Spears v. City of Indianapolis, B-L

• Citation: 74 F.3d 153
• Decision Date: 19 January 1996
• Docket Number: B-L,No. 95-1565,95-1565
• Parties: Charles R. SPEARS, R.H. Farley, Inc., and Huxley, Inc. d/b/aine Taxi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, William H. Hudnut III, individually and as mayor of the City of Indianapolis, Fred L. Armstrong, individually and as controller of the City of Indianapolis, and Gerald Young, individually and as a police sergeant of the City of Indianapolis, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 153

74 F.3d 153

Charles R. SPEARS, R.H. Farley, Inc., and Huxley, Inc. d/b/a B-Line Taxi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, William H. Hudnut III, individually and as mayor of the City of Indianapolis, Fred L. Armstrong individually and as controller of the City of Indianapolis and Gerald Young, individually and as a police sergeant of the City of Indianapolis, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-1565.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct. 27, 1995.

Decided Jan. 19, 1996.

Curtis Edward Shirley, Cremer & Miller, Indianapolis, IN, and Stephen Laudig, Mark W. Rutherford, Linda George, and W. Russell Sipes (argued), Laudig, George, Rutherford & Sipes, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Dale R. Simmons (argued), Office of the Corporation Counsel, City Counsel Legal Division, Indianapolis, IN, and John S. Beeman, Harrison & Moberly, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.

"What a diff'rence a day makes ... twenty-four little hours."

(Dinah Washington, ¹ Circa Summer of 1959)

This case is about "what a difference a day makes ... twenty-four little hours" when responding to a motion for summary judgment. If Charles Spears and the other plaintiffs had twenty-four little hours more they might still be in the case. Without twenty-four little hours extra they definitely are out of court. And "that's the diff'rence a day makes."

Our case arises from Mr. Spears' mostly unsuccessful venture into the taxicab business in the city of Indianapolis during the 1980's. Spears and his two corporations, R.H. Farley, Inc. and Huxley, Inc. (we'll occasionally refer to everyone simply as Spears), brought the suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983--with some pendent state law claims tagging along--against the City, its mayor, and two city employees--the controller and a police sergeant. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants and the plaintiffs appeal.

The primary argument on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Spears' request for one more day to fully respond to a defense motion for summary judgment. With something less than real enthusiasm, the plaintiffs also challenge the grant of summary judgment itself. Lastly, they contest a district court order that they pay costs associated with a discovery request. Because we find no abuse of discretion and no error, we affirm the district court in all respects. In order to appreciate why we find no abuse of discretion, we need to fully review the facts that led up to the court's decision. We'll start at the beginning, in the early 1980's.

R.H. Farley, Inc. and Huxley, Inc. were taxicab companies operating under the name of "B-Line Taxi" in Indianapolis from 1983 to 1989. Mr. Spears was the owner and sole stockholder of both companies. During the time Farley and Huxley were in business, William Hudnut was the mayor of Indianapolis, Fred Armstrong was the city's controller, and Gerald Young was a city police officer assigned to the controller's office. During the 1980's, the taxicab business in Indianapolis was regulated by an ordinance requiring that cabs be licensed, insured, inspected and put in service within 30 days after the license is issued.

Mr. Spears expressed interest in the taxicab business in 1981 when he visited the controller's office to research the availability of licenses. He was not able to apply for licenses at that time because new licenses are only issued during "open enrollment" periods. In 1983, Spears acquired five existing licenses by virtue of his ownership of Farley and Huxley. When an enrollment period finally opened in June 1984, Farley and Huxley each applied for 25 licenses. Each received 8, and 17 applications for each company were denied. Like every other taxicab company awarded licenses, Farley and Huxley were required to have their cabs on the street within 30 days of the license award. When they failed to field their cabs in time, the 16 licenses (8 each) were revoked. An appeal of this revocation order to the controller and to the License Review Board ("LRB") was available, but none was taken.

Six months after the licenses had been revoked, Farley and Huxley filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Marion County, Indiana, challenging the denial of 34 licenses applied for in June 1984. Spears and the City compromised the case by agreeing to a hearing before the controller to determine the status of the 34 licenses that were denied and the 16 that were revoked. Spears came up dry after the hearing however, as the controller ruled that the licenses were properly denied and revoked. This time Farley and Huxley appealed the controller's decision to the LRB. The LRB reinstated the 16 revoked licenses, but again with the requirement that Farley and Huxley have their cabs in service within 30 days. The time limit was not met, so the controller's office again revoked the 16 licenses.

