Spano v. CSX Transp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 February 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-245
• Parties: THOMAS SPANO, Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

THOMAS SPANO, Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-245

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

February 1, 2018

JUDGE KIM R. GIBSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Thomas Spano's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32). The motion has been fully briefed (see ECF Nos. 33, 34, 35) and is ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion.

II. Jurisdiction

The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because they arise under federal law. Venue is proper under 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 because the cause of action arose in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

III. Background

A. Factual Background¹

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.²

Plaintiff is a train conductor. (ECF No. 32 at ¶ 2; ECF No. 34 at ¶ 2.) On January 17, 2014, Plaintiff was operating a train for Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") (ECF No. 32 at ¶ 2; ECF No. 34 at ¶ 2) that was pushing another CSX train car up a mountain. (ECF No. 32 at ¶ 4; ECF No. 34 at ¶ 4.) Without warning, the couplers³ that connect the two train carsmalfunctioned, causing the emergency brakes in Plaintiff's train to activate. (ECF No. 32 at ¶ 4; ECF No. 34 at ¶ 4.) CSX owns the train whose couplers malfunctioned. (ECF No. 32 at ¶ 4; ECF No. 34 at ¶ 4; ECF No. 34 at 5.)

Plaintiff asserts that he was standing up when the emergency brakes activated because Justin Widmer, the train's engineer, had ordered him to go outside. (ECF No. 32 at ¶ 3) Plaintiff claims that the application of the emergency brakes caused him to be "thrown violently backwards" and strike his head on the train's windshield. (ECF No. 32 at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff states that he sustained severe injuries, including a concussion, a cervical sprain and/or strain, a contusion, and post-concussion headaches. (Id.)

CSX denies that Plaintiff fell inside the train car and maintains that Plaintiff did not suffer any injuries as a result of the couplers' malfunction. (ECF No. 34 at 5.) In support of its position that Plaintiff did not actually sustain an injury on January 17, 2014, CSX produced an affidavit from Mr. Widmer (the engineer) who attests that Plaintiff never hit his head nor mentioned hitting his head. (Id.) Widmer also asserts that, after the incident, Plaintiff proclaimed, "too bad I couldn't have got hurt. I could have got some money." (ECF No. 34-1.)

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff brings two claims against CSX: (1) a claim under the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA") and (2) a claim under the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FSRA"). (See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on the FELA claim only. (See ECF No. 32.)

Plaintiff's argument is summarized as follows:

1. The Federal Safety Appliance Act ("FSAA") provides that trains may only operate on rail lines if the trains are equipped with "couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles . . . ." 49 U.S.C. § 20302. CSX admits that couplers on one of its rail cars malfunctioned. (See ECF No. 1 at 2.) Therefore, CSX concedes that it violated the FSAA. (ECF No. 33 at 5-6.)

2. FELA preludes consideration of an employee's contributory negligence "in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee." 45 U.S.C. § 53. As CSX admits that its couplers malfunctioned, CSX also concedes it violated the FSSA. Accordingly, CSX is prohibited from offering evidence that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Therefore, the Court should grant summary judgment for Plaintiff on the issue of liability regarding his FELA claim. Only the issue of damages remains. (ECF No. 33 at 5-6.)

In response, CSX asserts that Plaintiff has failed to establish causation. (ECF No. 35 at 4.) CSX contends that causation is an essential element of Plaintiff's prima facie claim under the FELA. (Id.) In fact, CSX denies that Plaintiff suffered any work-related injury. (ECF No. 35 at ¶ 10.) CSX further asserts that it has produced evidence to support its position that Plaintiff did not suffer a work-related injury—the affidavit from the engineer who was in the train with Plaintiff when the emergency brakes activated and who denies that Plaintiff ever struck his head. (Id. at 5.) CSX argues that this dispute about causation constitutes a genuine issue ofmaterial fact that precludes the Court from granting Plaintiff summary judgment on his FELA claim. (Id. at 6.)

IV. Legal Standard

A. Summary Judgment

"Summary judgment is appropriate only where . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Melrose, Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ruehl v. Viacom, Inc., 500 F.3d 375, 380 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Issues of fact are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005). Material facts are those that will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court's role is "not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but only to determine whether the evidence of record is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009). "In making this determination, 'a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor.'" Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets this burden, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials" of the pleading, but"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 n.11 (1986)). "For an issue to be genuine, the nonmovant needs to supply more than a scintilla of evidence in support of its position—there must be sufficient evidence (not mere allegations) for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant." Coolspring Stone Supply v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that a party opposing summary judgment "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. The FELA

Congress "passed [FELA] in 1908 in an effort to provide a tort compensation system for railroad workers who, at that time, experienced among the highest accident rates in United States history." Hines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 1991). As Chief Judge Conti aptly noted, FELA "is a negligence statute with an explicitly-stated relaxed standard of causation." Monheim v. Union R. Co., 996 F. Supp. 2d 354, 361 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (Conti, J.) (citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994)). FELA provides, in relevant part, that:

Every common carrier by railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.

45 U.S.C. § 51. As the Supreme Court has observed, section 51's language is "as broad as could be framed." Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181 (1949). Thus, when considering a motion forsummary judgment under FELA, the "test . . . is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (emphasis added); Outten v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 1991); Monheim, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 361.

"[T]o present a prima facie case under the FELA, an employee must establish that: (1) he was injured within the scope of his employment; (2) his employment was in furtherance of the railroad's interstate transportation business; (3) the railroad was negligent; and (4) that negligence played some part in causing the injury for which he seeks compensation." Monheim, 996 F. Supp. 2d 354, 361 (citing Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 509 F.3d 265, 269 (6th Cir. 2007)); Volner v. Union Pac. R. Co., 509 F. App'x 706, 708 (10th Cir. 2013) (articulating same four-pronged test).

"Contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery under FELA, but damages are reduced 'in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to' the employee." Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 160 (2007) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 53); see Moncrease v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 405, 411 (D.N.J. 2016). However, the statute explicitly prohibits consideration of an employee's contributory negligence if the employer violated a safety statute:

[N]o such employee who may be injured or killed

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