Sparks v. Auditor Gen.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1940
• Docket Number: Motion No. 257.
• Citation: 292 Mich. 58,290 N.W. 327
• Parties: SPARKS, County Treasurer, v. AUDITOR GENERAL et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

292 Mich. 58

290 N.W. 327

SPARKS, County Treasurer,

v.AUDITOR GENERAL et al.

Motion No. 257.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 10, 1940.

Original mandamus proceeding by Charles A. Sparks, Treasurer of Oakland County, against the Auditor General of the State of Michigan, and others, to require the Auditor General to accept a sum of money tendered for purpose of redeeming land from a tax sale, to compel the State Land Office Board to withhold the property from a scavenger sale, and to command the State of Michigan and its agencies to relinquish all claim of title to the property in favor of the former title owner.

Writ of mandamus issued.

POTTER and CHANDLER, JJ., dissenting.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Charles L. Wilson, Pros. Atty., and Harry J. Merritt, Corp. Counsel, both of Pontiac, for plaintiff.

Burney E. Brower, of Jackson, for amicus uriae.

W. C. Hudson, City Atty., of Royal Oak, amicus curiae.

Orph C. Holmes, City Atty., of Ferndale, amicus curiae.

Paul E. Krause, Corp. Counsel, and John H. Witherspoon, Chief Asst. Corp. Counsel, both of Detroit, for amicus curiae.

Thomas Read, Atty. Gen., and Edmund E. Shepherd, Peter E. Bradt, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants.

NORTH, Justice.

This is an application for mandamus brought by plaintiff, treasurer of Oakland county, based upon sections 5 and 7 of the state land office board act (Pub.Acts 1937, Act No. 155, as amended by Pub.Acts 1939, Act No. 244), against defendants to require the Auditor General to accept a sum of money tendered for the purpose of redeeming a parcel of land from the May-1938 tax sale; to compel the State Land Office Board to withhold the property forever from the scavenger sale provided for in section seven of the act; and to command the state of Michigan, and all of its agencies, to relinquish all claim of title to the property involved in favor of Albert Weustenfeld, the former title owner.

The parcel of land is located in Waterford township, Oakland county, formerly owned by Albert Weustenfeld, upon which there were delinquent taxes for 1932 and prior years. May 3, 1938, the lands in question were sold for delinquent taxes under the terms provided for the sale of tax delinquent property (1 Comp.Laws 1929, §§ 3451-3467 [Stat.Ann. §§ 7.104-7.120]). Under the most recent of several amendments, it is provided that as to land sold at tax sales in 1938 and 1939, the equity of redemption shall expire at the end of 18 months (1 Comp.Laws 1929, § 3467 [Stat.Ann. § 7.120]), as amended by Act No. 52, Pub.Acts 1939. A decree was entered April 23, 1938, in the circuit court for Oakland county, in chancery, directing that the land be sold May 3, 1938, and that unless the delinquency was paid before that date, ‘title * * * shall become absolute in the State of Michigan on the expiration of the period of redemption from such sale.’ Weustenfeld made no attempt to pay the delinquency during the 18 months following May 3, 1938, and upon the expiration of that period, November 3, 1939, title became vested in the State of Michigan.

It is plaintiff's claim that sections 5 and 7 of the State land office board act (Act No. 155, Pub.Acts 1937, as amended by Act No. 244, Pub.Acts 1939) expressly or inferentially extends beyond 18 months the period of redemption.

The State land office board act provides that all lands sold to the State, where the equity of redemption has expired, shall be under the control and jurisdiction of the board, with certain exceptions not relevant here. Section 5, as amended by Act No. 244, Pub.Acts 1939, provides as follows:

‘Any municipality may at any time prior to the sale provided for in section 7 of this act make application to the state land office board for the withholding of the lands in said application from the said sale, for a period of 1 year from the date the title vests in the state, and the said state land office board shall withhold such lands from said sale, which lands shall be held subject to the lien of the city for delinquent taxes and special assessments. In the event the taxes on said lands included in said application are not redeemed or paid by said municipality, such lands shall be offered for sale at the next succeeding sale held the following year as provided in section 7 of this act the same as though said application had not been made and the proceeds of such sale paid pro rata to such municipality as provided in section 10 of this act.

