Southwestern N. H. Transp. Co. v. Durham

• Decision Date: 30 June 1959
• Citation: 102 N.H. 169,152 A.2d 596
• Parties: SOUTHWESTERN NEW HAMPSHIRE TRANSPORTATION CO., Inc. v. Roland DURHAM et al. SOUTHWESTERN NEW HAMPSHIRE TRANSPORTATION CO., Inc. v. Ruland SEARS et al. SOUTHWESTERN NEW HAMPSHIRE TRANSPORTATION CO., Inc. v. Irving TAYLOR et al. AUCLAIR TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. Henry CORRIVEAU et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 596

152 A.2d 596

102 N.H. 169

SOUTHWESTERN NEW HAMPSHIRE TRANSPORTATION CO., Inc. v. Roland DURHAM et al.

SOUTHWESTERN NEW HAMPSHIRE TRANSPORTATION CO., Inc. v. Ruland SEARS et al.

SOUTHWESTERN NEW HAMPSHIRE TRANSPORTATION CO., Inc. v. Irving TAYLOR et al.

AUCLAIR TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. Henry CORRIVEAU et al.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued May 6, 1959.

Decided June 30, 1959.

Booth, Wadleigh, Langdell, Starr & Peters and Charles J. Dunn, Manchester, for plaintiffs.

Upton, Sanders & Upton, Concord, Richard F. Upton, Concord, for the defendant Chauffeurs', Teamsters' & Helpers' Local Union No. 633, and the four individual defendants.

Sheehan, Phinney, Bass, Green & Bergevin and Kimon S. Zachos, Manchester, for defendant General Transportation Arbitration Board of New Hampshire.

KENISON, Chief Justice.

In this state the arbitration of disputes statute (RSA ch. 542) applies to arbitration agreements between employers and employees only if 'such agreement specifically provides that it shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter.' RSA 542:1. The collective bargaining agreement in this case is subject to the provisions of RSA ch. 542 by its express terms. This brings into play RSA 542:8 which empowers the court to confirm an award and also provides that the court may correct or modify arbitration awards (1) 'for plain mistake'; or may vacate them (2) 'for fraud, corruption, or misconduct by the parties or by the arbitrators,' (3) 'or on the ground that the arbitrators have exceeded their powers.' Only the first and third grounds are advanced in this proceeding.

The relevant part of Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement establishes the General Transportation Arbitration Board with power to decide 'Any dispute or grievance * * * with respect to wages, hours of work and all other conditions of employment for persons employed within the bargaining unit covered by this agreement and arising during the term of this Agreement.' Paragraph (g) of the article contains the following proviso: '* * * except that the Board may render no decision that conflicts with or exceeds the scope of the Agreement.'

While the scope of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement presents a question of law for the court (Brampton Woolen Co. v. Local Union 112, 95 N.H. 255, 61 A.2d 796), we must not lose sight of the principle that not all contracts are the same and each one must be interpreted in the light of its purpose and policy. Thus in Brampton, supra, it was held that under the collective bargaining agreement vacation pay to members of the Labor Union would be normally considered part of their wages even though the agreement did not specifically so state. Accordingly, it was held that the dispute was arbitrable. In this jurisdiction it is recognized that some contracts may be 'consummated with greater dispatch, more informality, and less meticulous detail than would be required of a municipal bond issue or a complicated corporate contract. Both are and must be definite but the former may be in shorthand expression for its well understood terms in the custom of the trade.' State v. Del Bianco, 96 N.H. 436, 439, 78 A.2d 519, 521.

The scope of interpretation necessary for a contract to purchase a horse or sell an automobile would be more confined than that of a collective bargaining agreement which involves multiple transactions, many people, and many problems under a continuing arrangement for arbitration and which inevitably will give rise to some unforeseen disputes that must be resolved within the general framework of the basic agreement. It is difficult, if not impossible, to try in advance to tie square knots for all the bundles of rights and privileges of both labor and management that are collected in the collective bargaining package. That is why successful and practical arbitrators in reaching their decisions must implement them with something more than a dictionary and a treatise on contracts. 6 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) s. 1929. Thus there will be occasions when the arbitrators may consider 'the generally accepted practice in industry and the whole agreement between the parties' in reaching their decision. Franklin Needle Co. v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers, etc., 99 N.H. 101, 105, 105 A.2d 382, 385. This problem is thoroughly canvassed in a competent manner in Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 1482, 1490-1500 (1959).

In the present case it is necessary to determine the meaning of the proviso in the arbitration clause that the board 'may render to decision that conflicts with or exceeds the scope of the agreement.' It seems reasonably clear that this proviso was not intended to deny the arbitration board power to render final and binding decisions on simple questions of fact such as whether an employee quit his job or was physically unable to perform it. So far as we are aware it is not the practice of courts to require a retrial of the facts which the arbitrators have already decided. To do so would destroy the value of grievance arbitration and would give the arbitration award the effect of a preliminary finding only rather than that of a final and binding decision which the collective bargaining agreement calls for. The arbitration clause was intended to establish an expert but informal tribunal for the resolution of questions of fact arising in the administration of the collective bargaining contract. Issues which were raised, or could have been raised, before the arbitration board are not to be retried in the Superior Court.

The Durham award which is representative of the others, illustrates these issues. The plaintiffs contend that Durham quit his job within the meaning of Article III(d) and (f) when he left his truck in Wilton and therefore the arbitration board exceeded its power when it made an award granting him relief. The arbitration board reinstated Durham to his former position on the seniority roster 'with such earning opportunity as may be available according to his seniority, ability and willingness to perform such work,' but did not award him any back pay. The plaintiffs' contention raises questions of fact and contract interpretation which were, and certainly could have been, raised before the arbitration board. There was a question of fact whether Durham left his truck on account of physical inability to carry on his duties. Even if Durham had left his work without strict compliance with requirements, there would be a further question of contract interpretation whether his leaving was a quit or a leave of absence within the meaning of Article III(d) and (f). The plaintiffs' offer of proof is an attempt to relitigate these questions before the Superior Court.

In the present collective bargaining agreement there was no specific provision which reserved questions of law for the court except as provided by statute nor was there any provision that required that the award be set aside because of errors of fact or law made by the arbitrators. Since the questions of fact and contract interpretation in the Durham case were covered by the...