Spalding v. Granite City
| Decision Date | 26 June 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 32874,32874 |
| Citation | 113 N.E.2d 567,415 Ill. 274 |
| Parties | SPALDING v. GRANITE CITY. * |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Randall Robertson, of Granite City, for appellant.
Fred P. Schuman, of Granite City, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from an order of the circuit court of Madison County entered in an action for declaratory judgment on March 30, 1953, wherein sections 60-12 through 60-18 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act were held to be constitutional. Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 24, pars. 60-12 to 60-18.
The plaintiff, a resident of the former city of Nameoki, now a part of Granite City, a property owner, taxpayer, and a prospective user of the sewer system, filed this complaint seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the constitutionality of these sections by which the city of Granite City seeks to finance an extension of its sewer system. The complaint alleged that pursuant to the requests of the residents and property owners of the Nameoki area of the city of Granite City, the council adopted a resolution on December 1, 1952, declaring its intention to construct an extension to its existing sewerage system to serve the Nameoki area. Granite City is a municipal corporation of around 35,000 population. In 1949 it annexed to it another city known as the city of Nameoki, populated by some five or six thousand inhabitants, and now known as the Nameoki area of Granite City. Prior to the annexation, Granite City had installed an extensive sewerage system serving the entire city. The city of Nameoki had no sewerage system and its sewerage was and now is disposed of by septic tanks and cesspools. It is stipulated by the parties hereto that this is an exact statement of facts, and that the lack of an adequate sewerage system constitutes a serious menace to the public health of the entire city. It is further stipulated that the present population of the Nameoki area is about 8000 persons, and is expected to increase by 4000 persons within the near future. The resolution set forth the boundaries of the proposed sewerage system extension, of what the system would consist, its estimated cost, possible rates to be charged users thereof, reserved the right of the city council to establish separate and different property classifications and to establish separate and different rates as the occasion may arise, and stated the connection charge. Under the provision of the resolution a public hearing was held and notice was sent to persons as provided by law. At the public hearing it was unanimously agreed that the project be built as provided in the resolution and on January 15, 1953, in accordance with the wishes of the persons at the hearing, the city council adopted a second resolution determining to proceed with the construction and acquisition of said sewerage system extension, and to adopt an ordinance for the issuance of sewer revenue bonds to defray the cost of said extension.
The complaint alleged several constitutional reasons why the statute, under the provisions of which Granite City proposes to construct this sewerage system extension, is invalid. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed for a declaratory judment finding the statute unconstitutional and the resolutions of the city under said statute illegal. The procedure of the city council pursuant to said statute is not in issue.
The matter was submitted to the court on the pleadings and stipulation of the parties, together with arguments of counsel thereon. The circuit court of Madison County held the statute constitutional, the proceedings thereunder by the city of Granite City legal and binding obligations, and authorized the construction program of the sewerage system extention.
It is first urged by plaintiff that the statute here in issue is in violation of the constitution of the United States and of the State of Illinois in that it permits plaintiff to be deprived of his property without due process of law. Plaintiff contends that the city has singled out an area for the purpose of locating a sewer system and seeks to issue revenue bonds to finance the construction of said system payable solely by the inhabitants of the area where the sewer is to be located. Thus it is urged that the statute is in violation of the due-process clause of both constitutions in that it does not apply to all of the citizens of the community and is a private law affecting only the rights of individuals in the locality to be served. Hence, property owners in the locality to be served will be burdened with an expense for the use of a sewer system that other citizens of the city do not have to bear while enjoying the complete use of the sewer system without any such charge.
The case at hand involves a situation where a privilege is extended to the property owners of the area to avail themselves of the use of the sewer or not as they see fit, and where the price to be paid for the privilege is tentatively fixed beforehand. Where the sue of such privilege is left optional with the property owner, by his election to avail himself of it or not, he contracts with the city to pay the rental fixed by its ordinance, if he elects to use it. It is obvious that plaintiff will be subject to no charge unless he elects to use the sewer, and such election constitutes a contract between himself and the city to pay so much as is the fixed charge for the use thereof. Carson v. Sewer Commissioners of Brockton, 182 U.S. 398, 21 S.Ct. 860, 45 L.Ed. 1151. There is no element of deprivation here or even of taxation, but one of contract, into which the property owner may or may not enter. There is no allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff will be required to discharge into this sewer system. No allegation is made that the present charges fixed by the council are unreasonable in any particular. Since the property owner may use the sewer or not, as he sees fit, and if he does choose to use it he contracts to pay a charge, certainly no deprivation of property without due process of law occurs.
The moneys obtained from the use of the proposed sewer will go to retire the revenue bonds issued to pay for the construction of this sewer extension. It is only those property owners located in the area to be served by this sewer who will have access to the use of this sewer. Other citizens of the city of Granite City who are not located in the Nameoki area cannot use this sewer extension. Moreover, those citizens use a sewer previously constructed and for which they have paid their taxes unaided by the residents of the Nameoki area.
It has been stipulated and agreed between the parties that the construction of a sewerage system to serve the Nameoki area is necessary to remove a serious health menace. Laws which tend to promote public health, comfort, safety and general welfare are deemed proper exercise of the police power. The legislature has the full right to delegate the execution of the police power to a municipality and vest it with the authority necessary for the execution of that power. People ex rel. Royal v. Cain, 410 Ill. 39, 101 N.E.2d 74. The constitutional guaranties that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, were not intended to limit the subjects upon which the police power of the State may lawfully be asserted in matters of health protection any more than in any other connection. It has been almost universally versally held in this country that the constitutional guaranties, including the prohibition of deprivation of property without due process, must yield to the statutes and ordinances designed to promote the public health as a part of the police powers of the State. People ex rel. Baker v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N.E.2d 441; People v. Anderson, 355 Ill. 289, 189 N.E. 338; City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198, 4 N.E.2d 78, 106 A.L.R. 789. It is manifest that the purpose of the statute is to permit the construction of sewers for the disposal of wastes and the ensuing protection of the public health. It is stipulated that the enactment of the resolution and all these proceedings by the city council in this situation were for the very purpose of eliminating an existing menace to the public health. The statute in question and the resolutions of the city council are, therefore, proper enactments under the police power. No constitutional rights could possibly have been infringed by these proceedings since such rights must yield to a valid exercise of the police power.
The second issue urged by the plaintiff is that this statute permits the city council to extend a sewer system into a particular locality to a class of...
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