Speakman v. Williams

Decision Date21 February 2020
Docket NumberC.A. No. 18-1252 (MN)
Citation440 F.Supp.3d 376
Parties Firefighter Brad SPEAKMAN, Ret.; Senior Firefighter Terrance Tate, Ret.; Lieutenant John Cawthray; Kelli Ann Starr-Leach as Administratrix of the Estate of Lieutenant Christopher M. Leach and as guardian ad litem of A.L. and M.L.; Brendan Leach; Laura Fickes, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Senior Firefighter Jerry W. Fickes, Jr.; Benjamin Fickes; Joshua Fickes; Simone Cummings as Administratrix of the Estate of Senior Firefighter Ardythe D. Hope; Aryelle Hope; Alexis Lee; and Ardavia Lee, Plaintiffs, v. Dennis P. WILLIAMS, individually; James M. Baker, individually; Anthony S. Goode, individually; William Patrick, Jr., individually; and The City of Wilmington, a municipal corporation, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware

Thomas C. Crumplar, Raeann C. Warner, Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A.; Stephen J. Neuberger, Thomas S. Neuberger, The Neuberger Firm, P.A. – attorneys for Plaintiffs

Michael P. Kelly, Steven P. Wood, Dawn Kurtz Crompton, Hayley J. Reese, & Adam N. Saravay, McCarter & English, LLP – attorneys for Defendant City of Wilmington

James D. Taylor, Jr. & Jessica M. Jones, Saul Ewing Arnstein & Lehr – attorneys for Defendant Dennis P. Williams

Kathleen Furey McDonough, Jesse L. Noa, & Tracey E. Timlin, Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP – attorneys for Defendant Anthony S. Goode.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOREIKA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Presently before the Court are the objections of Plaintiffs (D.I. 62-66) ("Plaintiffs' Objections") and of Defendants Dennis P. Williams ("Williams") (D.I. 67 ("Williams' Objections")), the City of Wilmington, Delaware ("City") (D.I. 68 ("City's Objections")), and Anthony S. Goode ("Goode") (D.I. 70 ("Goode's Objections")) (collectively, "Present Defendants" and "Present Defendants' Objections," respectively), to Chief Magistrate Judge Thynge's Report and Recommendation (D.I. 57, "the Report") relating to Present Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (D.I. 37, 39, 43 ("Williams' Motion," "Goode's Motion," and "City's Motion," respectively; collectively, "Present Defendants' Motions")). The Report recommends dismissal of at least some of Plaintiffs' counts against each of Present Defendants.1 (D.I. 57 at 37). The Court has reviewed the Report, Plaintiffs' Objections and Present Defendants' responses thereto (D.I. 75, 76, 78 ("Williams' Response," "Goode's Response," and "City's Response," respectively; collectively, "Present Defendants' Responses")), and Present Defendants' Objections and Plaintiffs' responses thereto (D.I. 79-82 ("Plaintiffs' Responses")),2 and has considered de novo the objected-to portions of the Report. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).3 The Court has also afforded reasoned consideration to any unobjected-to portions of the Report. EEOC v. City of Long Branch , 866 F.3d 93, 99-100 (3d Cir. 2017). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the Objections of Plaintiffs are OVERRULED-in-PART, the Objections of Present Defendants are SUSTAINED-in-PART, the Report is ADOPTED-as-MODIFIED below as to Present Defendants, and Present Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. The Complaint as to Present Defendants is dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The Report sets forth a detailed description of the factual and procedural background of this matter. (D.I. 57 at 2-12). The parties have not objected to any of those sections of the Report and the Court's reasoned consideration finds no clear error. The Court therefore adopts those sections and incorporates them here.

As noted in the Report, this matter concerns the death of three Wilmington Fire Department ("WFD") firefighters and the substantial injury of three other firefighters as a result of a house fire that occurred on September 24, 2016 in Wilmington, DE. Plaintiffs allege that the injuries sustained were proximately caused by the policies and actions of, inter alia , Present Defendants, regarding "rolling bypass," which Plaintiffs contend violated their substantive rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs' Complaint (D.I. 1) asserts three counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 : a "state-created danger" count (Count I), a "shocks the conscience" standalone count (Count II), and a "maintenance of policies, practices, and customs" count (Count III). Via their Motions, Present Defendants separately sought dismissal of each of the counts, asserting a variety of different – though frequently overlapping – grounds.

