Specter v. Tex. Turbine Conversions, Inc.
| Decision Date | 12 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-00194-TMB |
| Citation | 519 F.Supp.3d 576 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
| Parties | Jolyn L. SPECTER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of James E. Specter, M.D., and on behalf of herself, and the Surviving Family Members including Kevin Specter, and David W. Wood, Jr. and Marianne Wood, Individually an on behalf of the marital community, Plaintiffs, v. TEXAS TURBINE CONVERSIONS, INC., a Texas Corporation, Recon Air Corporation, a foreign corporation, Defendants. |
Alisa R. Brodkowitz, Schroeter Goldmark Bender, Rachel Min Luke, Friedman Rubin, Seattle, WA, Peter Reed Ehrhardt, Law Office of Peter Ehrhardt, Kenai, AK, for Plaintiffs.
Marc Gerhard Wilhelm, Robert L. Richmond, Richmond & Quinn, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant Rainbow King Lodge, Inc.
John B. Thorsness, Clapp, Peterson, Tiemessen, Thorsness & Johnson, LLC, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc.
Gary A. Zipkin, Kristin E. Crabb, Guess & Rudd P.C., Anchorage, AK, Robert James Fenn, Pro Hac Vice, Rohmer & Fenn, Richmond Hill, Ontario, for Defendant Recon Air Corporation.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND GARA (DKT. 190)
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Federal Preemption and GARA (the "Motion").1 Defendants Texas Turbine Conversions, Inc. ("TTC") and Recon Air Corporation ("RAC," and together with TTC, "Defendants") oppose the Motion.2 The Motion has been fully briefed and is ready for decision without oral argument.3 For the following reasons the Motion at Docket 190 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part .
The background facts of this case are set out in detail in this Court's order at Docket 313. The facts are incorporated by reference and will not be repeated here.4 Due to a lengthy discovery process and by agreement of the parties, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on July 15, 2020.5 TTC and RAC filed their Oppositions to the Motion on August 31, 2020.6 Plaintiffs filed their Reply on September 22, 2020.7
Plaintiffs bring the Motion to preclude Defendants from asserting an affirmative defense that Plaintiffs’ claims "are preempted by federal law."8 Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant summary judgment and "instruct that no testimony asserting that [Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA")] certification means an aircraft is safe be allowed."9 The Motion addresses three issues.
First, Plaintiffs assert that federal law, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, does not preempt their state law-based tort claims.10 Second, they argue that the testimony of defense expert Lawrence Timmons ("Timmons") that FAA certification "means that an aircraft complies with all applicable federal regulations and is airworthy" should be inadmissible.11 Third, Plaintiffs argue that the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 ("GARA") does not bar their claims.12
In response, TTC first argues that Plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims are preempted by federal law and that compliance with FAA regulations is admissible evidence that the TTC engine conversion was not defective.13 TTC asserts that it "satisfied all relevant federal warning requirements" and that the cause of the accident was Pilot John Furnia's negligence, not inadequate instructions in the Airplane Flight Manual ("AFM") or Airplane Flight Manual Supplement ("AFMS").14 TTC argues that Ninth Circuit law preempts "state law claims based on airlines’ failure to warn air passengers[.]"15 It further argues that "any changes to the content of FAA approved flight manuals ... must go through the FAA approval process," and thus TTC could not make alterations to the flight manuals without FAA approval, even if it wanted to.16 Second, TTC argues that defense expert Timmons is qualified under Daubert and that his testimony is admissible at trial.17 Third, TTC joins RAC's opposition regarding Plaintiffs’ GARA argument.18
RAC filed a response reiterating many of the same points raised by TTC.19 RAC points out that it "did not assert an affirmative defense predicated on federal preemption," though it joins TTC's opposition with respect to the issue.20 In a similar vein, RAC argues that Plaintiffs’ arguments against Timmons pertain to Timmons’ opinions "as to TTC, not RAC."21 RAC briefed the GARA issue, arguing that "Plaintiffs’ argument is conclusory, at best, and should be dismissed as a matter of law."22 RAC discusses GARA's " ‘rolling trigger date,’ " which "occurs when a new component that is alleged to have caused the accident replaces an existing component of the aircraft or is added to the plane."23 RAC cites a California case, Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. for the proposition that mere modification "does not restart the limitation period under GARA," but that " ‘replac[ing] an original item’ " would.24 RAC argues that "[P]laintiffs’ allegation is based on the replacement or modification of the engine system ... [and] insufficient to remove protections afforded by GARA."25
In reply, Plaintiffs first argue that the authority cited by TTC regarding preemption is inapposite because it relates to passenger warnings as opposed to warnings in the AFM or AFMS.26 Plaintiffs further argue that the regulations cited by TTC "have nothing to do with adding warnings to an aircraft manual and would not prohibit [TTC] from doing so."27 Second, Plaintiffs reiterate their objections to the proffered Timmons testimony as it relates to preemption because "it is a purely legal question."28 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that GARA does not bar their claims and that Defendants’ reliance on Hiser is misplaced, especially since the "new components added to the aircraft to change the engine system from piston to turbine resulted in a fresh limitation period if those parts are the cause of the accident[.]"29
Summary judgment is appropriate where, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,30 "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."31 Material facts are those which might affect the outcome of the case.32 A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."33 "There is no genuine issue of fact if, on the record taken as a whole, a rational trier of fact could not find in favor of the party opposing the motion."34 A movant's burden may be met by " ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."35 Thus, "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."36
Once a movant has met its initial burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial.37 Evidence introduced in opposition to a summary judgment motion does not have to be the kind that would be admissible at trial, but may be any type of evidence identified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).38 However, "conclusory assertions are wholly insufficient to sustain either the defendants’ burden or the district court's grant of summary judgment."39 "A party opposing a summary judgment motion must produce ‘specific facts showing that there remains a genuine factual issue for trial’ and evidence ‘significantly probative’ as to any [material] fact claimed to be disputed."40
"It is well established that Congress has the power to preempt state law."41 "Congress’ intent may be ‘explicitly stated in a statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’ "42 As stated by the Ninth Circuit:
Additionally, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ claims are be barred by GARA, which "precludes actions against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft if the part that allegedly caused the accident is more than 18 years old."45 According to GARA, the 18-year clock starts in accord with the following:
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