Spagnola v. New Method Laundry Co.
| Decision Date | 12 December 1930 |
| Citation | 152 A. 403,112 Conn. 399 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | SPAGNOLA v. NEW METHOD LAUNDRY CO. |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Hartford County; Thomas J Molloy, Judge.
Action for damages by Jean Spagnola against the New Method Laundry Corporation and another for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, tried to a jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, which, on defendant's motion, was set aside by the court, and the plaintiff appealed.
Error and judgment on the verdict directed.
Frank Covello, of Hartford, for appellant.
Charles H. Walker and W. Arthur Countryman, Jr. both of Hartford, for appellees.
Argued before MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.
This appeal involves but a single question, viz.: Was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law? A careful reading of all the evidence given on this feature of the case satisfies us that the jury could reasonably have found that the plaintiff had stopped near the trolley rail to allow an approaching trolley car to pass; instead of passing the car came to a full stop, and the motorman motioned to the plaintiff to pass in front of the standing car. It is a reasonable inference that at this time the defendant's automobile was not within the vision of the plaintiff, being on the other side of the car. Conforming to the direction of the motorman to pass in front of his car, the plaintiff did so, and had gone but two feet, and so about one ordinary step involving but a fraction of a second, past the car, when she was struck by the automobile, and so quickly she did not hear or see it. The jury could have found, and obviously did find, that the automobile driver was negligent. He was passing rapidly within about two feet of the side of a standing trolley car. As an intelligent driver, familiar with street traffic he knew that either a passenger or some other pedestrian was liable to cross in front of the car and into his path, and the situation was such that neither could see the other until the danger of collision was imminent. He was bound to exercise care commensurate with the dangers of the situation, and he clearly did not do so. Excessive speed is clearly indicated by brake marks for more than forty feet on the roadway, yet his car not only failed to stop but was passing the trolley car at a considerable speed. He neither sounded his horn nor...
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Dix v. Spampinato
...or other vehicle, six jurisdictions have concluded under the facts of each case that it is a jury issue: Spagnola v. New Method Laundry Corp., 112 Conn. 399, 152 A. 403 (1930); Sweet v. Ringwelski, 362 Mich. 138, 106 N.W.2d 742 (1961); Gamet v. Jenks, 38 Mich.App. 719, 197 N.W.2d 160 (1972)......
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Dix v. Spampinato, 977
...We shall first set forth those decisions where it was concluded that the liability issue was for the jury. In Spagnola v. New Method Laundry Co., 112 Conn. 399, 152 A. 403 (1930) a pedestrian was struck by an automobile as she passed in front of a street car. The motorman had motioned to he......
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Frey v. Woodard, Civ. A. No. 79-1458
...Holbert, 146 W.Va. 582, 122 S.E.2d 43 (1961); Cunningham v. Walsh, 53 R.I. 23, 163 A. 223 (1932); Spagnola v. New Method Laundry Corp., 112 Conn. 399, 152 A. 403 (1930). Some cases which reject the theory of the growing majority involved minor plaintiffs who, conceivably, could easily be mi......
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Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Wray
...cases initially appearing to provide guidance are of little utility in deciding the issue before us. While Spagnola v. New Method Laundry Corporation, 112 Conn. 399, 152 A. 403 (1930), and Cunningham v. Walsh, 53 R.I. 23, 163 A. 223 (1932), involve reliance upon a hand signal, the liability......