Southwire Co. v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 March 2008
• Docket Number: Civil No. 03-1100 (GAG-CVR).
• Citation: 540 F.Supp.2d 307
• Parties: SOUTHWIRE COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RAMALLO BROTHERS PRINTING, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

540 F.Supp.2d 307

SOUTHWIRE COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. RAMALLO BROTHERS PRINTING, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 03-1100 (GAG-CVR).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 11, 2008.

Carlos A. Valldejuly-Sastre, Mauricio 0. Muniz-Luciano, Jorge A. Rullan Marin, O'Neill & Borges, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Carlos R. Ramirez, Curbelo, Baerga & Quintana Law Office, Rafael A. Toro-Ramirez, Toro & Arsuaga, Jean Paul Vissepo-Garriga, San Juan, PR, Jose A. Bague-Soto, Rivera Tulla & Ferrer, Hato Rey, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER MODIFYING AND ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GUSTAVO A. GELPI, District Judge.

This case arises out of the decade-long alleged release of hazardous substances and disposal of other wastes by Defendants, Ramallo Brothers Printing, Inc.; Caribbean Forms Manufacturers, Inc.; Esteban Ramallo Díaz; Angel Ramallo Díaz; Ingrid Ramallo Díaz; Aida Ramallo Díaz; Aida Díaz de Ramallo; and the Estate of Esteban Ramallo González (hereinafter collectively "Ramallo")¹ on property in Canóvanas, Puerto Rico (hereinafter the "Site") owned by Plaintiffs, Southwire Company; Southwire International Corporation; and Heptagon, Limited (hereinafter collectively "Southwire").

Ramallo moved for partial summary judgment on Southwire's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, claims. Ramallo's motion asserts that Southwire's CERCLA claims fail because Southwire lacks evidence of a release or threatened release of hazardous waste at the Site. Ramallo bases its motion exclusively on the Criminal Plea Agreement dealing with Ramallo's activities at the Site.² The court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Camille. L. Vélez-Rive for a report and recommendation.

Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive concluded that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on Southwire's CERCLA claims and recommended that the court deny Ramallo's motion. More specifically, she held that Southwire's documentary evidence, including a United States Environmental Protection Agency Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent for Removal Action ("EPA Order"), raised genuine issues of material fact regarding the release of hazardous substances on the Southwire property. Ramallo objected to the report and recommendation on two grounds. First they argue that Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive erroneously concluded that Ramallo's evidence does not exclude the presence of hazardous substances at the site. Second, Ramallo challenges Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive's reliance on the EPA Order; Ramallo contends that the EPA document constitutes inadmissible double hearsay. Southwire also objected to the report and recommendation, albeit on one narrow ground. Southwire objected only to Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive's omission of an attorney's fees award in its favor.

After reviewing de novo the objected-to portions of the report and recommendation, the court agrees with Magistrate Judge Velez-Rive's conclusions with some qualifications. Accordingly, the court hereby MODIFIES and ADOPTS the report and recommendation (Docket No. 429) and DENIES the motion for partial summary judgment (Docket No. 363).

I. Standard for Reviewing Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

A district court may refer dispositive motions to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Loc. R. 72(a). Any adversely affected party may contest the report and recommendation by submitting written objections within ten days of being served with the report and recommendation. If a party timely objects, the court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations to which [an] objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations." Id.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the lack of evidence to support the non-moving party's case and to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000); Vega-Rodríguez v. P.R. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997). After the moving party has satisfied this burden, the onus passes to party opposing summary judgment to demonstrate a genuine issue regarding a material fact. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 52; Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1997). "An issue is genuine if it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party at trial, and material if it posses[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

Ramallo objects to Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive's recommendation that the court deny its motion for summary judgment on Southwire's CERCLA claims. After conducting a de novo review, the court agrees with Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive's conclusion that the existence of triable issues of fact preclude the entry of summary judgment in Ramallo's favor. The admissible evidence in the record reveals a genuine issue regarding, at a minimum, the presence of hazardous substances at the Site. The court further concludes that Ramallo fails to demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it anchors its summary judgment motion upon an erroneous statement of the applicable law.

A plaintiff seeking relief under CERCLA Section 107(a) or Section 113(f) must prove a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance.³ 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4), 9601(14), 9601(22); see also Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir.1999); cf. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1201 (2d Cir.1992) ("Liability under CERCLA depends only on the presence in any form of listed hazardous substances."). The release or threatened release of hazardous substances is sufficient to support a CERCLA claim; CERCLA does not require a showing of the presence of hazardous waste at a site. Ramallo now concedes this point, see Docket No. 449, ¶¶ 7-8, but argues that Southwire submitted no admissible evidence to demonstrate the presence of hazardous substances or hazardous waste at the Site. The court disagrees.

Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive's report and recommendation summarized the evidence with which Southwire supports its summary judgment opposition. She definitively addressed the admissibility of only one exhibit — the EPA Order. She determined that the EPA Order is admissible as a public record. She concluded that the EPA Order alone generated a triable issue regarding the presence of hazardous substances at the Site and prevented the entry of summary judgment. The court agrees.

Notwithstanding Ramallo's objections, the court concludes that the EPA Order is subject to the public records exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R.Evid. 803(8). As Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive noted, the EPA Order is "an official document of a federal agency" and its reliance on other documentation does not make the EPA's findings unreliable or inadmissible at this stage. Docket No. 429, p. 9. The EPA Order noted the presence of hazardous substances at the Site. See Docket No. 408, Exh. D, ¶¶ 21-22, 26, 31-32. Additionally, as Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive stated, the Criminal Plea Agreement, Ramallo's only exhibit, "does not necessarily exclude the issues now raised in this civil lawsuit." Docket No. 429, p. 9. None of the statements in the Criminal Plea Agreement preclude the possibility that hazardous substances were found at the Site. The Criminal Plea Agreement relies upon only initial Site investigations and does not reflect the findings of subsequent investigations. Moreover, the document limits the terms of the agreement "to [the United States and Ramallo Brothers Printing, Inc.] and cannot bind any other federal authority, or any state of local authority." Criminal No. 07-449(JAF), Docket No. 3, ¶ 19. Consequently, Ramallo overstates the significance of the Criminal Plea Agreement in this civil action. The court, therefore, affirms Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive's finding that genuine issues of material fact prevent the entry of summary judgment in Ramallo's favor.⁴

The court recognizes another basis not articulated by Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive on which to deny Ramallo's motion for partial summary judgment. Summary judgment is only appropriate if Ramallo shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Rivera-Torres v. Rey-Hernández, 502 F.3d 7, 13 (1st Cir.2007). As Magistrate Judge Vélez-Rive noted, the court may grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment only if the moving party's uncontested facts and other evidentiary facts of record demonstrate an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Rivera-Torres, 502 F.3d at 13. Even if Southwire had failed to oppose Ramallo's motion, denial would have been the correct course. Regardless of whether factual disputes exist, Ramallo's summary judgment motion fails as a matter of law. Ramallo fails to demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because it bases its motion on an inaccurate...