Speagle v. U.S. Steel Corp.

Decision Date17 June 1958
Docket Number6 Div. 569
Citation105 So.2d 721,39 Ala.App. 559
PartiesD. L. SPEAGLE et al. v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION and Department of Industrial Relations.
CourtAlabama Court of Appeals

Cooper, Mitch & Black, Birmingham, for appellant.

Burr, McKamy, Moore & Thomas, Birmingham, for appellees.

CATES, Judge.

This is a consolidated appeal by four employees of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Division of the United States Steel Corporation who were denied unemployment compensation by the Jefferson Circuit Court.

Their unemployment occurred during the summer of 1955. The conductors working in the corporation's Rail Transportation Department were on Strike from July 29 to August 11.

These cases were companion to the employer's appeals in United States Steel Corp. v. Grimes, 104 So.2d 329; United States Steel Corp. v. Garris, 104 So.2d 327; United States Steel Corp. v. Baxley, 114 So.2d 553; United States Steel Corp. v. Patterson, 104 So.2d 330; United States Steel Corp. v. Walton, 104 So.2d 331; United States Steel Corp. v. Glasgow, 114 So.2d 565; United States Steel Corp. v. Curry, 114 So.2d 532; United States Steel Corp. v. Case, 104 So.2d 332; United States Steel Corp. v. Goodwin, 104 So.2d 333, and United States Steel Corp. v. Lewis, 104 So.2d 335 (which arose out of the 1955 conductors' and the 1956 locomotive engineers' strikes and were all decided March 25, 1958, along with U. S. Steel Corp. v. Wood, 114 So.2d 533 --a 1954 strike case), today we are also deciding employee appeals in Phelps v. United States Steel Corp., 105 So.2d 714, and Widmar v. United States Steel Corp., 105 So.2d 716. Reference should be made from opinion to opinion.

Under Code 1940, T. 13, § 88, we certified questions to and received answers from the Supreme Court as follows:

Inquiry No. 1. Under Code 1940, T. 26, § 214, subd. A, as amended, does an employee of an employer against whom there is pending a labor dispute (involving other employees) in active progress at the establishment of his employment become disqualified if he refuses to cross a peaceful picket line in order to report to work?

Response

'We think that a voluntary refusal by an employee to cross a peaceful picket line set up in a labor dispute by some union, of which claimant is not a member, to work on a job still open to him by his employer, disqualifies an employee, while so doing, for unemployment benefits under section 214-A, Title 26, pocket part, Code.'

Inquiry No. 2. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, would there be a different answer if the place of work at which the picket line stands was not in the same 'establishment' as that in which the dispute existed?

Response

'We think inquiry No. 2 is governed by the same principles stated above; and, therefore, the answer to inquiry No. 2 is No.'

Inquiry No. 3. Is the refusal to cross a picket line by a nonstriking employee who does so because of his adherence to a tenet of his trade unionism a ground for disqualification under § 214, subd. A, as amended, supra?

Response

'Assuming that his refusal to cross the picket line is solely because of his adherence to a tenet of his trade unionism, we answer Yes.'

Inquiry No. 4. Is an employee's statement of his apprehending violence to his person, if he were to cross a picket line, legal evidence; and, if so, is such apprehension (without further evidence of anticipated violence) which leads to his refusal to cross a picket line (thrown up by a union to which he does not belong) before his working establishment sufficient and good ground to remove the disqualifying effect of said § 214, subd. A, as amended, supra?

Response

'In answer to this question it is our opinion that an employee's statement of his apprehension of violence to his person if he were to cross a picket line would not be legal evidence. McGuff v. State, 248 Ala. 259, 27 So.2d 241.'

The response of the Supreme Court was preceded by the following:

'* * * Attention is directed to the absence from section 214, subd. A, supra, of any reference to the act of crossing a picket line during a labor dispute.

'It is observed that to disqualify an employee for receiving unemployment benefits on account of a strike, his unemployment must be 'directly due' to a labor dispute still in active progress in the establishment in which he is or was last employee.--Section 214, subd. A, Title 26, pocket part, Code. Emphasis is placed upon the words 'directly due'. This is referred to and applied in Department of Industrial Relations v. Drummond, 30 Ala.App. 78, 1 So.2d 395, 397, certiorari denied, 241 Ala. 142, 1 So.2d 402, as follows:

"It thus appears that, because of the apprehension of the employer company that to allow some employees to work when others (the C. I. O. affiliates) were on strike would result in violence, the appellee was locked out of work by the published notices and close down of the Wylam Mine. This, therefore, was the direct cause of appellee's unemployment and not the 'labor dispute' in which the C. I. O. affiliates were involved.'

