Spano v. People of the State of New York, No. 582

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtWARREN
Citation360 U.S. 315,79 S.Ct. 1202,3 L.Ed.2d 1265
PartiesVincent Joseph SPANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Decision Date22 June 1959
Docket NumberNo. 582

360 U.S. 315
79 S.Ct. 1202
3 L.Ed.2d 1265
Vincent Joseph SPANO, Petitioner,

v.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 582.
Argued April 27, 1959.
Decided June 22, 1959.

Mr. Herbert S. Siegal, New York City, for the petitioner.

Mr. Irving Anolik, New York City, for the respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is another in the long line of cases presenting the question whether a confession was properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth Amendment. As in all such cases, we are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement.

Page 316

Because of the delicate nature of the constitutional determination which we must make, we cannot escape the responsibility of making our own examination of the record. Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074.

The State's evidence reveals the following: Petitioner Vincent Joseph Spano is a derivative citizen of this country, having been born in Messina, Italy. He was 25 years old at the time of the shooting in question and had graduated from junior high school. He had a record of regular employment. The shooting took place on January 22, 1957.

On that day, petitioner was drinking in a bar. The decedent, a former professional boxer weighing almost 200 pounds who had fought in Madison Square Garden, took some of petitioner's money from the bar. Petitioner followed him out of the bar to recover it. A fight ensued, with the decedent knocking petitioner down and then kicking him in the head three or four times. Shock from the force of these blow caused petitioner to vomit. After the bartender applied some ice to his head, petitioner left the bar, walked to his apartment, secured a gun, and walked eight or nine blocks to a candy store where the decedent was frequently to be found. He entered the store in which decedent, three friends of decedent, at least two of whom were ex-convicts, and a boy who was supervising the store were present. He fired five shots, two of which entered the decedent's body, causing his death. The boy was the only eyewitness; the three friends of decedent did not see the person who fired the shot. Petitioner then disappeared for the next week or so.

On February 1, 1957, the Bronx County Grand Jury returned an indictment for first-degree murder against petitioner. Accordingly, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest, commanding that he be forthwith brought before the court to answer the indictment, or, if the court had adjourned for the term, that he be delivered into the

Page 317

custody of the Sheriff of Bronx County. See N.Y. Code Crim.Proc. § 301.

On February 3, 1957, petitioner called one Gaspar Bruno, a close friend of 8 or 10 years' standing who had attended school with him. Bruno was a fledgling police officer, having at that time not yet finished attending police academy. According to Bruno's testimony, petitioner told him 'that he took a terrific beating, that the deceased hurt him real bad and he dropped him a couple of times and he was dazed; he didn't know what he was doing and that he went and shot at him.' Petitioner told Bruno that he intended to get a lawyer and give himself up. Bruno relayed this information to his superiors.

The following day, February 4, at 7:10 p.m., petitioner, accompanied by counsel, surrendered himself to the authorities in front of the Bronx County Building, where both the office of the Assistant District Attorney who ultimately prosecuted his case and the court-room in which he was ultimately tried were located. His attorney had cautioned him to answer no questions, and left him in the custody of the officers. He was promptly taken to the office of the Assistant District Attorney and at 7:15 p.m. the questioning began, being conducted by Assistant District Attorney Goldsmith, Lt. Gannon, Detectives Farrell, Lehrer and Motta, and Sgt. Clarke. The record reveals that the questioning was both persistent and continuous. Petitioner, in accordance with his attorney's instructions st eadfastly refused to answer. Detective Motta testified: 'He refused to talk to me.' 'He just looked up to the ceiling and refused to talk to me.' Detective Farrell testified:

'Q. And you started to interrogate him? A. That is right.

'Q. What did he say?

Page 318

A. He said 'you would have to see my attorney. I tell you nothing but my name.'

'Q. Did you continue to examine him? A. Verbally, yes, sir.'

He asked one officer, Detective Ciccone, if he could speak to his attorney, but that request was denied. Detective Ciccone testified that he could not find the attorney's name in the telephone book.1 He was given two sandwiches, coffee and cake at 11 p.m.

At 12:15 a.m. on the morning of February 5, after five hours of questioning in which it became evident that petitioner was following his attorney's instructions, on the Assistant District Attorney's orders petitioner was transferred to the 46th Squad, Ryer Avenue Police Station. The Assistant District Attorney also went to the police station and to some extent continued to participate in the interrogation. Petitioner arrived at 12:30 and questioning was resumed at 12:40. The character of the questioning is revealed by the testimony of Detective Farrell:

'Q. Who did you leave him in the room with? A. With Detective Lehrer and Sergeant Clarke came in and Mr. Goldsmith came in or Inspector Halk came in. It was back and forth. People just came in, spoke a few words to the defendant or they listened a few minutes and they left.'

But petitioner persisted in his refusal to answer, and again requested permission to see his attorney, this time from Detective Lehrer. His request was again denied.

