Southwestern Brewery Ice Company v. Joseph Schmidt

• Decision Date: 02 December 1912
• Docket Number: No. 55,55
• Citation: 226 U.S. 162,33 S.Ct. 68,57 L.Ed. 170
• Parties: SOUTHWESTERN BREWERY & ICE COMPANY, Don J. Rankin, Henry Loebs, and Otto Dieckmann, Plffs. in Err., v. JOSEPH SCHMIDT
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

226 U.S. 162

33 S.Ct. 68

57 L.Ed. 170

SOUTHWESTERN BREWERY & ICE COMPANY, Don J. Rankin, Henry Loebs, and Otto Dieckmann, Plffs. in Err.,

v JOSEPH SCHMIDT.

No. 55.

Argued and submitted November 14 and 15, 1912.

Decided December 2, 1912.

Messrs. Francis E. Wood, O. N. Marron, Aldis B. Browne, Alexander Britton, and Evans Browne for plaintiffs in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 163-166 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Neill B. Field, Joseph W. Cox, and John A. Kratz, Jr., for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 166 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action by a servant for personal injuries. The declaration alleged that it was the plaintiff's duty to cook brewer's mash in a cooker; that the cooker was so out of repair that the plaintiff was unwilling to use it, but that the defendant requested him to go on until it could be repaired, and promised that it should be within a very short time; that the plaintiff did go on, relying upon the promise, that the cooker gave way, and the plaintiff was badly scalded. The defendant denied the allegations and pleaded plaintiff's contributory negligence and a release. In a replication the plaintiff denied his mental capacity at the time the release was made. There was a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to special findings which by the law of New Mexico control (Walker v. New Mexico & S. P. R. Co. 165 U. S. 593, 41 L. ed. 837, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421), the defendant alleged exceptions. These were overruled by the supreme court of the territory and the judgment affirmed.

The first point argued is that the defendant was entitled to judgment on the special findings, because the fourth was that the cooker at the time was not in such a bad condition that a man of ordinary prudence would not have used the same. But the eleventh was that the defendant did not use ordinary care in furnishing the cooker and in having it repaired, and the sixth, that the defendant promised the plaintiff that the cooker should be repaired as an inducement for him to continue using it. So it is evident that the fourth finding meant only that the plaintiff was not negligent in remaining at work. Whatever the difficulties may be with the theory of the exception (1 Labatt, Mast. & S. chap. 22, § 423), it is the well-settled law that for a certain time a master may remain liable for a failure to use reasonable care in furnishing a safe place in which to work, notwithstanding the servant's appreciation of the danger, if he induces the servant to keep on by a promise that the source of trouble shall be removed. Hough v. Texas & P. R. Co. 100 U. S. 213, 25 L. ed. 612.

Next it is argued that the judgment should be set aside because ...