Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Wallace

• Decision Date: 26 November 1918
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 570
• Citation: 80 So. 691,16 Ala.App. 617
• Parties: SOVEREIGN CAMP WOODMEN OF THE WORLD v. WALLACE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

80 So. 691

16 Ala.App. 617

SOVEREIGN CAMP WOODMEN OF THE WORLD v. WALLACE.

4 Div. 570

Court of Appeals of Alabama

November 26, 1918

On Rehearing, December 17, 1918

Appeal from Circuit Court, Coffee County; R.I. Jones, Judge.

Action by Edie Wallace against the Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

C.H. Roquemore, of Montgomery, for appellant.

Baldwin & Murphy, of Andalusia, for appellee.

SAMFORD J.

The plaintiff's husband joined the defendant order on October 10, 1910, at which time there was issued to him a policy of life insurance, naming the plaintiff as beneficiary. The premiums or assessments due on the policy were $1.35, payable monthly in advance, and in default of payment for any assessment for 30 days, the member stood suspended and the insurance lapsed. There was indorsed on the policy at the time of delivery the following:

"He has made all payments required and has been introduced as a member of this camp. Signed Oct. 10th, 1910 T.A. Goodwin, Consul Commander. W.O. Searcy, Clerk."

Also the following indorsement:

"First liable for assessment #242 Nov."

It was in evidence that T.A. Goodwin was the consul commander, W.O Searcy the clerk, and 242 was the number of the assessment due November, 1910. There was some confusion as to some of the receipts issued to the deceased for assessments, but it was admitted by the defendant that the deceased had paid 56 assessments. If the first assessment for which deceased was liable was No. 242, November, 1910, as indicated by the indorsement on the policy, then deceased was not in default on June 1, 1915, and hence he was not suspended, as his policy was in full force at the time of his death. Besides under the terms of the contract of insurance, if the assessment for June was paid on or before July 1st, the deceased was not in default. The receipt for this payment issued to the deceased and introduced in evidence bore date of July 1st, and therefore, notwithstanding the testimony of Jeffcoat, the defendant clerk, that he could not be positive about receiving the payment on July 1st, the question was properly submitted to the jury. The fact that deceased had accepted annual receipts erroneously showing payments which if true, would place him in default, would not estop him from showing the true facts. These were questions of fact under the evidence, to be determined by the jury, and the court did not err in refusing to give at the request of the defendant the general charge. There was no error in permitting the witness Searcy...