Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields

Decision Date19 September 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-1021,00-1021
Citation266 F.3d 684
Parties(7th Cir. 2001) Eugene Sparing, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Village of Olympia Fields and Officer James Keith, Defendants-Appellees
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Before Easterbrook, Ripple, and Williams, Circuit Judges.

Williams, Circuit Judge.

Eugene Sparing sued Officer James Keith for alleged Fourth Amendment violations, stemming from his arrest in his home. He also sued Keith and the Village of Olympia Fields under the Illinois tort of malicious prosecution. The Village and Keith moved for summary judgment, with Keith asserting a defense of qualified immunity. Relying on our decision in United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991), the district court rejected Sparing's Fourth Amendment warrant claim. In addition, the district court found probable cause for Sparing's arrest on a closely related offense and rejected Sparing's Fourth Amendment probable cause and state law malicious prosecution claims. Sparing appeals, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Facts

Sparing's arrest arose out of an alleged scheme organized by a friend named David Smith. Smith filed a criminal report with the Olympia Fields Police Department on July 23, 1996. In his complaint, Smith alleged that he fired Tom Sanfratello on May 31, 1996, and that Sanfratello later stole files from the office and forged two checks made out to himself. Smith also stated that on the morning of July 9, 1996, Sparing saw Sanfratello in the office. According to Smith, Sparing knocked on the window to get Sanfratello's attention, but Sanfratello did not respond.

In mid-August, Officer Keith called Sparing to confirm his part of Smith's story. Sparing did. Keith next interviewed Sanfratello, who disputed the story in several respects but admitted to signing the checks because he was a signatory on the account and was owed money by Smith. He also admitted to taking files, but claimed to have returned them to Smith. Sanfratello also told Keith that he previously had a conversation with Sparing's secretary, Linda Parker, who told him that she had a facsimile sent by Smith to Sparing and that she believed that they were "up to no good." Sanfratello provided a copy of that fax to Keith; it read:

Gene

July 9, 1996 at 2:45 am observed Tom at office copying files from computer and photocopying. You knocked on windows and Tom ignored you. You left and went home.

Thanks
David

The next day, Keith had a telephone conversation with Parker. According to Keith, Parker said that after receiving the fax from Smith, she made a copy and gave the original to Sparing, who replied, "Dave wants me to perjure myself."

The following day, Parker telephoned Keith, recounting to him an encounter she recently had with Sparing. She said that Sparing had contacted her to have lunch and that when he picked her up he asked with whom she had been talking that week. Parker initially feigned ignorance, but Sparing persisted. He drove her by the Olympia Fields Police Department to "refresh [her] memory," and again asked with whom she had been talking, this time informing her that a friend of Sanfratello had already put him in the know. She then admitted to talking with the police about the fax. Sparing, according to Parker, replied, "I thought you were my friend. How could you do this to me? Don't you know that this could lead to criminal charges against me?" Parker told Keith that Sparing then took her back home, told her to get out of the car and that she was fired. He also told Parker that he was evicting her from the house she was renting from him and taking back his van on which she was making payments. Later that day, Keith spoke with Parker again, and she told him the same story.

After the meeting with Parker, Keith went to Sparing's house and knocked on the door. Sparing answered the door, and Keith asked that he identify himself, which he did. At that moment, Sparing was still standing inside his home behind his closed screen door, and Keith was standing outside. Keith then advised Sparing that he was under arrest.1 To which, Sparing inquired whether he had a warrant. Keith stated that he did not, but rather that he had probable cause. Sparing asked whether he could place something down, then turned, and walked away from the screen door further into his home. Keith entered the residence, taking several steps inside. Sparing came back to Keith, and they both left the house.

B. District Court Proceeding

Sparing filed a lawsuit against the Village, Keith, and Officer William Bendar, alleging violations of federal civil rights law as well as Illinois state law.2 Sparing alleged in his complaint that his arrest was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and he sought damages under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. Specifically, Sparing complained that Keith arrested him in his home without a warrant and without probable cause. He also alleged that the Village and Keith maliciously prosecuted him in violation of Illinois tort law.

The Village and Keith moved for summary judgment. Keith asserted an affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The district court held that Sparing had failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation and that Keith was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court concluded that the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Sparing acquiesced to Keith's entry to complete an arrest announced outside his home, and because probable cause existed for an offense closely related to the one for which Sparing was arrested. Having found probable cause for the arrest, the district court also concluded that Sparing could not meet the elements of malicious prosecution. The district court then entered judgment in favor of the Village and Keith. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Fourth Amendment and Section 1983

Sparing alleges two Fourth Amendment violations pursuant to section 1983 against Officer Keith. He claims that Keith unlawfully entered his home without a warrant to effectuate an arrest and unlawfully arrested him without probable cause. Both claims are subject to a defense of qualified immunity. We begin our analysis with the standard for qualified immunity, and then we proceed to apply that standard to each claim.

1. Qualified Immunity.

Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally entitled to qualified immunity and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity provides "ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). They are accorded this ample protection not as a license to violate constitutional rights without recourse nor as an excuse to turn a blind eye to the requirements of the law, but to preserve the vigilance of those individuals vested with the obligation to protect the public interest in the face of ambiguity. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1991); see also Malinowski v. DeLuca, 177 F.3d 623, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1999) (articulating policy reasons behind the immunity).

When presented with a defense of qualified immunity, courts must (1) determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and (2) if so, determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001); Layne, 526 U.S. at 609; Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1999). Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the burden of defeating an assertion of qualified immunity rests with the plaintiff. Spiegel, 196 F.3d at 723; Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1047-48 (7th Cir. 1996).

In this case, the district court, in granting summary judgment, found that Sparing could not establish a deprivation of an actual constitutional right and therefore did not fully address the second part of the standard for qualified immunity. We review the district court's judgment on the basis of qualified immunity de novo. Jones v. Watson, 106 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1997). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

2. Warrantless arrest in the home--the significance of Payton, Watson, Santana, and Berkowitz.

Sparing argues that Keith entered his home without a warrant or his consent to effectuate an arrest, which constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and in particular the Supreme Court's holding in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Keith responds that Sparing acquiesced to his slight entry to complete the arrest after he announced it outside Sparing's home, which is consistent with Payton and indistinguishable from our holding in United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1991). For the reasons stated below, we believe that the entry into Sparing's home without a warrant to effectuate or complete the arrest (although with probable cause) was unreasonable and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Two Fourth Amendment principles set the backdrop against which we analyze this case. First, police officers may constitutionally arrest an individual in a public place (e.g., outside) without a warrant, if they have probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417-24 (1976)....

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