Spalding v. Waxler, 38676

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation205 N.E.2d 890,2 Ohio St.2d 1
Docket NumberNo. 38676,38676
Parties, 31 O.O.2d 1 SPALDING, Appellant, v. WAXLER; Oates, Appellee.
Decision Date31 March 1965

Syllabus by the Court

1. Any unexcused failure to comply with the assured-clear-distance-ahead provision of Section 4511.21, Revised Code, constitutes negligence per se. (Paragraph two of the syllabus of Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427, approved and followed.)

2. Any unexcused failure to drive on the right side of the road as required by Section 4511.25, Revised Code, constitutes negligence per se.

3. Section 4513.20, Revised Code, which governs brake equipment, imposes a specific duty on an operator of a motor vehicle on the public highways to have brakes capable of stopping the vehicle within specified distances; to have two separate means of applying the brakes; and to maintain them in good working order.

4. Any unexcused failure to comply with the requirements of Section 4513.20, Revised Code, which governs brake equipment, constitutes negligence per se.

5. An emergency which will relieve a motorist of his duty to comply with a safety statute regulating vehicular traffic must arise as the result of something over which he has no control. A self-created emergency, one arising from the driver's own conduct or from circumstances under his control, cannot serve as an excuse. (Satterthwaite v. Morgan, 141 Ohio St. 447, 48 N.E.2d 653, distinguished.)

6. Brake failure cannot be a legal excuse for failure to comply with a safety statute regulating the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries originating in the Court of Common Pleas of Hardin County.

On May 29, 1958, at approximately 4:50 p. m., appellant, Ross Spalding, plaintiff herein, was injured in an automobile collision which occurred on South Main Street in the city of Kenton near the intersection of Letson Street. South Main Street is a main thoroughfare extending in a northerly-southerly direction.

At about the time in question, plaintiff was a passenger in his automobile which was being driven by his wife. They were traveling in a northerly direction.

Defendant Raymond A. Oates was driving south on Main Street in a truck, loaded with stone, owned by defendant Paul Waxler. Traveling ahead of him in the same direction was an automobile driven by one Elizabeth Layton. Mrs. Layton slowed her car as she prepared to turn right onto Letson Street. Defendant Oates applied his foot brake 50 feet away to avoid hitting the Layton automobile. The brake failed to stop the truck within the assured clear distance ahead, and the truck glanced off the left year end of the Layton car, crossed the center line and collided with the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger.

Plaintiff brought the action against both the owner and the driver but before going to trial elected to proceed against only the driver, defendant Oates, hereinafter called defendant.

Defendant denies negligence, claiming that the collision resulted from the sudden failure of his foot brake. He introduced testimony tending to show that the truck was regularly serviced, that the brakes had been inspected and adjusted less than six months prior to the collision, and that he had no warning that his foot brake would fail. He testified that he had no time after the foot brake failed to attempt to use his emergency brake.

The trial court instructed the jury that brake failure would not excuse the violation of either the assured-clear-distance-ahead staute (Section 4511.21, Revised Code) or the center-line statutes (Sections 4511.25 and 4511.26, Revised Code). The question of whether defendant complied with these sections was left to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and judgment was entered on the verdict.

The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court, holding that the instruction regarding the assured-clear-distance-ahead statute was prejudicially erroneous. The majority found that it was for the jury to decide whether the failure of the foot brake was an emergency caused by circumstances over which defendant had no control and whether the failure to use the emergency brake should be excused for lack of time. The majority was divided as to whether the instruction with respect to the center-line statutes was prejudicially erroneous.

The Court of Appeals found that its judgment is in conflict with that of the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Appellate District in Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Grissom, 117 Ohio App. 464, 192 N.E.2d 658, and certified the record to this court for review and final determination.

Kaylor & McKinley, Kenton, and Richard W. Penn, Circleville, for appellant.

Paul T. Mahon, Kenton, and Charles Van Dyne, Ada, for appellee.

MATTHIAS, Judge.

It is conceded that the truck operated by defendant collided with the rear of an automobile proceeding ahead of it, crossed over the center line and collided with the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger.

Defendant thereby failed to stop within the assured clear distance ahead as required by Section 4511.21, Revised Code. He also failed to drive his vehicle on the right side of the roadway and did not give one half of the roadway to the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger, in violation of the requirements of Sections 4511.25 and 4511.26, Revised Code.