"* * * the Legislature never intended that one, who has purchased his protection against involuntary unemployment, should be denied those benefits because of a 'labor dispute' in which he was in no way involved and the causes of which unemployment he, his agents or organization were powerless to avert.'

'The Court of Appeals held in the Drummond case, supra, that section 214, subd. A, supra, does not serve to disqualify employees for unemployment benefits when their unemployment results from a shut down of the operations in which such employee has been engaged, and when the shut down of those operations is the result of an apprehension by the employer that there would be violence if there was an attempt to operate during the labor dispute and strike in which the complaining employees did not participate.

'The same theory was recognized in Usher v. Department of Industrial Relations, 261 Ala. 509, 75 So.2d 165. See, also, T. R. Miller Mill Co. v. Johns, 261 Ala. 615, 75 So.2d 675, 680.

'Attention is called to the following statement in the Johns case, supra: 'It thus appears that it (section 214, subd. A) contains all the disabilities (disqualifications?) that the legislature intended to impose because of a labor dispute'. Attention is also directed to a feature of the quotation from the Drummond case, supra, which declares in substance that an employee has purchased the right to unemployment benefits not to be denied him on account of a labor dispute 'in which he was in no way involved and the causes of which unemployment he, his agents or organization were powerless to avert.'

'The Drummond, Usher and Johns cases, supra, are clear and distinct to the effect that subsection A of section 214 does not disqualify an employee for such benefits by reason of a labor dispute unless he is directly involved in the dispute. Such employment would not be directly due to a labor dispute if his employer closed the shop, in which he was engaged, on account of his fear that violence would result, even though such closing was directly due to the peaceful picketing which in turn was directly due to a labor dispute in which the claimant was not involved.

'There are many cases which hold that the refusal to cross a picket line to go to work does disqualify an employee for benefits, when such refusal does not result from a well-founded apprehension of personal violence to do so, and his job continues to be open to him, because such is a 'participation' in a labor dispute which under the statute disqualifies one for so doing. Baldassaris v. Egan, 135 Conn. 695, 68 A.2d 120; American Brake Shoe Co. v. Annunzio, 405 Ill. 44, 90 N.E.2d 83; Aitken v. Board of Review, 136 N.J.L. 372, 56 A.2d 587. See, also, 28 A.L.R.2d 333.'

Within this framework we shall discuss the evidence pertaining to each appellant seriatim.

I. Speagle

Speagle worked at the 'Tin Mill.' He reported for work at 7:00 A. M., July 30, 1955. He contends that a crane operator was needed in and about the work of the mill at which he worked. Parts of his testimony run:

'* * * there was a little discussion that went on and then Mr. English come out, he is superintendent of our department, and in the meantime they asked us how come we were not rolling and the best I remember I think the colored man Arthur made the statement, 'We don't have no coil.' At the time we didn't have a coil back there to come into the mill and always on the first coil I cut the tail end off to see what kind of marks are on it and then I had just finished that and I walked back and got in the discussion and we were standing waiting to get a coil where we could start rolling and something--I forgot how it was--but something was said about the conductors on strike and pickets at the gate. Then Mr. English asked us were we going to roll and I don't remember what the answers were, what the rollers told him but I asked him what was the trouble and he said he didn't know. He went back to the office and I walked back in the office and I thought I would call down to the local union and I asked permission to use the phone in Mr. English's office and he said, 'I would like to know the details myself' and I called down and a woman answered the phone and she told me the conductors were on strike about their contract. Then I come back and told them what it was and that is the way it was.

'Q. Is that how you found out there was a conductors' strike? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. When you told Mr. English or the other foreman that you were needing a coil, did anyone point out that--the coil had to be moved by crane? A. We all took that for granted.

'Q. Did he ever assign anybody to the crane to move the coils? A. To my knowing he didn't.

'Q. Did you fellows just walk off or did you take any steps to close down the line? A. Mr. English said, 'Make up your mind what you want to do, roll or go home' and I didn't say...

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8 cases
  • W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. v. McCleney, 6 Div. 254
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    ...the picket line would not have entailed his disqualification.' The case relied upon in Pledger, supra, is Speagle v. United States Steel Corporation, 268 Ala. 3, 105 So.2d 717, and at 39 Ala.App. 559, 105 So.2d 721. The Speagle case at 105 So.2d 719 (hereinafter referred to as Speagle No. 1......
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  • Donais v. Employment Sec. Dept. of State of Wash., 8276-8-III
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    ...time for which he was assigned his backdated vacation pay. Other jurisdictions are in accord. See, e.g., Speagle v. United States Steel Corp., 39 Ala.App. 559, 105 So.2d 721 (1958); Abud v. Department of Empl., 14 Cal.App.3d 405, 92 Cal.Rptr. 446 (1971); Talberg v. Commissioner of Economic ......
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