Sowards v. Loudon County, 98-6768

• Citation: 203 F.3d 426
• Decision Date: 26 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-6768,98-6768
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2000) Wanda Sowards, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Loudon County, Tennessee and Timothy Guider, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Loudon County, Tennessee, Defendants-Appellees. Argued:
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 426

203 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2000)

Wanda Sowards, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Loudon County, Tennessee and Timothy Guider, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Loudon County, Tennessee, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-6768

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Argued: October 26, 1999

Decided and Filed: February 8, 2000

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied March 24, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville; No. 96-00659--James H. Jarvis, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Peter Alliman, WHITE, CARSON & ALLIMAN, Madisonville, Tennessee, for Appellant.

Dean B. Farmer, HODGES, DOUGHTY & CARSON, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: JONES, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Wanda Sowards filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Loudon County and the Sheriff of Loudon County Timothy Guider, in his individual and official capacities, claiming that she was terminated from her position as a jailer at the Loudon County Sheriff's Department in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights of political and intimate association. Sowards's husband, William Sowards, had run unsuccessfully for sheriff against Guider in early 1994. Guider terminated Sowards's employment in July 1995 allegedly because she missed an outstanding warrant on a person brought into the jail. The district court granted Loudon County and Guider's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case because it found no genuine issue of material fact existed to show Sowards's constitutionally protected activity substantially motivated Guider to terminate her employment. Sowards appeals the dismissal of her case. Loudon County and Guider respond that even if Sowards's First Amendment rights were violated, political affiliation is a proper consideration for the position of a jailer under the Elrod/Branti exception. In addition, they claim that Guider is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity.

We conclude that Sowards has established that she suffered an adverse action while engaged in constitutionally protected activity. A genuine issue of material fact exists whether Guider's action was substantially motivated by this activity. Because political considerations are not appropriate for the position of a jailer, we hold that the Elrod/Branti exception to the First Amendment rule protecting public employees against politically-based dismissals does not apply in this case. Finally, Guider is not entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity. Therefore, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings in Sowards's retaliation suit against Loudon County and Guider.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Wanda Sowards began working at the Loudon County Sheriff's Department ("LCSD") as a road deputy in 1986 and then transferred to the position of a jailer in 1989. In early 1994, her husband, William Sowards, announced that he would be running as a Republican for the position of Sheriff of Loudon County against incumbent Timothy Guider, also a Republican. Sowards's husband lost to Guider in the Republican primary election in May 1994.

Sowards claims that after her husband announced his candidacy, her work environment changed significantly. She asserts that her supervisors ostracized her, disciplined her more harshly than her co-workers, changed her day shift to a split shift, and reduced her overtime opportunities. Finally, on July 19, 1995, she was terminated allegedly because she had missed an outstanding warrant.

On June 28, 1995, Edward D. Ricker was arrested on a DUI charge and brought to the LCSD jail. Sowards was working on that date and was responsible for checking for any outstanding warrants on persons brought into the facility. She claims that she did not find an outstanding warrant on Ricker because she had understood his name to be "Wicker," resulting in Ricker later being released without the warrant being served. Sowards's supervisor, Chief Jailer Joe Bridges, recommended terminating her employment because the warrant involved a serious burglary charge that had been outstanding for over one year. He did not consider the fact that she may have misunderstood the person's name to be an important consideration in his recommendation. After receiving Bridges's recommendation, Guider did not conduct any further investigation. A few days later he agreed to terminate Sowards's employment.

Sowards filed a complaint against Loudon County and Guider, in his individual and official capacities, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that she was terminated in retaliation for the exercise of her First Amendment rights of political and intimate association. Loudon County and Guider filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Sowards's retaliation claim. They also claimed that political considerations are appropriate for the position of a jailer under the Elrod/Branti exception and that Guider is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity. The district court granted Loudon County and Guider's motion in part and dismissed Sowards's claim based on the right of intimate association. The district court denied their motion with respect to Sowards's claim based on the right of political association and found insufficient evidence upon which to decide whether political considerations are appropriate for the position of a jailer and to evaluate the defense of qualified immunity. After more discovery, Loudon County and Guider filed a second motion for summary judgment based on the same arguments. Sowards filed a response to this motion and a motion to reconsider the district court's dismissal of her right of intimate association claim. The district court granted Sowards's motion to reconsider her right of intimate association claim but then granted Loudon County and Guider's motion for summary judgment dismissing all of Sowards's claims. It reasoned that no rational juror could find Guider's decision to terminate Sowards was substantially motivated by the exercise of her First Amendment rights of political and intimate association. Sowards filed a timely notice of appeal of the district court's decision.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sowards's First Amendment Retaliation Claim

A district court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See General Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1097 (6th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We must look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The proper inquiry is whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476-80 (6th Cir. 1989). We view inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See General Elec. Co., 29 F.3d at 1097-98.

Sowards claims that she was terminated from her position as a jailer at the LCSD for exercising her First Amendment rights of political and intimate association in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to establish retaliation for engaging in constitutionally protected activity, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: "(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two - that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct." Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In brief, this analysis focuses on whether the adverse employment action was motivated in substantial part by the plaintiff's constitutionally protected activity. See Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 520-21 (6th Cir. 1999). If the plaintiff meets her burden, the burden then shifts to the defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment decision would have been the same absent the protected conduct. See Kreuzer v. Brown, 128 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1802 (1998); see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).¹

1. Protected Conduct

To prove the first element of retaliation, Sowards argues that she was exercising her rights of both political and intimate association protected by the First Amendment. The right of political association is a well established right under the First Amendment for "'political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.'" Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 69 (1990) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)). Support of a political candidate falls within the scope of the right of political association. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356-57. Therefore, Sowards was exercising her constitutionally protected right of political association by supporting her husband's campaign for the office of Sheriff of Loudon County.

Sowards also claims that she was retaliated against because of her exercise of her First Amendment right of intimate association with her husband. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984), the Supreme Court stated that one type of constitutionally protected freedom of association is the right "to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships [which] must be secured against undue intrusion by the State...