‘The term ‘owner’ as used in this act shall mean the owner in fee, mortgagee, land contract vendee, or one having a substantial interest by way of actual investment in the property, priority to be given the one having the largest financial investment in the property.

‘The term ‘municipality’ as used in this act shall mean any county, city, village, township or school district. The term ‘taxing unit’ as used in this act shall include any municipality as herein defined and any other taxing unit in this state.'

Section 7 contains the following provision: ‘In sufficient time prior to each second Tuesday of February after the vesting of title in the state of Michigan, the state land office board shall prepare lists of the descriptions of said parcels of land in each county of this state under its jurisdiction and control: Provided, That parcels of land conveyed or deeded under section5 of this act shall be omitted from such lists.’

Weustenfeld, December 7, 1939, paid the township treasurer the money for which the land had been sold to the State. That officer accepted the money, plus the interest and penalties, and then settled with the county treasurer for this tax item. Plaintiff, as county treasurer, tendered the proportion thereof said to belong to the State to the auditor general who refused to accept it on the following grounds: (a) That he had no authority under Act No. 155, Pub.Acts 1937, or any other act, to accept such moneys; (b) that title to the property had vested in the State, subject only to the right of Weustenfeld to bid at the scavenger sale in 1940; (c) that neither Weustenfeld nor any other person or municipality had the right to redeem this property, said right having been completely lost on November 3, 1939; (d) that said property must be offered for sale at the scavenger sale in 1941, and would have been offered at the scavenger sale in 1940 if it had not been withheld by virtue of the application of Waterford township. Plaintiff instituted mandamus.

Plaintiff contends the language of sections 5 and 7 of the State land office board act, as amended by Act No. 244, Pub.Acts 1939, is plain, subject only to a literal interpretation, and not open to construction; that under the express and implied terms of those sections, and especially under section 5 of the act, an owner who has allowed his lands, delinquent for taxes, to be sold and conveyed to the State, and who has failed to redeem his property from such sale within the period of 18 months, is granted, at least inferentially, an extension of one year from the date on which title became vested in the State within which to redeem; and such redemption may within such period be lawfully effected through the medium of the municipality in which the property is situated by inducing the municipality to apply to the State land office board to withhold the property from the sale provided for in section seven of the act.

Defendants, on the other hand, contend these provisions upon which plaintiff founds his petition do not expressly or inferentially extend beyond 18 months the period of redemption now established by the general property tax law or grant to a municipality power or authority to accept from a former owner moneys tendered to effect redemption after the statutory time has passed and title has become vested in the State; that the language of section five refers to an express grant of privilege formerly embodied in Act No. 155, Pub.Acts 1937, but stricken out by way of amendment in 1939 (Act No. 244, Pub.Acts 1939), and that such language is, therefore, uncertain, indefinite, vague and ambiguous, and warrants resort to legitimate aid to construction, and, in the light of its legislative history, it has become void.

Remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. Pike v. Richardson, 136 Mich. 414, 99 N.W. 398;Closser v. Remley, 195 Mich. 313, 162 N.W. 120.

‘But the court cannot by construction extend the time or very the terms of the statute (of redemption) under which the right may be exercised.’ 4 Cooley, Taxation, 4th Ed., § 1562.

‘The terms of a statute cannot be extended by construction beyond the obvious import of its language. Morrill v. Seymour, 3 Mich. 65;Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99.’ City of Detroit v. Township of Redford, 253 Mich. 453, 235 N.W. 217, 218.

Even under the most liberal construction of section five, there is nothing which either expressly or by implication gives the owner an extension of time within which to pay taxes and redeem his land. For section 5 provides: ‘In the event the taxes on said lands included in said application are not redeemed or paid by said municipality, such lands shall be offered for sale at the next succeeding sale held the following year.’

The opportunity to pay the taxes and redeem the property after title has become vested in the State, if given at all, is given the municipality, and not the owner. The rights of the owner to redeem are elaborately set forth in section 74 of the general property tax law (Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 3467.

Plaintiff and defendants agree that section 5 requires the State land office board to withhold delinquent land from the...