Sparks v. Douglas County
| Decision Date | 02 November 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 61299-4,61299-4 |
| Citation | 904 P.2d 738,127 Wn.2d 901 |
| Parties | Herschel SPARKS and Elizabeth Sparks, husband and wife, Respondents, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY, State of Washington, Jay Weber, Joan Patterson and Matthew Warner, Board of County Commissioners; and Jerry Litt, Planning Director, Petitioners. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Jim Krider, Snohomish County Prosecutor, Marya J. Silvernale, Deputy, Everett, John M. Groen, Pacific Legal Foundation, Bellevue, for amicus curiae.
Steven M. Clem, Douglas County Prosecutor, Waterville, for petitioners.
James R. Graettinger, E. Wenatchee, for respondents.
Petitioner Douglas County seeks review of a decision by the Court of Appeals, Division Three, reversing a ruling of the Douglas County Superior Court which upheld action of the Board of Commissioners of Douglas County conditioning approval of short plat applications by Respondents Herschel and Elizabeth Sparks upon dedication of rights of way for road improvements. We granted review. We reverse.
The question presented in this case is whether the action by Douglas County conditioning approval of the Sparkses' short plat applications upon dedication of rights of way for road improvements was arbitrary and capricious and constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property.
On March 29, 1990, Herschel and Elizabeth Sparks (Sparkses) filed four short plat applications with the Douglas County Planning Office, designated as plats 2, 3, 4 and 5. 1 Plat 2 covers 9.19 acres located East of Empire Avenue and North of 30th Street Northwest in unincorporated Douglas County near East Wenatchee (Sparks 2). Plat 3 is located immediately South of Plat 2, East of Empire Avenue and North of 29th Street Northwest, covering 9.5 acres (Sparks 3). Plat 4 consists of 6.72 acres between Empire Avenue and Fir Street Northwest, north of 32nd Street Northwest (Sparks 4). Plat 5 is located on 5.6 acres between Empire Avenue and Fir Street Northwest and adjacent to 32nd Street Northwest on the south (Sparks 5). Each of the proposed short plats contains four residential lots.
The planning director reviewed the plat applications and determined the streets bordering the plats were deficient in right of way width by county standards and thus would not accommodate future construction of street improvements. 2 The director also determined that 32nd Street did not meet fire code requirements for safe access. 3
The matter was referred to the Subdivision Review Committee, which met on June 21, 1990. Its findings were consistent with those of the planning director. 4 It approved the short plat applications subject to certain conditions, which included dedication of rights-of-way for future improvements along the public roads bordering the plats. The committee specifically required a 10-foot right-of-way along the portion of plat 2 bordering Empire Avenue; a 10-foot right of way along the portion of plat 3 bordering Empire Avenue and a 5-foot right of way along the portion of that plat adjacent to 29th Street; a 25-foot right-of-way along the portion of plat 4 abutting Fir Street; and dedication of 25-foot rights of way along the portions of plat 5 bordering Fir Street and 32nd Street.
Respondents Sparks appealed the decision of the Subdivision Review Committee to the Douglas County Regional Planning Commission, which held a hearing on August 22, 1990. The Commission upheld the conditional approval of plats 2 and 3, but disapproved plats 4 and 5 based upon noncompliance with fire code provisions for adequate roadway. 5
Respondents then appealed the decision of the Planning Commission to the Douglas County Board of County Commissioners during a hearing on April 1, 1991. The Commissioners, reinstating the decision of the Subdivision Review Committee, approved all the short plat applications subject to the dedication requirements. As to Empire Avenue, the Board concluded:
9. Empire Avenue NW has been determined to have deficiencies regarding pavement width and pavement condition by Urban Arterial Board Standards.
10. Existing pavement width on NW Empire is 16' to 17' wide. Since the time of ... this finding, Empire has been improved to 20 feet of width by a maintenance project.
11. Urban Arterial Board standards require an improved roadway section of a minimum 24 feet of paving, ditches, and backslopes which can only be accomplished in a minimum of 50 feet of right-of-way.
