Spanel v. Mounds View School District No. 621

Decision Date14 December 1962
Docket NumberNo. 38513,38513
PartiesJeffrey SPANEL, a minor by Charles Spanel, his father and natural guardian, and Charles Spanel, Appellants, v. MOUNDS VIEW SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 621, Mary Gibbard and John Larson, Respondents.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

A motion to dismiss an action against a school district for personal injuries which plaintiff alleges were caused a child by the negligence of a teacher and principal who permitted defective equipment to be used in an elementary school, Held properly granted.

Finding that sovereign immunity is an unjust and archaic doctrine but recognizing the reliance which has heretofore been placed on it, the court overrules immunity as a defense available to school districts, municipal corporations, and other subdivisions of government on whom immunity has been conferred by judicial decision, with respect to torts which are committed after the adjournment of the next regular session of the Minnesota Legislature, subject, however, to any statutes which now or hereafter limit or regulate the prosecution of such claims.

Bertie & Bettenburg and John Claeson, St. Paul, for appellants.

Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, O. C. Adamson, II, and M. J. Coyne, Mordaunt Walstad, Cousineau & Hagglund, Minneapolis, for respondents.

William H. DeParcq, Charles T. Hvass, Eugene A. Rerat, Donald L. Rudquist, Minneapolis, Israel Steingold, Norfolk, Va., and Charles Alan Wright, Austin, Tex., for National Association of Claimants' Counsel of America, amicus curiae.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., and Linus J. Hammond, Asst. Atty. Gen., amici curiae.

Orville C. Peterson and David J. Kennedy, Minneapolis, for League of Minnesota Municipalities, amicus curiae.

Peter S. Popovich, Edward P. Starr, Jr., and Peterson & Popovich, St. Paul, for Minnesota School Bds. Assn., Metropolitan-Suburban School Bds. Assn., and certain school districts, amici curiae.

Ralph T. Keyes, St. Paul, for State Assoc. of County Commissioners, amici curiae.

Robert J. Swords, Corp. Counsel, St. Paul, amicus curiae.

Keith M. Stidd, City Atty., Minneapolis, and G. V. Johnson, Asst. City Atty., amici curiae.

Montreville J. Brown, Gordon Shepard, and Oppenheimer, Hodgson, Brown, Baer & Wolff, St. Paul, for Metropolitan Airports Commission, amicus curiae.

Harry E. Weinberg, City Atty., Duluth, and D. Peter Rask, Asst. City Atty., amici curiae.

William B. Randall, County Atty. of Ramsey County, and Thomas Quayle, Asst. County Atty., amici curiae.

OTIS, Justice.

Plaintiff sues on behalf of his 5-year-old son to recover damages from a school district and a teacher and principal employed by it for injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of defendants in permitting a defective slide to remain in the kindergarten classroom of an elementary school.

Plaintiff appeals from an order granting a motion to dismiss the action as to defendant school district on the ground the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against it.

The only issue before us is whether the doctrine of governmental tort immunity shall now be overruled by judicial decision.

Anticipating the grave problems which a reversal might precipitate, the court has sua sponte requested and secured a reargument after notice to the State Board of Education, the attorney general, the League of Minnesota Municipalities, and a number of municipalities and bar associations. Briefs amicus curiae on both sides of the issue have been submitted by interested organizations and units of government.

We hold that the order for dismissal is affirmed, with the caveat, however, that subject to the limitations we now discuss, the defense of sovereign immunity will no longer be available to school districts, municipal corporations, and other subdivisions of government on whom immunity has been conferred by judicial decision with respect to torts which are committed after the adjournment of the next regular session of the Minnesota Legislature.