These sections were enacted for the public safety and establish specific requirements to be followed by operators of motor vehicles. Any unexcused failure to comply with these requirements constitutes negligence per se. Paragraph two of the syllabus of Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427 (assured clear distance ahead); Skinner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722 (assured clear distance ahead); paragraph six of the syllabus of Brandt v. Mansfield Rapid Transit, Inc., 153 Ohio St. 429, 92 N.E.2d 1 (center line); paragraph one of the syllabus of Mahoning Savings & Trust Co., Exr., v. Kellner, Admx., 131 Ohio St. 69, 1 N.E.2d 616 (center line).

Defendant contends that his failure to comply with the requirements of the above statutes is excused by the sudden emergency caused by the failure of his foot brake.

The issue to be determined by this appeal is whether the failure of his foot brake is a legal excuse which would enable the defendant to avoid the imputation of negligence per se.

To constitute a legal excuse for failure to comply with a safety statute, it is not enough for defendant to show that he acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances. The required standard of care has been specified by the General Assembly, and the specific requirements of the statute have replaced the rule of ordinary care. Kehrer v. McKittrick, 176 Ohio St. 192, 194, 198 N.E.2d 669; Prosser, Torts (3 Ed.) 191, Section 35.

'Some statutes, such as traffic laws, are enacted * * * to prescribe uniform and certain rules of conduct in the interest of safety. Such rules are authoritative declarations as to how persons shall act, and must be observed * * *. In such a field, 'when the Legislature has spoken, the standard of care required is no longer what the reasonably prudent man would do under the circumstances but what the Legislature has commanded.'' Traynor, J., concurring in Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 596, 177 P.2d 279, 287.

In order to avoid liability for injuries resulting from his failure to comply with a safety statute regulating the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways, a motorist must show that something over which he had no control or an emergency not of his making made it impossible for him to comply with the statute. Paragraph two of the syllabus of Bush, Admr., v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E.2d 851; paragraph two of the syllabus of Hangen, a Minor, v. Hadfield, 135 Ohio St. 281, 20 N.E.2d 715. What a reasonably prudent person would have done under the circumstances is immaterial.

Section 4513.20, Revised Code, establishes what constitutes adequate brakes for motor vehicles on the public highways. This section provides, in part, as follows:

'(A) Every * * * motor vehicle * * * when operated upon a highway shall be equipped with brakes adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold such * * * motor vehicle, including two separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means shall be effective to apply the brakes to at least two wheels. If these two separate means of applying the brakes are connected in any way, then on such * * * motor vehicles manufactured or assembled after Junuary 1, 1942, they shall be so constructed that failure of any one part of the operating mechanism shall not leave the * * * motor vehicle without brakes on at least two wheels.

'* * *

'(G) Every * * * motor vehicle * * * shall be capable at all times and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
68 cases
  • Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 39493
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • 15 d3 Junho d3 1966
    ...... In some instances, it has. See, for example, Spalding v. Waxler (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 1, 205 N.E.2d 890; Bird v. Hart (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 9, 205 [218 ......
  • Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 2002-0285.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • 23 d3 Julho d3 2003
    ...resulting accident even though the accident may have been unforeseeable. {¶ 35} For example, in Spalding v. Waxier (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 1, 2-3, 31 O.O.2d 1, 205 N.E.2d 890, the defendant driver who failed to maintain assured clear distance and who failed to keep his vehicle on the right hal......
  • State v. Thomas, Case No. 13 CAC 05 0039
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • 29 d3 Janeiro d3 2014
    ...12 Ohio St.2d at 34, 231 N.E.2d 306. However, the Court noted,As was stated in paragraph five of the syllabus of Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St.2d 1, 205 N.E.2d 890:'An emergency which will relieve a motorist of his duty to comply with a safety statute regulating vehicular traffic must arise......
  • Peters v. B. & F. Transfer Co., 39592
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • 27 d3 Julho d3 1966
    ...own conduct or from circumstances under his control, cannot serve as an excuse. (Paragraph five of the syllabus of Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St.2d 1, 205 N.E.2d 890, approved and 5. The fact that a wet or icy spot on the road may have caused a motorist to lose control of his car is not a s......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT