Spano v. Metro. Life Co.
| Decision Date | 02 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09-cv-01243 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | JOSEPH H. SPANO, JR., Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 35] filed by Defendant. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff worked for Defendant as an insurance salesperson. Plaintiff claims that he was forced to resign in April 2009, after Defendant had accused him of altering a document. On September 30, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia alleging monetary damages for unpaid compensation, defamation, and wrongful forced termination. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has not compensated him pursuant to the West Virginia Payment and Collection Act ("WPCA"), W. Va. Code § 21-5-1 et seq. Plaintiff also presents a defamation claim, arguing that Defendant knowingly made false and misleading accusations against Plaintiff to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). Finally, Plaintiff argues thatbecause he was forced to resign, Defendant is entitled to damages for constructive wrongful discharge.1
Defendant removed the action to this Court on November 13, 2009, by invoking diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. Defendant filed the summary judgment motion on September 10, 2010, arguing that (1) Plaintiff's work environment was not intolerable and Plaintiff voluntarily resigned; (2) the statements to the FINRA were true; and (3) Defendant does not owe Plaintiff any compensation.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. That rule provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, if there exist factual issues that reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). "Facts are 'material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ. Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). When construing such factual issues, it is well established that the Court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the [party opposing summary judgment]." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
The moving party may meet its burden of showing that no genuine issue of fact exists by use of "depositions, answers to interrogatories, answers to requests for admission, and variousdocuments submitted under request for production." Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If a party fails to make a sufficient showing on one element of that party's case, the failure of proof "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id.
"[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party is not enough to withstand summary judgment; the judge must ask whether "the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant failed to pay him compensation due under the WPCA. Initially, seven compensation items were in dispute. These first four items included Plaintiff's last four paychecks, advisory fees for the second quarter of 2009, a quarterly bonus for the first quarter of 2009, and a monthly bonus for March 2009. (Docket 41 at 16). Defendant argues that with respect to four of the items, Plaintiff admitted he was mistaken. (Docket 35 at 2.) Plaintiff agrees, and he has retracted his claim for these four items. (Docket 46 at 11.)
The fifth and sixth items that Plaintiff believes he is owed are a pro rata portion of a quarterly bonus for the second quarter of 2009 and a pro rata portion of a monthly bonus for April 2009. (Docket 41 at 16.) Regarding these items, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff is entitled to them.However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not owed anything because the items were credited against the debt Plaintiff owed. Thus, Plaintiff's debt was simply reduced. (Docket 35 at 2.) Plaintiff explains how commissions are paid in his response: (Docket 46 at 15.) Plaintiff argues that because there is an issue of material fact as to the date when Plaintiff was no longer employed by Defendant, it is unclear how the compensation plan should be determined and whether Defendant's payment system was valid under the WPCA.
As to the final item, first year commissions for sales that had not yet closed as of his termination date, Defendant argues that it was not required to immediately pay Plaintiff under West Virginia law because the items were not due unless and until they were earned. (Docket 35 at 3.)
The WPCA is "remedial legislation designed to protect working people and assist them in collection of compensation wrongly withheld." Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 530 S.E.2d 676, 688 (W. Va. 1999). Given its remedial nature, the WPCA is to be construed liberally. Id. The WPCA states in relevant part: "Whenever an employee quits or resigns . . . the corporation shall pay the employee's wages no later than the next regular payday." W. Va. Code § 21-5-4(c). However, if an employee is discharged, the employees wages must be paid in full within 72 hours. § 21-5-4(b). Wages include "accrued fringe benefits capable of calculation and payable directly to the employee," and fringe benefits include "production incentive bonuses." § 21-5-1. Whether wages have accrued "are determined by the terms of employment and not by the provisions of W. Va. Code § 21-5-1(c)." Syl. pt. 5, Meadows, 530 S.E.2d at 676. "[T]he word 'accrued,' as used in the WPCA, [means] 'vested.'" Gress v. Petersburg Foods, LLC, 592 S.E.2d 811, 815 (W. Va. 2003)."The concept of vesting is concerned with expressly enumerated conditions or requirements all of which must be fulfilled or satisfied before a benefit becomes a presently enforceable right." Meadows, 530 S.E.2d at 688-89. Thus, before wages are payable to an employee, the wage must have accrued to the employee. Gress, 592 S.E.2d at 815. Gregory v. Forest River, Inc., 369 F. App'x 464, 469 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Saunders v. Tri-State Block Corp., 535 S.E.2d 215, 219 (W. Va. 2000)).
The Gregory case concerned an employment agreement where commissions would be paid on shipped units, and if an employee left the employer, then the salesperson would be paid 50% of the commission on any order that was logged but not yet shipped. 369 F. App'x at 469. The court held that the employer violated the WPCA by failing to pay the employee a commission within 72 hours of termination for units that were shipped in the month prior to his termination. Id. Plaintiff argues that the court in Gregory found the commission payment schedule to run afoul of the WPCA. (Docket 46 at 17.) However, that is simply not the holding in Gregory. The court held that the employer was in violation of the WPCA because the employee was not paid within 72 hours of discharge, not because the employer's commission system violated the WPCA.2 In WPCA cases, courts must consider the specific employment agreement.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant was required to pay him immediately for sales that finalized in May 2009. Defendant counters that under Defendant's published rules, commissions for employees did not accrue until the end of the quarter. (Docket 41 at 23.) Thus, Defendant would not earn a quarterly bonus until the end of the quarter or a monthly bonus until the end of April 2009. Additionally, Defendant's employees are not guaranteed a commission at the end of a quarter because credits are offset against any debits the employee owes. (Docket 49 at 17.) Plaintiff, therefore, would only receive a payment at the end of a quarter if there was a positive balance at that time. (Id.) As made clear in the depositions and the briefing, Plaintiff did not have a positive balance at the end the second quarter. Because Plaintiff's wages, or bonus, had not accrued, then the wages had not yet been earned. The Court finds that there is no issue of material fact regarding when Plaintiff's employment ended. As Plaintiff admitted, he was an at-will employee and his employment ended on the last day of employment, April 17, 2009. The employee agreement is controlling, and thus Plaintiff's wages would not be determined until the end of April and the end of the second quarter. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to receive payment for the fifth and sixth items.
Regarding the final item, commissions that closed after Plaintiff's termination, the Gregory case is controlling. The court held that Defendant had to be paid for commissions that were earned, according to the employment agreement, during...
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