Spanos v. Taylor
| Citation | 76 Va.App. 810,883 S.E.2d 720 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0139-22-2 |
| Decision Date | 07 March 2023 |
| Parties | Nickolas G. SPANOS v. Shannon L. TAYLOR |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Virginia |
Nickolas George Spanos, pro se.
Theodore I. Brenner (Freeborn & Peters LLP, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Beales, Friedman and Callins
OPINION BY JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN
Nickolas G. Spanos filed a legal ethics complaint against Shannon L. Taylor, the Commonwealth's Attorney for Henrico County, in the Circuit Court of Louisa County. The circuit court sustained Taylor's amended demurrer and dismissed the complaint, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the complaint or to grant the relief sought.
Spanos challenges the circuit court's judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Spanos filed a complaint against Taylor seeking "to revoke the Defendant's license(s) [to] practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, or discipline the Defendant[ ] consistent with the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia." Spanos asserted that the circuit court had jurisdiction under Code § 54.1-3915 to grant the relief he requested. Taylor filed an amended demurrer arguing, among other things, that the circuit court "ha[d] no jurisdiction to determine the matter raised in the [c]omplaint or to grant the relief requested."
The circuit court heard argument; Spanos filed a written opposition but did not appear for the hearing. At the hearing, the court found the lack of jurisdiction and lack of available relief dispositive. The court ruled "that the [c]ourt has no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the relief sought in this case to, generally, revoke the attorneys’ right to practice in the Commonwealth of Virginia or otherwise subject them to discipline." The circuit court entered a final order incorporating its bench ruling, sustaining the demurrer, and dismissing the complaint. This appeal followed.
In multiple assignments of error, Spanos presents three basic arguments: (1) that the circuit court's dismissal of his complaint violated Code § 54.1-3915 which Spanos claims requires that a circuit court discipline lawyers rather than the Bar; (2) that the Disciplinary Rules set out in the Rules of the Supreme Court give "mandatory jurisdiction to Virginia Courts" to address his attempt to revoke Taylor's license; and (3) that the circuit court's ruling dismissing his claim was arbitrary and capricious. Based on these alleged errors, Spanos concludes that the circuit court improperly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to address his claims. We will address each of Spanos’ theories in turn.
The basic premise underpinning Spanos’ claims is that "any person or entity has standing to file a Virginia legal ethics complaint within any court according to [Code] § 54.1-3915."1
He argues that under Code § 54.1-3910, the Virginia State Bar "has no authority to prosecute or discipline attorneys"; rather, "only the courts (of record) are authorized to discipline attorneys." Continuing, he asserts that Code § 54.1-39102 requires the Bar to "act as an administrative agency of the Court" to investigate and report violations of rules and regulations adopted by the Court. He contends, however, that the Bar's power to investigate and report such violations excludes the power to adjudicate them. In In re Moseley , 273 Va. 688, 643 S.E.2d 190 (2007), Spanos continues, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Id. at 695, 643 S.E.2d 190. He interprets Moseley to require the circuit court to adjudicate his ethics complaint under Code § 54.1-3915.
Spanos expressly disclaims, however, any reliance on Code § 54.1-3935, which provides for the adjudication of a legal ethics complaint by a three-judge court, after certain prerequisite conditions are met. Similarly, he acknowledges that the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct do not confer a private right of action, but merely provide the metric for evaluating whether an attorney has committed an ethical violation warranting discipline. He contends that the allegations in his complaint sufficiently stated a claim that Taylor violated those rules, so he concludes the complaint properly invoked the circuit court's jurisdiction to discipline her.
We are unpersuaded by Spanos’ interpretation of the statutory framework governing attorney discipline. We agree with the circuit court's judgment that it lacked jurisdiction under that statutory framework to revoke Taylor's license to practice law in Virginia.