All of the paths leading to the origin of governmental tort immunity converge on Russell v. The Men of Devon, 100 Eng.Rep. 359, 2 T.R. 667 (1788). This product of the English common law was left on our doorstep to become the putative ancestor of a long line of American cases beginning with Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812). Russell sued all of the male inhabitants of the County of Devon for damages occurring to his wagon by reason of a bridge being out of repair. It was apparently undisputed that the county had a duty to maintain such structures. The court held that the action would not lie because: (1) To permit it would lead to 'an infinity of actions,' 1 (2) there was no precedent for attempting such a suit, (3) only the legislature should impose liability of this kind, (4) even if defendants are to be considered a corporation or quasi-corporation there is no fund out of which to satisfy the claim, (5) neither law nor reason supports the action, (6) there is a strong presumption that what has never been done cannot be done, and (7) although there is a legal principle which permits a remedy for every injury resulting from the neglect of another, a more applicable principle is 'that it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.' 2 The court concluded that the suit should not be permitted 'because the action must be brought against the public.' (Italics supplied.) 3 There is no mention of 'the king can do no wrong,' but on the contrary it is suggested that plaintiff sue the county itself rather than its individual inhabitants. Every reason assigned by the court is born of expediency. The wrong to plaintiff is submerged in the convenience of the public. No moral, ethical, or rational reason for the decision is advanced by the court except the practical problem of assessing damages against individual defendants. The court's invitation to the legislature has a familiar ring. It was finally accepted as to claims against the Crown in 1947, although Russell had long since been overruled. 4

In 1812 when Mower's horse was killed by stepping in a hole on the Leicester bridge, counsel argued that 'Men of Devon' did not apply since the town of Leicester was incorporated and had a treasury out of which to satisfy a judgment. The Massachusetts court nevertheless held that the town had no notice of the defect and that quasi-corporations are not liable for such neglect under the common law. On the authority of 'Men of Devon' recovery was denied. 5 It was on this shaky foundation that the law of governmental tort immunity was erected in Minnesota and elsewhere. In 1871 we held that one who was injured by a defective bridge Did have a cause of action against a municipal corporation for its negligence, citing 'Men of Devon.' 6 A few years later we recognized the distinction between municipal corporations and quasi-corporations with respect to liability to individuals for the negligence of municipal officers or agents. Without citing any authority we held that a plaintiff injured on a defective courthouse sidewalk could not recover damages against the county, basing our decision on what we said was a long-established doctrine which 'the legislature alone should change.' 7

The following year we reverted to 'Men of Devon' in finding a town not liable for its negligent failure to repair a bridge, 8 defendant citing also Mower v. Leicester, supra.

An 8-year-old boy was denied recovery for the loss of a leg injured on defendant's school grounds in Bank v. Brainerd School Dist., 49 Minn. 106, 109, 51 N.W. 814, 815. We held that the school district enjoyed the same tort immunity as towns and counties, saying:

'* * * So the board of education is a corporation, which holds and manages the property in its control as trustee for the district, for a public purpose. It is made its duty to take care of and keep in repair the property of the district, but this is a duty which it owes to the district, and not to individuals, and is a duty imposed for the benefit of the public, with no consideration or emolument to the corporation; and it is given a corporate existence solely for the exercise of this public or administrative function. It is organized for educational purposes, not for the benefit or protection of property or business interests. Finch v. Board (of Education), 30 Ohio St. (37), 47.

'The rule as adopted and applied in those states which accept this doctrine, is summarily stated in Shear. & R. Neg. § 267, as follows: Boards of education, on which is imposed by the state the duty of providing and keeping in repair public school buildings, exercise a purely public function and agency for the public good, for which they receive no private or corporate benefit; and they are not, therefore, liable to an individual for the negligence of their servants in the business of such agency.'

The court then said it doubted that the statute 9 (from which Minn. St. 127.03 has evolved) was intended to render a school district liable for personal injuries for mere neglect to repair but that the statute apparently referred to a breach of duty to an individual, not a public duty such as there involved. In a later case where plaintiff was injured by a school bus we said that a school district is an arm of the state, its functions are governmental, and the legislature having acquiesced for 35 years in the court's previous interpretation of the statute, that construction must have been correct. 10

The distinction between governmental functions, which are immune from tort liability, and proprietary functions, which are not, emerged in an opinion of Mr. Justice Mitchell in Snider v. City of St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 53 N.W. 763, 18 L.R.A. 151. Plaintiff's foot had been crushed by a city hall elevator. In holding the municipality not liable, Judge Mitchell stated (51 Minn. 472, 53 N.W. 764):

'But it is also generally...

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