Sparks v. Johnson

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Hightower
• Citation: Sparks v. Johnson, 235 S.W. 975 (Tex. App. 1921)
• Decision Date: 06 December 1921
• Docket Number: (No. 739.)
• Parties: SPARKS v. JOHNSON.

Page 975

235 S.W. 975

SPARKS v. JOHNSON.

(No. 739.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

December 6, 1921.

Appeal from Nacogdoches County Court; J. M. Marshall, Judge.

Action by Tobe Sparks against Matthew Johnson. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

S. M. Adams, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.

V. E. Middlebrook, of Nacogdoches, for appellee.

HIGHTOWER, C. J.

The appellant, Sparks, was the plaintiff below, and brought this suit against the appellee, Johnson, for the recovery of damages, alleging, substantially, that about October 1, 1917, he and the appellee entered into a verbal contract, by the terms of which appellee contracted and agreed to rent and lease to appellant, for the year 1918, a certain 100-acre farm in Nacogdoches county, at that time owned by the appellee. Appellant then alleged, substantially, that appellee breached the contract and sold the farm, some time later, to one Eph Coon, to whom possession of the farm was delivered, and that appellant was deprived thereby of the use of the farm. He then alleged, substantially, that he was to pay appellee under the verbal contract a cash rent of $200 for the farm during the year 1918, and that by reason of appellee's breach of the contract in selling the farm and denying him the possession thereof he was forced to rent another farm of no greater value, for which he was compelled to pay a much larger rent than he had agreed to pay appellee, to wit, $628, and he prayed judgment for the difference between the price he agreed to pay appellee as rent and the price he was compelled to pay for the farm he procured.

From the record as presented, it appears that the main contention and fight between the parties below was as to whether appellee contracted, absolutely and unconditionally, to rent appellant the farm for the year 1918, or whether his agreement to do so was merely upon the condition that he did not sell the farm before the first of the year 1918. It was appellant's contention that the verbal contract was absolute, and that there was no understanding or condition to the effect that he was to have the farm only in the event that appellee did not sell the same, while, on the other hand, appellee strenuously contended that the contract was that appellant should have the farm for the year 1918, provided appellee did not sell it before that time.

The case was tried with a jury, and upon a special issue submitted the jury found, in effect, that appellee did not agree absolutely to rent the farm to appellant for the year 1918, but, as contended by appellee that the agreement was to rent appellant the farm, provided appellee should not sell it. Upon the verdict so rendered judgment was entered in favor of appellee.

Appellee has filed objections to the consideration of appellant's brief, contending that the same is not in compliance with the rules for briefing, but upon consideration of the matter we discover that the objections interposed by appellee to the brief have reference to the rules of briefing before the amendment by the Supreme Court, which took effect September 1, 1921. Appellant's brief is prepared under the new rules, and was filed since such rules took effect, and as prepared is a substantial compliance with those rules.

On the trial, appellant introduced as his first witness Eph Coon, a white man, to whom appellee sold the farm in question, and proved by Mr. Coon, substantially, that he was the man who purchased the farm from appellee, and the fact that Mr. Coon took possession and worked the farm during the year 1918, and, further, the character and quantity of crops raised by him on the farm, and the value of such crops. Appellant did not further interrogate the witness, but thereupon turned him over for cross-examination by the attorney for appellee. Among other things testified to by Coon, while being questioned by the attorney for the appellee, was the following:

"When I moved my first load of household goods to the place that I bought from Matthew Johnson, I met Tobe Sparks in the Nacogdoches and Henderson road near Allen Rhodes' place, and he [meaning Tobe Sparks] told me that he had not rented the place from Matthew Johnson."

When the witness was again turned back for further interrogation by the attorney for appellant, the latter propounded the following question to Mr. Coon:

"Mr. Coon, is it not a fact that when you met Tobe Sparks, the plaintiff, in the Nacogdoches and Henderson road near Allen Rhodes' residence, Tobe told you he had rented the place, but that you were a white man and he was a negro and did not wish to antagonize you, but that he was going to make Matthew Johnson pay him whatever damages he may suffer?"

This question was objected to by the attorney for the appellee on the ground, substantially, that it was an attempt by appellant to impeach his own witness, and...