The next enrollment period opened on December 1, 1986, and Farley and Huxley each applied for 25 licenses. Huxley was awarded 25; Farley none, because it was found not to be qualified under the city ordinance. On this occasion, Huxley (surprisingly) was able to field 25 taxi-cabs within the required 30 days. During the next enrollment period in June 1987, Farley and Huxley were each awarded 25 licenses. Over the course of the next three months, however, 21 licenses were revoked because the cabs either failed inspection or were found to be inoperable. After an appeal to the controller, the parties executed a settlement agreement whereby Farley and Huxley retained a total of 40 of the 50 licenses awarded to them.

Problems continued to plague Spears' businesses when 6 licenses (it may have been only 5, but we think 6 is correct) were revoked in March 1988 because cabs were not in service as required. An appeal was taken to the controller, who affirmed the revocations. Further appeal was taken to the LRB, which decided to review all of Farley and Huxley's licenses, a total of 40 at that time.

While the appeal we just mentioned was pending, Spears faced difficulties on another front. Indiana law requires that taxicab companies provide proof of financial responsibility by either an insurance policy, a certificate of self-insurance, or a deposit of money or securities. Ind.Admin.Code tit. 140, art. 1, r. 5 (1984). Farley and Huxley met this requirement when they obtained a certificate of self-insurance from the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) on December 18, 1987. On April 5, 1988, the BMV notified Farley and Huxley that their certificate of self-insurance was only valid for 1987 and that it needed to be renewed. Farley and Huxley renewed their application for a certificate of self-insurance, but it was denied by the BMV because they did not meet the minimum financial collateral requirement to be self-insured. They appealed this decision to the BMV, which scheduled the matter for a hearing. Meanwhile, the BMV also informed the controller's office that Farley and Huxley were not self-insured. The controller, Armstrong, immediately sent written notice to Farley and Huxley that they had 24 hours to correct the lack of insurance. He also warned them that failure to do so would lead to suspension and possible revocation of their remaining licenses.

Rather than provide proof of insurance, Farley and Huxley again sought relief in state court. On September 2, 1988, they obtained a temporary restraining order against the controller prohibiting revocation of the licenses based on their lack of self-insurance. Twenty-one days later, after the TRO expired, the controller's office revoked the licenses because Farley and Huxley had still failed to provide proof of insurance. After a hearing, in October 1988, the BMV upheld the decision denying Farley and Huxley self-insured status for 1988. Not to be denied, Farley and Huxley again sought declaratory relief from the state court. In November 1988 they won a preliminary injunction enjoining the controller from suspending or revoking their licenses based on their lack of self-insurance. The injunction was subsequently dissolved.

Eventually, in April 1989, the LRB held a hearing on the revocation of all of Farley and Huxley's 40 licenses. At this hearing, Farley and Huxley withdrew their appeal of the 34 licenses that were revoked for lack of insurance. The revocation was not contested further, and it is undisputed that Farley and Huxley failed to exhaust their administrative remedies with regard to these 34 licenses. Thereafter, the state court dissolved the preliminary injunction granted to Farley and Huxley with regard to the revoked 34 licenses. Farley and Huxley were not happy with this result so they tried to appeal, but they failed to perfect the appeal as required by Indiana law.

Thus, the LRB was left to consider the status of the 6 remaining licenses. The LRB upheld the revocation of the 6 licenses for failure to put the taxicabs in service, leaving Farley and Huxley with no licenses and no taxicabs on the street. Although Farley and Huxley filed a petition for judicial review of this revocation, it was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Having struck out in his dealings with the controller, the LRB, and the state courts, Spears took his case to federal court in 1991. He filed a complaint seeking compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights by conspiring to harass, threaten, and intimidate him in order to drive his companies out of the taxicab business in Indianapolis.

Following two years of swimming in the sea of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, with supporting documentation, on January 3, 1994. The filing of the motion triggered Local Rule 56.1 (S.D.Ind.), which gave Spears 15 days to file a responsive brief together with supporting documentation of his...