scrutinize the trial court's decision to ensure that the losing party is not improperly denied his day in court. Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind.1992). Summary judgment...