Sparta Ins. Co. v. Colareta

• Decision Date: 06 January 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 13–60579–CIV.
• Citation: 990 F.Supp.2d 1357
• Parties: SPARTA INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Miguel COLARETA, Aida Colareta, Pamela Colareta, and Allied Medical Transport, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

990 F.Supp.2d 1357

SPARTA INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.Miguel COLARETA, Aida Colareta, Pamela Colareta, and Allied Medical Transport, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 13–60579–CIV.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Jan. 6, 2014.

Dara Lynn Schottenfeld, David J. Schottenfed, P.A., Plantation, FL, John R. Catizone, Litchfield Cavo LLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan Michael Hixon, Justin Charles Leto, The Leto Law Firm, Miami, FL, Ralph Lane McGrath, Jr., Ralph L. McGrath Jr., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

ROBIN S. ROSENBAUM, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment[ECF No. 36] and Plaintiff's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 41]. The Court has reviewed the Motions, all supporting and opposing filings, and the record in the case. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and Plaintiff's Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Sparta Insurance Company filed this action against Defendants Allied Medical Transport, Inc., and Miguel Colareta, Aida Colareta, and Pamela Colareta (“the Colareta Defendants”) seeking declaratory relief with respect to its rights and obligations under an insurance policy in connection with an underlying lawsuit between Allied and the Colareta Defendants pending in the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. The underlying action stems from Miguel Colareta's fall from an Allied transport van and the damages that allegedly arose out of that incident. Allied holds an insurance policy with Sparta, and Sparta seeks a declaration from this Court that coverage under that policy is available only under the Business Auto coverage portion. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 36; ECF No. 41.

II. Material Facts

A. The Underlying Accident

The underlying dispute arises from an accident that occurred on April 16, 2012. ECF No. 37–1 at ¶¶ 15–21. Miguel Colareta is an individual suffering from Arnold Chiari malformation, which renders him dependent on a wheelchair. Id. at ¶ 7. As a result of this physical disability, Colareta requires transportation assistance. Id. at ¶ 9. Allied is a non-emergency transport company that provides transportation services to individuals with disabilities. ECF No. 37 at ¶ 1; ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10.

On the date in question, Allied transported Colareta to his place of employment through the use of an accessible van owned, leased, or operated by Allied. ECF No. 37 at ¶ 12. Allied's accessible van was equipped with a wheelchair platform at the rear of the vehicle, which allowed wheelchair-bound passengers to disembark. ECF No. 37–1 at ¶ 11. Upon arrival at Colareta's place of employment, the driver exited the transport van and walked to the rear of the vehicle to begin operating the wheelchair lift. ECF No. 37 at ¶ 13. While Colareta was attempting to disembark from the vehicle, he fell from the handicap platform onto the concrete below and suffered serious injury. Id. at ¶ 14.

The Colareta Defendants subsequently sued Allied, alleging various theories of negligence, including, among others, negligent failure to monitor and properly instruct Colareta while he was exiting from the vehicle, negligent failure to properly and adequately maintain the vehicle and wheelchair lift, and negligent failure to provide proper training to employees. ECF No. 37–8 at ¶ 23. In brief, the Colareta Defendants allege that the driver of the van failed to warn Miguel Colareta when he was safely on the platform and that the latch on the outer barrier of the platform did not properly engage to prevent the wheelchair from falling over the edge.

B. The Sparta Insurance Policy

Sparta issued Allied an insurance policy containing Commercial General Liability coverage (“CGL”) and Commercial Auto (Business or Truckers) Liability coverage (“BAL”). ECF No. 37–3. In this case, Sparta seeks a declaration that coverage for the accident is available only under the BAL and not under the CGL. ECF No. 36 at 3. Specifically, Sparta avers that the “Aircraft, Auto or Watercraft” exclusion in the CGL precludes coverage. ECF No. 41 at 2. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that Sparta is responsible for coverage under both the BAL and the CGL. ECF No. 36 at 3.

“Coverage A” of the CGL provides insurance coverage for bodily injury and property damage, stating that Sparta “will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.... However, [Sparta] will have no duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance does not apply.” ECF No. 37–3 at 15. Included in the CGL's “Coverage A” are various “Exclusions,” to which “[the] insurance does not apply.” Id. at 16.

One such exclusion bars coverage for injury arising out of the use of certain vehicles and states, in pertinent part,

g. Aircraft, Auto Or Watercraft

“Bodily injury” or “property damage” arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, “auto” or watercraft owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured. Use includes operation and “loading or unloading.”

This exclusion applies even if the claims against any insured allege negligence or other wrongdoing in the supervision, hiring, employment, training or monitoring of others by that insured, if the “occurrence” which caused the “bodily injury” or “property damage” involved the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, “auto” or watercraft that is owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured.

Id. at 18 (“Auto Exclusion”).

After receiving notice of Colareta's claims against Allied, Sparta tendered $500,000, which it believed to be the applicable policy limit (the one-accident limit under the BAL). ECF No. 1 at ¶ 20. Colareta, however, refused the tender, contending that the $1,000,000 limit provided under the CGL is applicable, or in the alternative, that both the CGL and the BAL apply for a combined limitation of $1,500,000. Id. at ¶ 21; ECF No. 36 at 1; ECF No. 41 at 2. Thus, the issue before the Court is whether Allied is entitled to coverage under the CGL. See ECF No. 41 at 2.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

“Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ ” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if “a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party.” Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

The moving party shoulders the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir.2008). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, “the nonmoving party ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ ” Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 Fed.Appx. 819, 825 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Instead, “the non-moving party ‘must make a sufficient showing on each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.’ ” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Accordingly, the non-moving party must produce evidence, going beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts suggesting that a reasonable jury could find in his favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. But even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged material facts in controversy, the court must still satisfy itself that all the evidence on the record supports the uncontroverted material facts that the movant has proposed before granting summary judgment. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268–69, 1272 (11th Cir.2008); United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 S.W. 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1103 n. 6 (11th Cir.2004).

In conducting this analysis, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir.2006). But the Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir.2007) (quoting Carlin Commc'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1986)).

IV. Analysis

A. Applicable Law on Insurance Policy Interpretation

Since the parties premise jurisdiction in this case on diversity grounds, this Court must determine the law applicable to this matter by looking to Florida's choice-of-law rules. Adolfo House Distrib. Corp. v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 165 F.Supp.2d 1332, 1335 (S.D.Fla.2001) (citing LaFarge Corp. v....