Spangler v. Armstrong
| Decision Date | 15 December 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 23994.,23994. |
| Citation | 201 W.Va. 643,499 S.E.2d 865 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Crystal Lynn SPANGLER, Mother and Next Friend of Christopher Ryan Hensley, an Infant, and Crystal Spangler, Individually, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. Jeffrey ARMSTRONG and Patricia Armstrong and Kentucky Central Insurance Company, a Corporation, Defendants Below, Appellees. |
Matthew J. Hayes, Pepper & Nason, Charleston, for Appellants.
Catherine D. Munster, James A. Varner, McNeer, Highland, McMunn & Varner, Clarksburg, for Appellee Kentucky Central Insurance Company.
1
This declaratory judgment action is before this Court upon an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of Fayette County entered on May 24, 1996. Pursuant to that order, the circuit court entered declaratory judgment in favor of the appellee, Kentucky Central Insurance Company (hereinafter "Kentucky Central"), declaring that liability coverage did not exist for Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong under an insurance policy issued to Timothy and Margaret Armstrong. Specifically, the circuit court determined that Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong were not "insureds" for purposes of personal liability coverage.
This Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record, and the briefs and argument of counsel. As discussed below, this Court is of the opinion that Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong are not "insureds" under the policy. Accordingly, the final order is affirmed.
On February 22, 1991, Christopher Ryan Hensley, infant child of Crystal Lynn Spangler, was bitten on the face by a Chow dog owned by Jeffrey Armstrong and his mother, Patricia Armstrong. The attack occurred on property owned by Timothy Armstrong and his wife, Margaret Armstrong, and rented and occupied by Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong.2 As a result of the attack, Crystal Spangler filed suit individually and on behalf of her son against all four Armstrongs.
Prior to the incident, Kentucky Central issued a dwelling policy which included a personal liability section to Timothy and Margaret Armstrong. Kentucky Central undertook the defense of its named insureds and filed an answer to the complaint on their behalf. Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong failed to file answers and default judgments on the issue of liability were entered against them.
Thereafter, appellants were granted leave to amend their complaint to bring in Kentucky Central and assert a declaratory judgment action to determine insurance coverage for Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong under the policy issued to Timothy Armstrong. The declaration page of the personal liability section lists Timothy Armstrong and his address as General Delivery, Winona, West Virginia, but it is noted that the residence premises covered by the policy is the "Scarbro property" which is where the attack occurred.
The policy indicates that coverage exists for the dwelling only.3 The dwelling rating information sheet indicates that the residence is "Owner Occupied." However, it is undisputed that Timothy and Margaret Armstrong have not resided at the property where the attack occurred since they purchased it. Instead, Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong have lived on the property and paid the mortgage, taxes and utilities as rent. There is no evidence that Kentucky Central knew that Timothy Armstrong's brother and mother were living on the property.
While appellants amended their complaint, Kentucky Central, in further defense of its insureds, filed a motion for summary judgment on their behalf. On April 24, 1996, the circuit court granted the motion and entered an order dismissing Timothy and Margaret Armstrong from the suit.4 Subsequently, on May 24, 1996, the circuit court issued the final order declaring that liability coverage did not exist for Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong as they were not "insureds" under the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy.
In syllabus point 3 of Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995), this Court held: "A circuit court's entry of a declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo." See also syl. pt. 1, Bruceton Bank v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Ins. Co., 199 W.Va. 548, 486 S.E.2d 19 (1997); syl. pt. 1, Bush v. Richardson, 199 W.Va. 374, 484 S.E.2d 490 (1997).
In this case, appellants contend that the circuit court failed to follow the doctrine of reasonable expectations. They assert that the insurance policy is ambiguous regarding the definition of "insured." Appellants claim that by ruling that Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong are not insured persons under the policy, the circuit court created an absurd result leaving the house and property without liability coverage which is clearly not what was intended.
Kentucky Central maintains the policy language is clear and unambiguous. It contends that Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong were not named insureds and were not additional insureds because they did not reside in Timothy Armstrong's household. Kentucky Central further contends that the circuit court's ruling does not create "illusory coverage" or defeat the intention of Timothy and Margaret Armstrong to have personal liability coverage on the property because they were successfully defended and dismissed from the case below.
The critical determination in this case is whether the term "household" is ambiguous. We have previously held that: "When reasonable people can differ about the meaning of an insurance contract, the contract is ambiguous, and all ambiguities will be construed in favor of the insured." Syl. pt. 1, D'Annunzio v. Security-Connecticut Life Ins. Co., 186 W.Va. 39, 410 S.E.2d 275 (1991). However, we have also held that: "Where the provisions of an insurance policy contract are clear and unambiguous they are not subject to judicial construction or interpretation, but full effect will be given to the plain meaning intended." Syllabus, Keffer v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 153 W.Va. 813, 172 S.E.2d 714 (1970). See also syl. pt. 1, Miller v. Lemon, 194 W.Va. 129, 459 S.E.2d 406 (1995). In addition, in syllabus point 1 of Soliva v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 176 W.Va. 430, 345 S.E.2d 33 (1986), we held that: "Language in an insurance policy should be given its plain, ordinary meaning." See also syl. pt. 2, Auber v. Jellen, 196 W.Va. 168, 469 S.E.2d 104 (1996); Syl. pt. 2, Russell v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W.Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992).
The pertinent policy language provides:
In accordance with the policy language, Jeffrey and Patricia Armstrong are "insureds" under the policy as relatives of Timothy Armstrong if they were residents of his "household" at the time of the event. Although this Court has not had an occasion to consider the word "household" within an insurance policy provision, several other jurisdictions have examined this language. For instance, in Gredig v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 891 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994), the court considered language in an insurance policy which defined "insured person" to include "(a) you; (b) your spouse or relatives of either residing in your household." The policy in question had been issued to Robert Gredig and covered a house he owned which was later destroyed by fire. Prior to the fire, Robert had traded houses with his brother, Donald Gredig, but had not given notice to his insurer. Accordingly, the insurer denied coverage on the basis that Robert had not obtained written consent for his brother to occupy the property. Donald argued that the policy was ambiguous and contended that he was an insured person under the policy because he was Robert's relative and was living in Robert's "household" at the time of the fire. Id. at 911-12. Finding that the language, "residing in your household," was not ambiguous, the court vacated the decision below and held that there was no coverage because "Donald and Robert were not `living under one roof.'" Id. at 914. In so holding, the court relied on a prior decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court which stated: "`The great weight of authority seems to be to the effect that a household means those living together under one roof, under one head, and under the common control of one person.'" Id. at 913 (quoting Boyd v. Peoples Protective Life Ins. Co., 208 Tenn. 280, 345 S.W.2d 869, 872 (1961)).
In Howard v. Hartford Ins. Co., 127 N.H. 727, 507 A.2d 230 (1986), the court considered policy language which covered only those persons living in the named insured's household. The case resulted from a shooting incident in which the plaintiff's decedent was shot and killed by Neil Bird. The decedent and Bird had lived together in a house owned by Bird's parents who also resided on the property in a second house. The insurance policy at issue was owned by Bird's parents. The trial court found that there was no coverage under the policy based on the "`separate roof theory.'" Id., 507 A.2d at 230-31. Affirming the decision, the New Hampshire court stated:
[E]ven if there was an intent by the elder Birds to include the younger couple, the policy clearly states that there is liability coverage only for members...
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