For Defendants Williams and Goode, the Report finds that Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts necessary to meet the elements of Count I but succeeded for Counts II and III. (D.I. 57 at 14-28). For the City, the Report finds that Plaintiffs have successfully pleaded Count III, but not Counts I or II. (Id. ). The Report also recommends that neither Williams nor Goode is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage, (id. at 28-30), but Williams (not Goode) is protected by the political question doctrine, (id. at 32-37). Finally, the Report recommends that Plaintiffs Brad Speakman, Terrance Tate, John Cawthray, and the estates of Jerry W. Fickes, Ardythe D. Hope, and Christopher M. Leach ("Firefighter Plaintiffs") have standing to bring an action under § 1983, but all other Plaintiffs ("Family Member Plaintiffs") do not. (Id. at 31-32).

On September 11, 2019, both sides filed their Objections. (D.I. 62-68, 70). On September 25, 2019, they filed their Responses. (D.I. 75, 76, 78-82).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Mayer v. Belichick , 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010) ; see also Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008). "To survive a motion to dismiss, [however,] a civil plaintiff must allege facts that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’ " Victaulic Co. v. Tieman , 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if a complaint does not contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The Court is not obligated to accept as true "bald assertions" or "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. , 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. , 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997). Instead, "[t]he complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element" of a plaintiff's claim. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc. , 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Review of Reports and Recommendations on Dispositive Motions

The power invested in a federal magistrate judge varies depending on whether the issue is dispositive or non-dispositive. "Unlike a nondispositive motion (such as a discovery motion), a motion is dispositive if a decision on the motion would effectively determine a claim or defense of a party." City of Long Branch , 866 F.3d at 98-99 (citations omitted). Under this standard, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is clearly dispositive.

For reports and recommendations issued for dispositive motions, Rule 72(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that "a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations" "[w]ithin 14 days" and "[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; Brown v. Astrue , 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). When no timely objection is filed, "the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee notes to 1983 amendment. "[B]ecause a district court must take some action for a report and recommendation to become a final order and because ‘[t]he authority and the responsibility to make an informed, final determination ... remains with the judge," however, district courts are still obligated to apply "reasoned consideration" in such situations. City of Long Branch , 866 F.3d at 99-100 (citing Mathews v. Weber , 423 U.S. 261, 271, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) ; Henderson v. Carlson , 812 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987) ).

III. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court must determine whether the parties' Objections were both timely and "specific." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). All of the Objections and Responses were timely, as they were filed within the requisite fourteen-day period. Some of the Objections and Responses were also fairly specific. Others, however, were not. The Court will not belabor the point it has made in its two previous related decisions in this matter, (see D.I. 84 at 4-5; D.I. 87 at 4-5), but the same issues noted in those orders in regard to the specificity of objections and responses persist in the relevant filings here. As in those decisions, however, the Court – as a matter of judicial efficiency – has considered all issues in the parties'...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Oliveras v. Basile
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • February 25, 2020
  • Spahr v. Collins
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Delaware
    • December 17, 2021
    ...is brought against all three Defendants in their individual capacities and therefore cannot stand as pleaded. See Speakman v. Williams, 440 F.Supp.3d 376, 390 n.15 (D. Del. 2020) (explaining that the complaint did not state a Monell claim against two defendants “because Count III is a Monel......
  • Speakman v. Williams
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • January 6, 2021
    ...(citing JA115), R. & R. adopted as modified, 2019 WL 471939 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2019); 2020 WL 109073 (D. Del. Jan. 9, 2020); 440 F. Supp. 3d 376 (D. Del. 2020). The three injured firefighters—Firefighter Brad Speakman, Senior Firefighter Terrance Tate, and Lieutenant John Cawthray—as well a......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT