Sovereign Bank v. Fowlkes

• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: SILVERSTEIN, J.
• Decision Date: 25 January 2010
• Docket Number: C.A. PB 08-4330
• Citation: Sovereign Bank v. Fowlkes, C.A. PB 08-4330 (R.I. Super. Jan 25, 2010)
• Parties: SOVEREIGN BANK v. DAVID FOWLKES, JR., HENRY SEEMORE, JR., MICHELLE GORDON-SEEMORE, IAN HARDMAN AND JENNIFER HARDMAN

SOVEREIGN BANK v. DAVID FOWLKES, JR., HENRY SEEMORE, JR., MICHELLE GORDON-SEEMORE, IAN HARDMAN AND JENNIFER HARDMAN

C.A. No. PB 08-4330

Superior Court of Rhode Island

January 25, 2010

DECISION

SILVERSTEIN, J.

Before this Court is a Super. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. Rule 56, brought by Sovereign Bank ("Sovereign or Plaintiff") against David Fowlkes, Jr., Henry Seemore, Jr., Michelle Gordon-Seemore, Ian Hardman and Jennifer Hardman (collectively, "Defendants or Counterclaimants"). The Plaintiff filed the instant action to recover indebtedness owed by the Defendants under various notes and personal guaranties. The Defendants asserted sixteen counterclaims against the Plaintiff alleging, inter alia, fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, duress, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff challenges the Defendants' counterclaims based on grounds including, but not limited to, judicial estoppel, novation res judicata, and collateral estoppel.

I Facts and Travel

In 2001, Davin Wheels, Inc. ("Davin") began operations. Its sole shareholder was The Rhegos Group, Inc. ("Rhegos"). David Fowlkes Jr., Henry Seemore, and Ian Hardman, three of the Defendants in the instant matter were the shareholders of Rhegos. In October 2003, Sovereign and Davin entered into an asset-based loan agreement ("Original Loan") as a result of which Plaintiff extended to Davin a $2 million credit facility. In August of 2004, Sovereign increased Davin's credit line from $2 million to $3 million. In August of 2005, Sovereign declared Davin in breach of the Original Loan and demanded payment in full.

On December 28, 2005, Sovereign began an application process for a so-called Section 7(a) loan^1[] to be guaranteed by the Small Business Association ("SBA"), an agency of the United States government. In January 2006, the SBA approved the Plaintiff's application to guarantee 75 percent of a loan in the amount of $2 million to assist Davin and Rhegos. (Pl Ex. 1(B).) On February 23, 2006, Sovereign and Davin entered into the $2 million SBA guaranteed term loan agreement ("SBA Loan") evidenced by a $2 million term note. (Pl. Ex. 1(C, A).) According to the terms of the note, the proceeds of the loan were to be used to repay notes payable to Sovereign. (Pl. Ex. 1 (C).) Defendants Fowlkes, Seemore, and Hardman each executed SBA unconditional guarantee agreements guarantying payment of the last mentioned $2 million note to the Plaintiff. (Pl. Ex. 1(D-F).) Michelle Gordon-Seemore and Jennifer Hardman, the spouses of two of the before mentioned Defendants, each executed and delivered to Sovereign SBA unconditional limited guaranties. (Pl. 1(G-H).) Furthermore, the Defendants each executed mortgage deeds to secure their respective SBA unconditional guaranties. (Pl. 1(I-K).) In addition to the SBA Loan, Davin also borrowed from the Plaintiff additional sums evidenced by a $100,000 line of credit note and a $454,000 term note. These notes were also each personally guaranteed by Hardman, Seemore, and Fowlkes. At the closing of the loan transactions, Sovereign entered into a Side Letter Agreement ("Letter Agreement") to confirm that Sovereign would use its commercially reasonable best efforts to work with the SBA to cause the release of Sovereign's equity mortgages on the homes owned by the Defendants. (Pl. Ex. 5(E).)

