Spangler v. McQuitty

• Decision Date: 27 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. 23,2011.,Sept. Term,23
• Citation: 424 Md. 527,36 A.3d 928
• Parties: Donald SPANGLER, et al. v. Peggy McQUITTY and Gary McQuitty, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Dylan McQuitty.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

36 A.3d 928

424 Md. 527

Donald SPANGLER, et al.

v.Peggy McQUITTY and Gary McQuitty, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Dylan McQuitty.

No. 23

Sept. Term

2011.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 27, 2012.

D.C. Offutt, Jr. (Offutt Nord, PLLC, Huntington, West Virginia; Robert J. Farley of Wharton, Levin, Ehrmantraut & Klein, P.A., Annapolis, MD), on brief, for Appellants.

Henry E. Dugan, Jr. (Bruce J. Babij and George S. Tolley III of Dugan, Babij & Tolley, LLC, Timonium, MD), on brief, for Appellees.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA, JOHN C. ELDRIDGE, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

BATTAGLIA, J.

In this case, we have been asked to sit in judgment once again in the case of McQuitty v. Spangler, about which we previously opined, 410 Md. 1, 976 A.2d 1020 (2009) (hereinafter McQuitty I ). In a series of post-trial motions following McQuitty I, Appellant, Dr. Donald Spangler, moved to reduce the verdict in favor of the Appellees, Dylan McQuitty and his parents Peggy and Gary McQuitty. After the verdict, but prior to resolution of the post-trial motions, Dylan died. Dr. Spangler argued, among numerous other contentions, that Dylan's death absolved the portion of the judgment allocated to Dylan's future medical expenses; Judge Michael J. Finifter of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County disagreed. Dr. Spangler appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court, we granted certiorari to consider the following questions:

1. Whether, under Maryland law, a litigant is denied due process of law where a trial court denies a motion for new trial following the Court of Appeals of Maryland's substantive change of the common law of informed consent.

2. Whether, under Maryland law, a trial court abuses its discretion by entering judgment in favor of the estate of a deceased plaintiff where an award for future medical care is included as one of the elements of damages in the judgment entry.

3. Whether, under Maryland law, a settling defendant may increase the liability of a non-settling defendant merely by designating himself a non-joint tortfeasor.

4. Whether, under Maryland law, a litigant can alter or change Maryland's law by contractual agreement and thereby preclude a settling tortfeasor from being classified as a “joint tortfeasor” under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort–Feasors Act to the detriment of a non-settling tortfeasor who was not a party to the agreement.

5. Whether, under Maryland law and the circumstances of this case, Post Judgment Interest should run from the last date final judgment is entered, where the original judgment was vacated due to the trial court's grant of the defendant's judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

We shall affirm the trial court's denial of Dr. Spangler's motions for post-trial relief, because our holding in McQuitty I did not substantively change the Maryland common law of informed consent. We also shall hold that the post-verdict death of Dylan does not absolve Dr. Spangler from the finality of the jury's award of future medical expenses. In addressing Dr. Spangler's third and fourth questions together, we shall hold that the Franklin Square Hospital, for which summary judgment was entered in its favor as to liability and damages during the first case, was not a “joint tort-feasor” under Maryland's Uniform Contribution Among Tort–Feasors Act, Sections 3–1401 to –1409 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), such that its settlement release from the McQuittys did not entitle Dr. Spangler to a reduction of the judgment against them. We finally shall hold that post-judgment interest on the verdict accrued from the date of the original judgment.

I. Background ¹

Dylan McQuitty, by and through his parents Peggy and Gary McQuitty (together “the McQuittys”), successfully sued Ms. McQuitty's obstetrician and primary care physician, Donald Spangler, and his practice, Glowacki, Elberfeld & Spangler, P.A. (together “Dr. Spangler”) for having failed to obtain her informed consent to treatment,² after which Ms. McQuitty suffered complete placental abruption ³ that resulted in severe injuries to Dylan during his birth in 1995.