"Jurisdiction is the power to adjudicate a case upon the merits and dispose of it as justice may require." Pure Presbyterian Church of Washington v. Grace of God Presbyterian Church , 296 Va. 42, 49, 817 S.E.2d 547 (2018) (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Shelton v. Sydnor , 126 Va. 625, 629, 102 S.E. 83 (1920) ). "In order for a court to have the authority to adjudicate a particular case upon the merits, to have what we have termed ‘active jurisdiction,’ several elements are needed." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Farant Inv. Corp. v. Francis , 138 Va. 417, 427-28, 122 S.E. 141 (1924) ). Foremost among these elements is subject-matter jurisdiction "which is the authority granted through constitution or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or controversies." Id. (quoting Morrison v. Bestler , 239 Va. 166, 169, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990) ). "[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is the paramount consideration in assessing whether a court has authority to enter judgment, and a judgment will always be void without it." Watson v. Commonwealth , 297 Va. 347, 352, 827 S.E.2d 782 (2019). Subject-matter jurisdiction Pure Presbyterian Church , 296 Va. at 49, 817 S.E.2d 547 (quoting Humphreys v. Commonwealth , 186 Va. 765, 772, 43 S.E.2d 890 (1947) ).
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question of law an appellate court considers de novo. Knight v. Ottrix , 69 Va. App. 519, 523, 820 S.E.2d 411 (2018) ; accord Parrish v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n , 292 Va. 44, 49, 787 S.E.2d 116 (2016).
In Moseley , the Supreme Court discussed two separate forms of attorney discipline. First, any court may suspend or revoke an attorney's privilege to appear before that court. 273 Va. at 695-96, 698 n.10, 643 S.E.2d 190 ; Ex Parte Fisher , 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 619, 624-25 (1835). Each court's inherent power to discipline attorneys practicing before that court arises directly from the Constitution of Virginia: it is "derived from the separation of powers between the judiciary, as an independent branch of government, and the other branches." Moseley , 273 Va. at 697, 643 S.E.2d 190 ). Therefore, it "is not dependent on its creation by legislative enactment and thus cannot be limited by statute." Id. at 698, 643 S.E.2d 190. This authority of a court "to control those who practice before it," id. at 696, 643 S.E.2d 190, in a pending matter is not at issue in this case.3
The second form of attorney discipline involves inquiries into alleged misconduct which may affect the attorney's licensure to practice law. "A license to practice law covers the full panoply of actions an attorney can undertake from writing a will to representing a person in a controversy before a court." Id. at 695, 643 S.E.2d 190. Licensure, and suspension or revocation of a license to practice law, "are matters governed by statute." Id. ; see Code §§ 54.1-3900 to -3944.4 Therefore, we must examine the statutory framework applicable to Spanos’ complaint. In doing so, "it is our duty to interpret the several parts of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal." Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax Cnty. v. Cohn , 296 Va. 465, 473, 821 S.E.2d 693 (2018) (quoting Cuccinelli v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va. , 283 Va. 420, 425, 722 S.E.2d 626 (2012) ). We also consider "statutes related to the same subject matter" in order "to ‘make the body of the laws harmonious and just in their operation.’ " Id. (quoting Lucy v. County of Albemarle , 258 Va. 118, 130, 516 S.E.2d 480 (1999) ).
Under the controlling statutes, the Supreme Court of Virginia has express authority to "[p]rescrib[e] a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys," to "[d]efin[e] the practice of law," and to "[p]rescribe[e] procedures for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys." Code § 54.1-3909. Consistent with this charge, the Supreme Court has adopted detailed guidelines and procedures for disciplinary proceedings involving attorneys. See Va. Sup. Ct. R. Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13. This framework has been aptly summarized as follows:
Disciplinary cases begin when the Virginia State Bar, an agency of the Supreme Court of Virginia, receives a "complaint." Id. para. 13-1. After the Bar's staff "determines that the conduct questioned or alleged [presents] an issue under the Disciplinary Rules," it investigates the complaint, which proceeds through several preliminary reviews by Bar committees. Id. paras. 13-10 to 13-15. If appropriate, the Bar eventually issues a "charge of misconduct," which proceeds to a hearing. Id. para. 13-16. If the case involves possible...
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Elliott v. Fant
... ... there are exceptions to Rule 5A:18, "[Elliott] has not ... invoked" them, "and we do not consider them sua ... sponte." Spanos v. Taylor, 76 Va.App. 810, ... 827-28 (2023) (citing Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 ... Va.App. 752, 761 (2003) (en banc)); cf. Jones v ... ...