In September 2007, a temporary receiver was appointed by this Court to take charge of the assets of both Davin and Rhegos. ^2[] Henry Seemore, Jr., et al. v. Davin Wheels, Inc., P.B. No. 07-4813 (Filed September 12, 2007); Henry Seemore, Jr., et al. v. The Rhegos Group, Inc., P.B. 07-4814 (Filed September 12, 2007). The principal assets of both corporations consisted of the patent, names, trademarks, and all associated intellectual property rights of Davin's brand of motor vehicle wheels, particularly its patented continuous motion technology custom "spinner" wheels, as well as the associated customer and distributor lists, inventory and equipment. A permanent receiver of the corporations was appointed thereafter.

During the receivership proceeding, this Court entered an order approving Plaintiff's secured claim totaling $2,583,168.68. (Pl. Ex. 1(V).) The receiver, pursuant to an appropriate court order, sold and disposed of the corporate assets. Plaintiff received a $150,000 distribution on account of its allowed secured claim. Plaintiff demanded payment from the Defendants under their respective guaranties and proceeded to file the instant action for such indebtedness.

II Standard of Review

It is well-settled in Rhode Island that the role of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is merely to test the sufficiency of the complaint. See Toste Farm Corp. v. Hadbury, Inc., 798 A.2d 901, 905 (R.I. 2002) (quoting R.I. Employment Sec. Alliance, Local 401, S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO v. State Dep't of Employment and Training, 788 A.2d 465, 467 (R.I. 2002)). "When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the trial justice must look no further than the complaint, assume that all allegations in the complaint are true, and resolve any doubts in a [non-movant's] favor." Id. (quoting Rhode Island Affiliate, ACLU v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989)). The court should grant such a motion "only when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the [non-movant] would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the claim." Siena v. Microsoft Corp., 796 A.2d 461, 463 (R.I. 2002).

However, a judge need not reject affidavits or other evidence presented in support of a motion to dismiss. Laurence v. Sollitto, 788 A.2d 455, 457 (R.I. 2002). Rather, when the court receives a dismissal motion which, as in the instant matter, relies on evidence outside the pleadings, "it must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." Strynar v. Rahill, 793 A.2d 206, 209 (R.I. 2002). Since matters outside the pleading have been presented to and not excluded by this Court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. Super. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b). All parties have been given reasonable opportunity to present all materials pertinent to a Rule 56 motion. Id.

Summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "no genuine issue of material fact is evident from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, and the motion justice finds that the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1038 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Rule 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, "the court may not pass on the weight or credibility of the evidence but must consider the affidavits and other pleadings in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820, 822 (R.I. 1980). During a summary judgment proceeding, "the justice's only function is to determine whether there are any issues involving material facts." Id. (quoting Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338, 340 (R.I. 1981)). "Therefore, summary judgment should enter 'against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case * * *.'" Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (construing the substantially similar federal rule)).

III Discussion

In the instant matter, Plaintiff has filed a complaint seeking payment from each of the Defendants under their respective guaranties. In their counterclaims, Defendants argue inter alia, that Plaintiff fraudulently induced them into entering into the Original Loan and the various personal guaranties. In addition to attacking each of the sixteen counts of the counterclaims individually, Plaintiff also argues that all or most of the claims asserted by the Defendants should be barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel, novation, res judicata, and/or collateral estoppel. Plaintiff argues that the claims asserted by the Defendants in Counts I, III, V, VII, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, and XVI^3[] of the counterclaims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these same claims and issues in the previous receivership proceeding. According to the Plaintiff, all of these claims, even those relating to the Original Loan, were part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action in the receivership proceeding arose. However, the Defendants argue that the limited nature of a receivership proceeding precludes application of res judicata to bar subsequent litigation of claims arising from transactions possibly at issue during the receivership.

The doctrine of res judicata applies as an absolute bar to a second cause of action where there exist identity of parties identity of issues, and finality of judgment in an earlier action. Plunkett, 869 A.2d at 1188 (R.I. 2004) (citing Beirne v. Barone, 529 A.2d 154, 157 (R.I. 1987)). The term "res judicata" is commonly used to refer to two preclusion doctrines: (1) collateral estoppel or issue preclusion; and (2) res judicata or claim preclusion. Plunkett v. State, 869 A.2d 1185, 1188 (R.I. 2005) (citing Foster-Glocester Regional School Committee v. Board of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 1014 (R.I. 2004)). In Plunkett, the Rhode Island Supreme Court chose to follow the United States Supreme Court by electing to use the terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion," instead of res...