Sparman v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 19 September 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:13-cv-00521-TMP
• Parties: CONNIE LOU SPARMAN, individually and in her capacity as legal guardian and next friend of D.W., a minor child, Plaintiff, v. BLOUNT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

CONNIE LOU SPARMAN, individually and in her capacity aslegal guardian and next friend of D.W., a minor child, Plaintiff, v. BLOUNT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Case No. 2:13-cv-00521-TMP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

September 19, 2016

SECOND MEMORANDUM OPINION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This cause is once again before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Blount County Board of Education on October 27, 2014. (Doc. 51). In an Order issued on February 9, 2015, the Motion for Summary Judgment was granted pending the plaintiff's exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 70). The plaintiff since has exhausted those remedies, and the court's previous order was vacated on December 9, 2015. (Doc. 82). The parties were allowed to file supplemental briefs regarding the Motion for Summary Judgment and to conduct necessary additional discovery. Supplemental discovery and briefing having concluded, the Motion for Summary Judgment is ripe to be taken under submission on the merits. The court has considered the evidence and arguments set forth by both parties, and the parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Doc. 7).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The instant case was filed on March 19, 2013, at which time there were two plaintiffs, Connie Lou Sparman and Martha Lynn Vanzandt. All parties consented to dispositive magistrate judge jurisdiction on June 5, 2013. The case was referred to mediation on November 19, 2013, and the parties moved for a court-conducted settlement conference on December 1, 2014. The parties filed joint status reports regarding the progress of mediation and settlement proceedings on March 20, 2014; April 4, 2014; April 25, 2014; and May 2, 2014. Mediation and settlement negotiations resulted in the settlement of all claims by plaintiff Vanzandt.

Plaintiff Sparman filed her Amended Complaint on June 20, 2014. (Doc. 25). After a discovery period that was extended once at the parties' request, the defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 33). The plaintiff filed a motion for a hearing, which was granted. The hearing was not held, however, because the issue the plaintiff wished to raise was resolved. The plaintiff moved to file excess pages (doc. 36) and, in response, the defendant notified the court that there was no objection to the plaintiff filing excess pages so long as the defendant could file a substitute motion containing excess pages (doc. 48). The court granted both motions. (Doc. 50).

The defendant filed a substitute Motion for Summary Judgment on October 27, 2014. (Doc. 51). The plaintiff moved to strike from the Motion for Summary Judgment the Affidavit of Shannon Lakey, and the court granted in part and denied in part the motion. (Docs. 54, 67). The plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on November 14, 2014 (doc. 60), and the defendant replied on December 1, 2014 (doc. 65). Theplaintiff moved for a hearing regarding the Motion for Summary Judgment, which was held on December 11, 2014. (Doc. 65). The court granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on February 9, 2015, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. 70). The court stayed the case to allow the plaintiff to exhaust such remedies and, upon exhaustion, the court vacated its Order on December 9, 2015. (Doc. 82). The court allowed the parties until January 6, 2016, to respond to any additional discovery requests, and until January 15, 2016, for the defendant to file additional evidentiary material and a supplemental brief in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 82). The plaintiff was allowed to file a responsive brief no later than January 29, 2016, and any reply by the defendant was due no later than February 5, 2016. (Id.)

The defendant filed the record of the Administrative Due Process Proceeding and a supplemental brief regarding the Motion for Summary Judgment on January 15, 2016. (Docs. 83, 85). In response, the plaintiff moved for another hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court granted. (Docs. 86, 87). The plaintiff did not file a written response to the defendant's brief. The motion hearing was held on February 24, 2016. On March 17, 2016, the court directed the parties to file briefs regarding the plaintiff's allegations that the defendant failed to accommodate D.W.'s asthma-induced panic attacks, discriminated against D.W. by refusing to allow him to check out library books on his grade level, and required D.W. to shorten his lunch period to receive special education services. (Doc. 89). The parties were allowed until April 7, 2016, to file initial simultaneous briefs, and until April 14, 2016, to file reply briefs. Each party filed a brief on the deadline, and the defendant filed a reply brief onApril 14, 2016. (Docs. 90, 91, 92). The Motion for Summary Judgment then was taken under submission.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 47 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. There is no requirement, however, "that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 323.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56 "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party need not present evidence in a form necessary for admission at trial; however, he may not merely rest on his pleadings. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a partywho fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322.

After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court "shall" grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-252; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n. 11 (1983).

However, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The evidence supporting a claim must be "substantial," Marcus v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 379 (5th Cir., Unit B, 1981)¹; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Young v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004); Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1249-1250 (11th Cir. 2004). If the non-movant's evidence is so thoroughly discredited by the rest of the recordevidence that no reasonable jury could accept it, the evidence fails to establish the existence of a genuine issue of fact requiring a jury determination. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) ("Respondent's version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have reviewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape."); Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1290 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2009). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989).

Furthermore, the court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n. 12 (11th Cir. 1988). Utilizing these standards, the court undertakes the analysis of whether the...