Spalding v. Waxler, No. 38676

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Writing for the Court: MATTHIAS; TAFT; SCHNEIDER; ZIMMERMAN
• Citation: 205 N.E.2d 890,2 Ohio St.2d 1
• Parties: , 31 O.O.2d 1 SPALDING, Appellant, v. WAXLER; Oates, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 38676
• Decision Date: 31 March 1965

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2 Ohio St.2d 1 205 N.E.2d 890, 31 O.O.2d 1 SPALDING, Appellant,
v.
WAXLER; Oates, Appellee. No. 38676. Supreme Court of Ohio. March 31, 1965.

[205 N.E.2d 891] Syllabus by the Court

1. Any unexcused failure to comply with the assured-clear-distance-ahead provision of Section 4511.21, Revised Code, constitutes negligence per se. (Paragraph two of the syllabus of Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427, approved and followed.)

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2. Any unexcused failure to drive on the right side of the road as required by Section 4511.25, Revised Code, constitutes negligence per se.

3. Section 4513.20, Revised Code, which governs brake equipment, imposes a specific duty on an operator of a motor vehicle on the public highways to have brakes capable of stopping the vehicle within [205 N.E.2d 892] specified distances; to have two separate means of applying the brakes; and to maintain them in good working order.

4. Any unexcused failure to comply with the requirements of Section 4513.20, Revised Code, which governs brake equipment, constitutes negligence per se.

5. An emergency which will relieve a motorist of his duty to comply with a safety statute regulating vehicular traffic must arise as the result of something over which he has no control. A self-created emergency, one arising from the driver's own conduct or from circumstances under his control, cannot serve as an excuse. (Satterthwaite v. Morgan, 141 Ohio St. 447, 48 N.E.2d 653, distinguished.)

6. Brake failure cannot be a legal excuse for failure to comply with a safety statute regulating the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries originating in the Court of Common Pleas of Hardin County.

On May 29, 1958, at approximately 4:50 p. m., appellant, Ross Spalding, plaintiff herein, was injured in an automobile collision which occurred on South Main Street in the city of Kenton near the intersection of Letson Street. South Main Street is a main thoroughfare extending in a northerly-southerly direction.

At about the time in question, plaintiff was a passenger in his automobile which was being driven by his wife. They were traveling in a northerly direction.

Defendant Raymond A. Oates was driving south on Main

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Street in a truck, loaded with stone, owned by defendant Paul Waxler. Traveling ahead of him in the same direction was an automobile driven by one Elizabeth Layton. Mrs. Layton slowed her car as she prepared to turn right onto Letson Street. Defendant Oates applied his foot brake 50 feet away to avoid hitting the Layton automobile. The brake failed to stop the truck within the assured clear distance ahead, and the truck glanced off the left year end of the Layton car, crossed the center line and collided with the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger.

Plaintiff brought the action against both the owner and the driver but before going to trial elected to proceed against only the driver, defendant Oates, hereinafter called defendant.

Defendant denies negligence, claiming that the collision resulted from the sudden failure of his foot brake. He introduced testimony tending to show that the truck was regularly serviced, that the brakes had been inspected and adjusted less than six months prior to the collision, and that he had no warning that his foot brake would fail. He testified that he had no time after the foot brake failed to attempt to use his emergency brake.

The trial court instructed the jury that brake failure would not excuse the violation of either the assured-clear-distance-ahead staute (Section 4511.21, Revised Code) or the center-line statutes (Sections 4511.25 and 4511.26, Revised Code). The question of whether defendant complied with these sections was left to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and judgment was entered on the verdict.

The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court, holding that the instruction regarding the assured-clear-distance-ahead statute was prejudicially erroneous. The majority found that it was for the jury to decide whether the failure of the foot brake was an emergency caused by circumstances over which defendant had no control and whether the failure to use the emergency brake should be excused for lack of time. The majority was divided as to whether the instruction with respect to the center-line statutes was prejudicially erroneous.

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The Court of Appeals found that its judgment is in conflict with that of the [205 N.E.2d 893] Court of Appeals of the Seventh Appellate District in Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Grissom, 117 Ohio App. 464, 192 N.E.2d 658, and certified the record to this court for review and final determination.

Kaylor & McKinley, Kenton, and Richard W. Penn, Circleville, for appellant.

Paul T. Mahon, Kenton, and Charles Van Dyne, Ada, for appellee.

MATTHIAS, Judge.

It is conceded that the truck operated by defendant collided with the rear of an automobile proceeding ahead of it, crossed over the center line and collided with the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger.

Defendant thereby failed to stop within the assured clear distance ahead as required by Section 4511.21, Revised Code. He also failed to drive his vehicle on the right side of the roadway and did not give one half of the roadway to the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger, in violation of the requirements of Sections 4511.25 and 4511.26, Revised Code.

These sections were enacted for the public safety and establish specific requirements to be followed by operators of motor vehicles. Any unexcused failure to comply with...