Spahn v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 26 March 1937 |
| Citation | 268 Ky. 97 |
| Parties | Spahn et al. v. Stewart et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
5. Constitutional Law. — Statute authorizing cities of first class to create Municipal Housing Commission for purpose of clearance of slums and erection and maintenance of low cost houses held not void as delegation to mayors of such cities of legislative power, since mayors have only power of appointment (Acts 1934, c. 113).
6. Constitutional Law. — Act authorizing cities of first class to create Municipal Housing Commission for purpose of clearance of slums and erection and maintenance of low cost houses held not void on ground that Municipal Housing Commission is vested with legislative power (Acts 1934, c. 113).
7. Municipal Corporations. — A "public purpose" has for its objective the promotion of public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political subdivision, such as a municipality, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose.
8. Statutes. — Where General Assembly in authorizing cities of the first class to create Municipal Housing Commission for clearance of slums and erection of low cost houses declared the plan to involve objects essential to public interest, declaration was not binding on the court as determination that result sought was public use, but conclusions would be given considerable effect (Acts 1934, c. 113).
9. Statutes. — Motives that influence legislative body in enacting measures improving slum districts will not be inquired into, except in rare cases, where it is manifest that flagrant wrong has been perpetrated on the public (Acts 1934, c. 113).
10. Eminent Domain. — Question of necessity for exercise of eminent domain is one primarily and almost exclusive for legislative branch, while question of whether use to which proposed condemned property be put is public use or purpose, is one to be determined by the judiciary.
11. Constitutional Law. — Fact that act authorizing cities of the first class to create a Municipal Housing Commission for the purpose of clearance of slums and erection of low cost houses limits use of improved property to such persons as may be selected to occupy it does not brand purpose of act as class or special legislation so as to render it unconstitutional (Acts 1934, c. 113).
The word "slum" has come to have a well-defined meaning, applicable to sections of almost every city or town of proportions. It is usually taken to mean a squalid, dirty street or quarter of a city, town, or village, ordinarily inhabited by the very poor, destitute, or criminal classes; overcrowding is usually a prevailing characteristic.
12. Municipal Corporations. — Fact that some would reap more benefit than others from act authorizing cities of the first class to create Municipal Housing Commission for purpose of clearance of slums and erection and maintenance of low cost houses does not render act unconstitutional (Acts 1934, c. 113).
13. Municipal Corporations. — Act authorizing cities of the first class to create Municipal Housing Commission for purpose of clearance of slums and erection and maintenance of low cost houses held not unconstitutional on ground that act put government into competition with private enterprise (Acts 1934, c. 113).
14. Taxation. — Bonds issued under provision of act authorizing cities of the first class to create Municipal Housing Commission for clearance of slums and erection and maintenance of low cost houses held properly exempted from taxation, since property acquired was to be used for public purpose and condemnation was not violation of Constitution (Acts 1934, c. 113).
15. Municipal Corporations. — That act, authorizing cities of the first class to create a Municipal Housing Commission for clearance of slums and erection and maintenance of low cost houses, and ordinance required, because of condition of federal grant, certain prescribed wages and hours of workmen, did not render act invalid on ground that it violated charter of cities requiring contracts to be let on "competitive bidding" to lowest and best bidder (Acts 1934, c. 113).
"Competitive bidding" is such bidding as requires that all bidders be placed on a plane of equality and that they bid on the same terms and conditions and requires that the city council by due advertisement give every one an opportunity to bid.
16. Municipal Corporations. — Where Legislature delegates power to municipal corporation, municipal corporation has implied right to select means by which purpose may be accomplished, provided that adopted means do not transcend any constitutional inhibition.
17. Municipal Corporations. — Resolution in act authorizing cities of the first class to create a Municipal Housing Commission for the purpose of clearance of slums and erection of low-cost houses held valid as in keeping with the act, and not contrary to its terms (Acts 1934, c. 113).
18. States. — Act authorizing cities of the first class to create a Municipal Housing Commission for the purpose of clearance of slums and erection of low-cost houses held not unconstitutional for delegating powers of the state, the municipality, or the Housing Commission, to the federal government (Acts 1934, c. 113).
19. Constituitonal Law. — Forbidden legislative delegation of powers is the delegation of the exercise of discretion as to what a law shall be, and not a delegation of discretion in the administration of the law itself.
20. Municipal Corporations. — Act authorizing cities of the first class to create a Municipal Housing Commission for the purpose of clearance of slums and erection of low-cost houses held not to prevent city from providing for necessary expenses of a Municipal Housing Commission, since purpose of act is a public one (Acts 1934, c. 113).
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.
WALLACE A. McKAY for appellants.
H.O. WILLIAMS and MARK BEAUCHAMP for appellees.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY MORRIS, COMMISSIONER.Affirming.
The 1934 General Assembly enacted chapter 113, authorizing cities of the first class to create a Municipal Housing Commission for the purpose of improving internal conditions by carrying out a plan for the clearance of slums and to erect and maintain low cost houses in keeping with modern, sanitary, and safe methods.
The act and ordinance were so enacted and adopted that such cities might be entitled to the advantage of the provisions of Acts of Congress, extending to states and municipalities certain grants of money in furtherance of a purpose to better the standards of living.
Substantially the act provides that any city of the first class may establish an agency to investigate housing and living conditions; to plan and effectuate projects for the clearing of slum districts and to furnish instead reconstructed homes at reasonable rentals to persons of low incomes. The Commission is authorized to sell tax exempted bonds which are not to be obligations of the city, county, or state. Power of exercising the right of eminent domain is given the Commission. It was also empowered after reconstruction, to rent the new habitations, applying the proceeds of such rentals to payment of interest on and for retirement of the bonds and obligations of the Commission; to provide a sinking fund to be applied to upkeep, necessary improvements, and for deterioration. Any surplus is to go to the sinking fund of the city for the meeting of its bonded or other governmental indebtedness. Under the act the Commission may be paid limited compensation for services, either in form of a salary or per diem.
Conceiving both the act and ordinance to be invalid, appellants filed petition in the lower court seeking to perpetually enjoin the Commission from proceeding further under the ordinance mentioned. Appellant Spahn owns property within the subjected boundary; Silk, another appellant is the owner of rental property outside the proposed boundary. Both are taxpayers and sue not only for themselves and others owning property within and without the boundary, but for all taxpayers of the city. The relief sought was denied by the lower court, demurrer to the petition being sustained, followed by dismissal upon a declination to plead further.
The pleadings fully state jurisdictional and other facts to the extent that a case is presented. The right of appellants to institute and prosecute such a suit is not challenged. The first contention of appellants is,...
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