12. Adequate right-of-way is not available to allow future improvements for safe access based on the existing average daily traffic (ADT) 220 ADT, nor the increase in traffic that may be generated by this short plat. 6
The commissioners also concluded that 29th Street is deficient in right of way and road surfacing; that Fir Street "is deficient in standards for right-of-way width to allow future street improvements"; and that 32nd Street "does not meet Uniform Fire Code requirements for safe access" and is "deficient in right-of-way width, road surface, and pavement width." 7 Based upon these findings, the Commissioners determined that the plats could be approved only if the Sparkses dedicated sufficient rights-of-way to allow the roads to be improved according to county standards.
Respondents Sparks sought a writ of review in the Superior Court of Douglas County, arguing that the required dedications were unconstitutional takings of property without compensation. The Superior Court, the Honorable John E. Bridges, affirmed the County Commissioners' action on June 18, 1992. Consistent with the Commissioners' findings, the court determined the streets bordering the plats were deficient in paved surface and in width of right-of-way. Comparing the County's traffic counts on each of the access streets with the projected average daily trips the developments would generate, the court found the developments would approximately double traffic in the area. 8 It concluded Respondents Sparks did not establish that the County Commissioners' action was arbitrary or capricious. 9
The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision on December 14, 1993. 10 The majority determined there was no evidence that residential development of the Sparkses' properties would have an adverse impact which would necessitate widening the adjacent roads. 11 The court concluded that requiring dedication of rights-of-way as a condition for plat approval was an unconstitutional taking.
On January 13, 1994, Douglas County filed a petition for review in this Court. Consideration was deferred pending a decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dolan v. Tigard. 12 The Supreme Court has now ruled in that case. We granted the petition on September 7, 1994.
The federal and Washington state constitutions provide that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation. 13 Where the government physically appropriates a portion of a person's private property, such as through an easement or right-of-way, a taking has occurred which requires compensation. 14 This rule does not necessarily apply, however, where conveyance of a property right is required as a condition for issuance of a land permit. 15
"As a prerequisite for development permission, a regulation may require a landowner to dedicate property rights for public use if the regulatory exaction is reasonably calculated to prevent, or compensate for, adverse public impacts of the proposed development." 16 The theory underlying this principle is that if denial of a development permit does not constitute a taking of property, then neither is it a taking if instead the government imposes a condition on the development which serves the same legitimate police power purpose as denial of a permit, even if that condition involves dedication of land. 17 A land use regulation is not a taking if it substantially advances a legitimate state interest and does not deprive the owner of economically viable use of the owner's land. 18 The constitutional propriety no longer applies, however, if the condition substituted for the denial "utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition." 19
Any decision approving or disapproving a plat is reviewable for "unlawful, arbitrary, capricious or corrupt action." 20 An action is arbitrary or capricious when the legislative body reaches its decision "willfully and unreasonably, without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances." 21 A decision reached after due consideration on a matter upon which there is room for differing opinions is not arbitrary or capricious. 22 This is so even though a reviewing court may believe the decision is erroneous. 23 In this case, our review is limited to determining whether the findings of fact on the record were given due consideration by the trial court and by Douglas County when it conditioned approval of the Sparkses' short plat applications upon dedication of rights-of-way.
After examining the record in this case, the trial court found:
[T]he four proposed short plats will result in either 16 single family residences or 32 duplexes.... [E]ach residence generates on an average 9.5 ADT's [average daily trips] per day which mathematically computes (in consideration of the 16 proposed lots) at a minimum of 152 ADT to a possible maximum of 304 ADT's. The County performed traffic counts on each of the access streets. Comparing these traffic counts with the projected ADT's resulting from the short plats reveals that the developments will approximately double the traffic in the area. In the case of Fir Street, the increase will approximate 100 percent. 24
Based upon these findings, the trial court concluded that Douglas County did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it conditioned approval of the plat applications upon dedication of rights-of-way for road improvements.
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