Sowles v. Urschel Laboratories, Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 April 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-1732,78-1732 |
| Citation | 595 F.2d 1361 |
| Parties | William H. SOWLES, Appellant, v. URSCHEL LABORATORIES, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
David A. Stofferahn (on brief), of Grose, Von Holtum, Von Holtum, Sieben & Schmidt, Minneapolis, Minn., argued, for appellant; Paul L. Pond, Worthington, Minn., on brief.
John M. Kennedy, Jr. (on brief), of Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, St. Paul, Minn., argued, for appellee.
Before HEANEY and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges, and SCHATZ, * District Judge.
This products liability case arose when the plaintiff-appellant, William Sowles, injured his hand trying to unclog the blades of a poultry dicing machine while working for Campbell Soup Company in Worthington, Minnesota. Sowles brought suit against Urschel Laboratories, Inc. (hereinafter Urschel), an Indiana corporation which manufactured the machine in question. Sowles alleged that the machine itself was defective and, further, that Urschel was negligent in failing to provide adequate instructions concerning a safe method to unclog the dicer blades. Jurisdiction was founded on diversity of citizenship and the matter is for resolution under Minnesota law. By answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that the machine was not defective, but that Urschel was guilty of negligence and rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The district court granted Urschel's post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and Sowles appeals. The question presented to this court is whether the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the jury's verdict of liability on the part of Urschel. We affirm.
The facts are these. Sowles began working for Campbell Soup Company (hereafter Campbell) in 1952. From 1962 until his accident on May 1, 1972, Sowles worked full time in the dicing department of the company plant. His primary duties involved counting and weighing boxes of poultry meat which had been prepared for use in Campbell's canned products. On occasion Sowles would also substitute for other employees and perform their duties. Sowles estimated at trial that approximately ten per cent of his time was spent as a dicing machine operator.
The dicing operation at Campbell consists of a mechanized system of conveyor belts which carry poultry meat through its various stages of preparation. Deboned meat is first taken to a "shaker room" where it is chilled to a temperature considered appropriate for dicing. The chilled meat is then directed on a conveyor belt toward two side-by-side dicing machines where it is dropped into stainless steel hoppers. The machine operator places the meat into the feeder chute of the machine which leads to the blades, where the meat is diced into one-inch cubes. The cubed meat then travels by conveyor belt to the boxing area preparatory to freezing.
Not infrequently the blades of the dicing machines become clogged with meat, either because some of the meat is frozen or because meat is fed into the machine faster than the blades can dice it. When this happens it is the job of the machine operator to remove the excess meat, which task is usually performed by placing one's arm into the feeder chute and manually dislodging the meat from the blades.
For many years Campbell has had in effect a work rule requiring its machine operators to follow a three-step procedure before attempting to remove meat from the dicer blades. This procedure requires shutting off the power to the conveyor system feeding into the machine, shutting off the power to the dicing machine itself by pressing the off switch and, finally, shutting off all power to the machine by disconnecting the electrical plug from its nearby wall socket.
Each dicing machine has its own electrical plug, both of which are inserted into separate outlets of a single over-and-under wall socket. Each machine also has its own set of on-off switches consisting of two vertically arranged buttons, the on button being located on top. Both sets of switches are mounted on a post located several feet from the dicing machines and, like the machines, the two sets of switches are attached side by side. However, depending upon which outlet the machines are plugged into, either of the given machines might be operated by either set of switches. Often, the machines are removed from their positions on the conveyor line for the purpose of cleaning or repair. Since the machines are identical, they might be returned to the conveyor line in an order opposite from their original positions. Neither the switches nor the machines are marked in such a way as to indicate which set of switches operate which machine.
On direct examination, Sowles testified as follows concerning his understanding of the on-off switches and their relationship to the dicing machines Q. So if the cords to the machine were reversed in the wall sockets, that would reverse the switches on the post?
A. (Sowles) That would reverse the switches on the post.
Q. So what is labeled as "one dicer right" on that picture would not operate the one dicer right, necessarily?
A. I would say that it wouldn't.
Q. This would be because the dicers could be interchanged?
A. The dicers would be interchanged.
Q. Was this the situation during the whole time you worked in the dicing room, Mr. Sowles?
A. From 1965, at least, on.
Q. You were aware of the situation?
A. I was aware of the situation.
On May 1, 1972, the day of his accident, Sowles was working as a machine operator when the blades of both dicers became clogged with meat at about the same time. Sowles pressed one of the off buttons, but did not disconnect the wall plugs. He then successfully unclogged the machine located to his right and reactivated the same by pressing the on button. Thinking that he had earlier shut off the power to both machines, Sowles then placed his arm into the feeder chute of the left machine. The left machine was still on, however, and the roll bars drew Sowles' hand down into the dicer blades, severely lacerating his three center fingers. Sowles was unable to remove his hand from the machine until a co-worker disconnected the wall plug.
This incident represented the second time Sowles had attempted to unclog a dicing machine while it was still running. In October of 1968, he had also reached his arm into the feeder chute under a mistaken belief that he had shut off the machine. On that occasion, however, Sowles was wearing a freezer glove and, while the glove was torn from his hand, Sowles escaped uninjured. Following that incident, Sowles was given a written reprimand by his employer for not following company safety regulations.
Sowles contended at trial that Urschel, as the manufacturer of the dicing machine, had negligently caused Sowles' injury because its operator's manual failed to provide proper instructions on how to safely unclog the dicer blades. In answer to a special interrogatory, the jury apportioned responsibility for Sowles' injury as follows: Campbell 45%, Urschel 29%, Sowles 26%. The jury also determined that Sowles had sustained damages in the amount of $24,500. Following a hearing on Urschel's motion for judgment n. o. v. or in the alternative for a new trial, the district court concluded that the evidence of record was insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict of liability, and accordingly, granted Urschel's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
In testing the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a jury verdict in diversity actions, this court has applied the appropriate state sufficiency standard where, as here, the issue has not been raised by the parties and the state and federal standards are similar. McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir. 1978); Gisriel v. Uniroyal, Inc., 517 F.2d 699, 701 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1975); Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586, 589-90 (8th Cir. 1960) (applying Minnesota law). Therefore, we look for guidance to the Minnesota courts, which instruct us that
(A) motion for a judgment notwithstanding, whether based on negligence or on contributory negligence, should be denied unless the evidence in support of the verdict, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, be so wholly incredible and unworthy of belief or so conclusively overcome by other uncontradicted evidence that the want of negligence or the presence of contributory negligence is so clear as to leave no room for an honest difference of opinion among reasonable men.
Johnson v. Evanski, 221 Minn. 323, 22 N.W.2d 213, 215 (1946); See also Stapleman v. St. Joseph the Worker, 295 Minn. 406, 205
N.W.2d 677, 679 (1973); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1967). Applying this standard to the record before us, we conclude that...
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