In the original complaint, the McQuittys also named as defendants the Hospital where Dylan was born, Franklin Square Hospital Center, Inc, and Dr. Spangler's partner, Harrold Elberfeld. Franklin Square Hospital moved for summary judgment as to liability and damages, which was granted by the Circuit Court, and both the Hospital and Dr. Elberfeld settled with the McQuittys before trial. Franklin Square Hospital's Release and Settlement of Claim provided that the Hospital would be considered a “joint tortfeasor” only if it was “adjudicated to be a joint tortfeasor by a final judgment of a court of record after trial on the merits.” In contrast, Dr. Elberfeld's release provided that he would be considered a “joint tortfeasor.” These settlements were entered on the record and the case proceeded, on the informed consent claim, with Dr. Spangler and his practice as the sole defendants.

Prior to trial on the informed consent claim, Dr. Spangler also moved for summary judgment, arguing that he had no duty to obtain the informed consent of Ms. McQuitty regarding a placental abruption because he did not conduct or propose an “affirmative invasion of her physical integrity.” McQuitty I, 410 Md. at 13–14, 976 A.2d at 1027–28. The motion was denied, and, eventually, a trial ensued.

The jury awarded Dylan $13,078,515.00 in damages, including $8,442,515.00 in future medical expenses. Dr. Spangler filed a Motion for Remittitur and a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, again asserting that the doctrine of informed consent required “an affirmative invasion of physical integrity.” The Circuit Court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Dr. Spangler, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.

We ultimately reversed the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in McQuitty I, concluding that physical invasion was not a prerequisite to a physician's duty to obtain a patient's informed consent. Rather than battery, we recognized that personal autonomy and personal choice of the patient were foundational for the informed consent doctrine. We observed that our prior opinion applying the doctrine, Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993), did reference, but that it did not rely upon, Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977), a New York case requiring an affirmative physical invasion of the patient before the physician's duty to obtain the informed consent of the patient arose. We explained that the New York doctrine of informed consent relied upon battery rather than negligence, which contrasted with our own common law that “a lack of informed consent claim is clearly predicated on negligence and the gravamen is the healthcare provider's duty to provide information, rather than battery or the provider's physical act.” 410 Md. at 31, 976 A.2d at 1038. We, therefore, reversed the Circuit Court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remanded with instructions that the Circuit Court consider Dr. Spangler's unresolved Motion for Remittitur.

Dylan McQuitty, however, died on September 26, 2009, prior to the trial court's resolution of the remittitur. Dr. Spangler then filed various post-trial motions seeking a new trial or a reduction in the award of future medical expenses, alleging that Dylan's death was a “significant event [affecting] the equities of this case” and seeking a reduction of future medical expenses to only be those actually expended. He also argued that our opinion in McQuitty I “overruled a consistent line of procedural decisions upon which Dr. Spangler based his defense,” so that the application of McQuitty I to the case, without a new trial, constituted a deprivation of due process of law.

Judge Finifter denied the Motion for Revision of Judgment but denied in part and granted in part Dr. Spangler's Motion for Remittitur. Judge Finifter reduced the jury's award, pursuant to the statutory cap on non-economic damages of $500,000, under Section 11–108(b)(2)(i) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.) and then reduced the judgment by fifty percent to reflect Dr. Elberfeld's pro rata share of liability, pursuant to Dr. Elberfeld's joint tortfeasor release from the McQuittys and the Uniform Contribution Among Tort–Feasors Act, Section 3–1404 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.⁴ Judge Finifter denied Dr. Spangler's requests to permit the payment of future economic damages in the form of periodic payments under Section 11–109(c) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.),⁵ to further reduce the jury's award by the Franklin Square Hospital's settlement amount, as the Hospital had not been judicially determined to be a joint tort-feasor, and finally that no post-judgment interest be calculated. Judge Finifter ultimately concluded that the judgment should be reduced to $5,039,257.50, plus post-judgment interest “calculated from the date of the entry of Judgment, September 27, 2006, plus costs.”

Dr. Spangler filed a Renewed Motion for New Trial on Due Process Grounds, Renewed Motion for New Trial on Due Process Grounds (Amended) (“Amended Motion for New Trial”) and Motion for the Court to Order a New Trial, or to Conditionally Order a New Trial Unless Plaintiffs Agree to a Remittitur, Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2–533 ⁶ or, in the Alternative, to Alter, Amend, or Revise the Judgment Entered Against Them Pursuant to Maryland Rules 2–534 ⁷ and 2–535.⁸ In his motions, Dr. Spangler again argued that McQuitty I changed the common law, which required that the case be retried and also that Dylan's death served as grounds for reopening and revising the...