Sparks v. Mills
| Decision Date | 26 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:20-cv-190-LEW,2:20-cv-190-LEW |
| Parties | MARC SPARKS, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. JANET MILLS, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
In this action Marc Sparks ("Plaintiff"), on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, alleges that Janet Mills, the Governor of Maine, Randall Liberty, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, and Laura Fortman, the Commissioner of the Department of Labor (collectively, "Defendants") improperly seized already realized and improperly denied future unemployment benefits. In his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff asserts a solitary claim alleging a deprivation of procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for two reasons. First, Defendants believe this Court should abstain so the State of Maine can hash out the novel issues of state law at the heart of this case without federal interference. Secondly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Finally, Defendants argue they are not subject to Plaintiff's suit to the extent there is a claim for money damages because they are immune under the qualified immunity doctrine. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED.
While incarcerated at Bolduc Correctional Facility, Plaintiff participated in the Work Release Program ("WRP") which permitted certain inmates to work outside the facility to earn money and ease their transition back into society. Plaintiff typically worked about forty-five hours per week at Applebee's in Thomaston, Maine. However, on March 16, 2020, the State of Maine suspended the WRP and told participants they could no longer leave the facility to limit their potential exposure to COVID-19.
In response to the pandemic, the Maine Legislature passed emergency legislation easing the requirements for unemployment benefits. See P.L. 2020, Ch. 617, Part B-1, codified at 26 M.R.S. § 1199(2)(A). Shortly after its passage, Mae Worcester, Bolduc's Community Programs Coordinator, encouraged WRP participants to apply for benefits and helped them file their applications. On April 29, 2020, an Assistant Attorney General ("AAG') sent Department of Labor ("DOL") Commissioner Laura Fortman a memo explaining why she believed that WRP participants were eligible for unemployment benefits. Based, at least in part, on this memo, the DOL determined that WRP participants were eligible under the new legislation. Fifty-three WRP participants were deemed eligible for both state and federal unemployment benefits. In total, these individuals received $198,767. Plaintiff personally received seven payments of $106 from the state of Maine and $600 from the federal government.
After getting wind of the DOL decision, Governor Mills directed DOC Commissioner Randall Liberty to take all unemployment benefits already given to WRP participants and place them into a trust account. Governor Mills also instructed the DOL to withhold any further distribution of unemployment funds to WRP participants because she did not believe either the Maine Legislature or Congress intended to provide WRP participants with unemployment benefits. The DOL and DOC complied with Governor Mills' directives.
Defendants contend that the feds ought to mind their own business, refrain from exercising federal jurisdiction and yield to state courts to resolve this local controversy under the so-called Burford abstention doctrine.
Burford abstention is a judicial construct in which a federal court may, in certain circumstances, decline from hearing a case otherwise properly before it.
Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar; or (2) where the exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.
New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). While Burford could be interpreted broadly to "requir[e] that federal courts abstain from hearing any case involving important state regulatory policies,"the First Circuit has declined to give the doctrine such a wide reach. Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol Puerto Rico Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 2011).
It is useful in thinking about abstention to recall its limiting principle; that "federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been conferred." New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 358. Federal courts have Id. ). "Treason to the Constitution" is suitably strong language. When a plaintiff enters the courthouse doors seeking redress, federal courts "cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case [to which their jurisdiction extends] in favor of another jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893)).
While the federal courts' obligation to adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction is not absolute, the obligation is "virtually unflagging." Id. at 359 (quoting Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988)). Because abstention "runs so firmly against the jurisprudential grain," Chico Serv. Station, 633 F.3d at 29, the carefully defined areas in which a federal court may abstain remain "the exception, not the rule." New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 358.
Burford abstention aims to protect complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference, not all federal interference. Id. at 362. Burford does not require abstention whenever there is an administrative process or even when there is potential for conflict with regulatory policy. Id. The First Circuit has made clear that Burford only applies in the "'unusual circumstances,' when federal review risks having the district courtbecome the 'regulatory decision-making center.'" Chico Serv. Station, 633 F.3d at 30 (quoting Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 473 (1st Cir. 2009)). Federal courts are not required to abstain "merely because the federal action may impair operation of a state administrative scheme or overturn state policy." Id. See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380, n. 5 (1978) ().
This is not to say that abstention is never appropriate. The Supreme Court instructs that federal courts "have the power to refrain from hearing cases . . . in which the resolution of a federal constitutional question might be obviated if the state courts were given the opportunity to interpret ambiguous state law." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-17 (1996). When federal courts abstain, they do so out of "deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of comity and federalism." Id. at 723. For those keeping score, on one side of the ledger is the federal judiciary's constitutional duty to hear the cases over which they have jurisdiction and on the other are the principles of comity and federalism. See id. at 728.
In Burford, the Supreme Court addressed whether the district court should have declined jurisdiction over an oil company's challenge to the Texas Railroad Commission's order allowing Burford to drill four wells in the East Texas oil field. The Court described the regulatory system formulated to govern the conservation of oil and gas in the East Texas oil field "as thorny a problem as has challenged the ingenuity and wisdom of legislatures." Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318 (1943) (quoting Railroad Commission v. Rowan& Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 579 (1940)). The Texas Legislature had conferred limited jurisdiction over oil field controversies to certain courts because it wanted such controversies to be heard by the same judges so they could, in turn, gain specialized knowledge of this specialized, local problem. When describing the relationship between the state courts and the Commission, the Court called the two "working partners . . . in the business of creating a regulatory system for the oil industry." Id. at 326.
Burford abstention would require me to conclude that: (1) there exists a timely and adequate state review process that culminates in state-court review; and either 2) the resolution of Plaintiff's federal case would require that I usurp the role of state agencies to establish state policy of substantial public import; or 3) there is no practical means by which I might avoid becoming such a usurper by careful management of the federal case. Chico Serv. Station, 633 F.3d at 32.
The first concern is whether timely and adequate review is available in a state proceeding that will culminate in state-court review. "Under Maine law, a party to an administrative proceeding may appeal any final agency action to a state Superior Court, which will review the decision for abuse of discretion, errors of law, or findings not supported by the evidence." Kilroy v. Mayhew, 841 F. Supp. 2d 414, 421 (D. Me. 2012). This Court has held that Maine's general framework for administrative appeals is enough under Burford. See id. Although there have been some...
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