It was then that those in charge of the investigation decided that petitioner's close friend, Bruno, could be of

Page 319

use. He had been called out on the case around 10 or 11 p.m., although he was not connected with the 46th Squad or Precinct in any way. Although, in fact, his job was in no way threatened, Bruno was told to tell petitioner that petitioner's telephone call had gotten him 'in a lot of trouble,' and that he should seek to extract sympathy from petitioner for Bruno's pregnant wife and three children. Bruno developed this theme with petitioner without success, and petitioner, also without success, again sought to see his attorney, a request which Bruno relayed unavailingly to his superiors. After this first session with petitioner, Bruno was again directed by Lt. Gannon to play on petitioner's sympathies, but again no confession was forthcoming. But the Lieutenant a third time ordered Bruno falsely to importune his friend to confess but again petitioner clung to his attorney's advice. Inevitably, in the fourth such session directed by the Lieutenant, lasting a full hour, petitioner succumbed to his friend's prevarications and agreed to make a statement. Accordingly, at 3:25 a.m. the Assistant District Attorney, a stenographer, and several other law enforcement officials entered the room where petitioner was being questioned, and took his statement in question and answer form with the Assistant District Attorney asking the questions. The statement was completed at 4:05 a.m.

But this was not the end. At 4:30 a.m. three detectives took petitioner to Police Headquarters in Manhattan. On the way they attempted to find the bridge from which petitioner said he had thrown the murder weapon. They crossed the Triborough Bridge into Manhattan, arriving at Police Headquarters at 5 a.m., and left Manhattan for the Bronx at 5:40 a.m. via the Willis Avenue Bridge. When petitioner recognized neither bridge as the one from which he had thrown the weapon, they re-entered Manhattan via the Third Avenue Bridge, which petitioner stated was the right one, and then returned to

Page 320

the Bronx well after 6 a.m. During that trip the officers also elicited a statement from petitioner that the deceased was always 'on (his) back,' 'always pushing' him and that he was 'not sorry' he had shot the deceased. All three detectives testified to that statement at the trial.

Court opened at 10 a.m. that morning, and petitioner was arraigned at 10:15.

At the trial, the confession was introduced in evidence over appropriate objections. The jury was instructed that it could rely on it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury returned a guilty verdict and petitioner was sentenced to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction over three dissents, 4 N.Y.2d 256, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793, 150 N.E.2d 226, and we granted certiorari to resolve the serious problem presented under the Fourteenth Amendment. 358 U.S. 919, 79 S.Ct. 293, 3 L.Ed.2d 238.

Petitioner's first contention is that his absolute right to counsel in a capital case, Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, became operative on the return of an indictment against him, for at that time he was in every sense a defendant in a criminal case, the grand jury having found sufficient cause to believe that he had committed the crime. He argues accordingly that following indictment no confession obtained in the absence of counsel can be used without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks to distinguish Crooker v. State of California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448, and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 78 S.Ct. 1297, 2 L.Ed.2d 1523, on the ground that in those cases no indictment had been returned. We find it unnecessary to reach that contention, for we find use of the confession obtained here inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment under traditional principles.

The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent...

To continue reading

Request your trial
937 practice notes
  • Rogers v. Richmond, No. 40
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • March 20, 1961
    ...166; Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 172—174, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209—210, 96 L.Ed. 183; Spano v. People of State of New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320—321, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1205 1206, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265; Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206—207, 80 S.Ct. 274, 279—280, 4 L.Ed.2d 242.......
  • Miller v. Fenton, No. 83-5530
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • September 28, 1984
    ...4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); 11 see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389-90, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1787-88, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1206, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959) (as "the methods used to extract confessions [become] more sophisticated, our duty to enforce ......
  • Davis v. Burke, No. 16728.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • April 2, 1969
    ...denied as in Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and Spano v. People of State of New York, 1959, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265. He was not duped as in Massiah v. United States, 1964, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246. He was not d......
  • Soffar v. Cockrell, No. 98-20385.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 29, 2002
    ...prior knowledge, experience, and contact with Soffar gave him an advantageous position from which to work on Soffar. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). Given the ability of interrogators to needle, tease, taunt, and repeat again and again, remaining silen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
934 cases
  • Rogers v. Richmond, No. 40
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • March 20, 1961
    ...166; Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 172—174, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209—210, 96 L.Ed. 183; Spano v. People of State of New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320—321, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1205 1206, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265; Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206—207, 80 S.Ct. 274, 279—280, 4 L.Ed.2d 242.......
  • Miller v. Fenton, No. 83-5530
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • September 28, 1984
    ...4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); 11 see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389-90, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1787-88, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1206, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959) (as "the methods used to extract confessions [become] more sophisticated, our duty to enforce ......
  • Davis v. Burke, No. 16728.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • April 2, 1969
    ...denied as in Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, and Spano v. People of State of New York, 1959, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265. He was not duped as in Massiah v. United States, 1964, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246. He was not d......
  • Soffar v. Cockrell, No. 98-20385.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • July 29, 2002
    ...prior knowledge, experience, and contact with Soffar gave him an advantageous position from which to work on Soffar. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959). Given the ability of interrogators to needle, tease, taunt, and repeat again and again, remaining silen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Rethinking Police Expertise.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 2, November 2021
    • November 1, 2021
    ...& Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 908-09 (2004); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 n.2 (1959) (listing (104.) See Drizin & Leo, supra note 103, at 908-10; Julia Simon-Kerr, Public Trust and Police Deception, 11 NE. U. L......
  • The Study of Judicial Attitudes: the Case of Mr. Justice Douglas
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 24-1, March 1971
    • March 1, 1971
    ...229. Dissenting in Draper v. UnitedStates, 358 U.S. 307, 314, accounts for two evaluative statements. Concurring in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959). Dissenting in Frank v. Maryland, 359 360, 374 (1959). Majority in Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1960). Concurringin Jones v......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT