Souza v. Vehicles
Decision Date | 17 May 2012 |
Docket Number | SJC–11123. |
Citation | 462 Mass. 227,967 N.E.2d 1095 |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Parties | Paul J. SOUZA v. REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES & another. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Dana Alan Curhan, Boston (Joseph P. Cataldo, Franklin, with him) for the plaintiff.
David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.
Brian E. Simoneau & Peter B. Krupp, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.
Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.
This case turns on the interpretation of the word “convicted” in G.L. c. 90, § 24(1) ( f )(1), a statute providing for the suspension of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a test for blood alcohol content (breathalyzer test) on arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. We conclude that as used in the statute, “convicted” references only dispositions of criminal charges that include a determination of guilt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
1. Background. The facts are undisputed. In 1997, the plaintiff was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), a violation of G.L. c. 90, § 24(1) ( a )(1). He admitted to sufficient facts for a finding of guilty; he did not plead guilty. His case was continued without a finding and later dismissed after he had successfully completed the terms of his probation, including assignment to an alcohol education program. The plaintiff was arrested again for OUI on January 14, 2010. He refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. Thereafter, the registrar of motor vehicles (registrar) suspended the plaintiff's driver's license for three years on account of his refusal to take the test. Pursuant to G.L. c. 90, § 24(1) ( f )(1) (§ 24[1] [ f ] [1] ), the registrar is required to suspend an arrested driver's license for three years for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test if the driver has been previously “convicted” of an OUI offense. If the driver has not been previously convicted, the license suspension period is 180 days. Id.
The plaintiff appealed from the registrar's decision to the board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds (board), arguing that his license should only have been suspended for 180 days because he had never previously pleaded guilty to or been found guilty of OUI. Therefore, he claimed, he had not previously been “convicted” of OUI. The board affirmed the registrar's decision. The plaintiff then sought review of the board's decision in the Superior Court under G.L. c. 30A, § 14. After hearing, a judge in that court affirmed the board's decision. We granted the parties' joint application for direct appellate review.2,3
2. Standard of review. “In general, we give ‘substantial deference’to an agency's interpretation of those statutes which it is charged with enforcing.” Providence & Worcester R.R. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 453 Mass. 135, 141, 899 N.E.2d 829 (2009). Deference is particularly appropriate when the statute in question explicitly grants broad rule-making authority to the agency, see Goldberg v. Board of Health of Granby, 444 Mass. 627, 634, 830 N.E.2d 207 (2005), contains an ambiguity or gap, see Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Amesbury v. Housing Appeals Comm., 457 Mass. 748, 759, 933 N.E.2d 74 (2010), or broadly sets out a legislative policy that must be interpreted by the agency. See Massachusetts Org. of State Eng'rs & Scientists v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 389 Mass. 920, 924, 452 N.E.2d 1117 (1983), quoting School Comm. of Springfield v. Board of Educ., 362 Mass. 417, 442, 287 N.E.2d 438 (1972). We also must give deference to the agency's “experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge,” where relevant. G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7). See, e.g., Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 461 Mass. 166, 178, 959 N.E.2d 413 (2011), quoting Cambridge v. Department of Telecomm. & Energy, 449 Mass. 868, 875, 874 N.E.2d 1110 (2007) ( ); Springfield v. Department of Telecomm. & Cable, 457 Mass. 562, 568, 931 N.E.2d 942 (2010) ().
The issue of statutory interpretation raised in this case—how “convicted” should be defined in § 24(1) ( f )(1), as appearing in St.2005, c. 122, § 9 (known as “Melanie's Law”)—does not involve any gaps in the statute that the board or the registrar (collectively, board) needs to flesh out in order to give the statute meaning. Moreover, the board's specialized knowledge relating to motor vehicles and driving rules does not give it any special competence to determine what the Legislature meant by “convicted,” a term that is unrelated to these subjects. Because the interpretive question here is purely a legal one, and because “[t]he duty of statutory interpretation rests ultimately with the courts,” we review the board's interpretation de novo. Boston Hous. Auth. v. National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155, 164, 935 N.E.2d 1260 (2010), quoting Town Fair Tire Ctrs. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 454 Mass. 601, 605, 911 N.E.2d 757 (2009). See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 Mass. 651, 657, 856 N.E.2d 799 (2006) (); Raytheon Co. v.Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 364 Mass. 593, 595, 307 N.E.2d 330 (1974) ().
3. Discussion.Section 24(1) ( f )(1) provides in relevant part:
(emphasis added).
In order to determine who has been “previously convicted of a violation,” we first must look to G.L. c. 90, § 24(1) ( d ) (§ 24[1] [ d ] ), which defines the term “convicted” for purposes of all the subsections of § 24(1). The pertinent part of § 24(1) ( d ) reads:
“For the purposes of subdivision (1) of this section [i.e., § 24(1) ], a person shall be deemed to have been convicted if he pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or was found or adjudged guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction,whether or not he was placed on probation without sentence or under a suspended sentence or the case was placed on file....”
“A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result.” Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110 (2001). By its terms, the definition of “convicted” in § 24(1) ( d )—and derivatively, the meaning of “convicted of” in § 24(1) ( f )(1)—confines itself to a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a finding of guilty, or a judgment of guilty. The definition makes no mention of an admission to sufficient facts; an assignment to an alcohol education, treatment, or rehabilitation program (program assignment); or a continuance without a finding (CWOF). Evaluated in connection with the plain words of the statutory definition, the plaintiff's 1997 disposition, namely, the admission to sufficient facts followed by a CWOF and a program assignment, does not qualify him as someone who has been previously “convicted of” OUI.
The board's main argument, articulated in several slightly different ways, comes down to the same fundamental premise: that “convicted” in § 24(1) ( f )(1) must be interpreted not solely according to its plain meaning, but in light of the remedial purpose of Melanie's Law, namely, “to increase penalties for drunk drivers in the Commonwealth.” St.2005, c. 122, preamble. In light of this purpose and prior decisions of this court, it argues, the plaintiff's 1997 admission to sufficient facts should be considered the equivalent of a guilty plea and therefore the registrar properly treated the plaintiff as previously having been “convicted of” OUI.
We have several concerns with this purpose-centered argument. Melanie's Law amended § 24(1) ( f )(1) by increasing the periods of license suspension for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, but it did not amend the definition of “convicted” in § 24(1) ( d ). Accordingly, it is inappropriateto look to Melanie's Law as the source of justification for reading this term in a more expansive manner than applied before Melanie's Law was enacted. Even if we were to consider the purpose of Melanie's Law, we are not at liberty to construe the statute in a manner that might advance its purpose but contravenes the actual language chosen by the Legislature. See Franklin v. Wyllie, 443 Mass. 187, 196, 819 N.E.2d 943 (2005) (...
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