Spector Motor Service v. Connor v. 29 8212 30, 1950
Decision Date | 26 March 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 132,132 |
Citation | 71 S.Ct. 508,340 U.S. 602,95 L.Ed. 573 |
Parties | SPECTOR MOTOR SERVICE, Inc., v. O'CONNOR. Argued Nov. 29—30, 1950. Re |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Cyril Coleman, Hartford, Conn., for petitioner.
Mr. Louis Weinstein, New Haven, Conn., for respondents.
This proceeding attacks, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, the validity of a state tax imposed upon the franchise of a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within the State when (1) the business consists solely of interstate commerce, and (2) the tax is computed at a nondiscriminatory rate on that part of the corporation's net income which is reasonably attributable to its business activities within the State. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we hold this application of the tax invalid.
Petitioner, Spector Motor Service, Inc., is a Missouri corporation engaged exclusively in interstate trucking. It instituted this action in 1942 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Tax Commissioner of that State. It sought to enjoin collection of assessments and penalties totaling $7,795.50, which had been levied against it, for various periods between June 1, 1935, and December 31, 1940, under the Connecticut Corporation Business Tax Act of 1935 and amendments thereto.1 It asked also for a declaratory judgment as to its liability, if any, under that Act. It claimed that the tax imposed by the Act did not apply to it and that, if it did, such application violated both the Connecticut Constitution and the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Amend. 14. Finally, it alleged that it had no plain, speedy and efficient remedy at law or in equity in the state courts2 and that the collection of the taxes and penalties by the means provided in the statute would cause it irreparable injury. The District Court took jurisdiction, held that the Act did not apply to petitioner and granted the injunction sought. Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 47 F.Supp. 671. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one judge dissenting, reversed. 139 F.2d 809. It held that the tax did apply to petitioner and was constitutional. We granted certiorari, 322 U.S. 720, 64 S.Ct. 1155, 88 L.Ed. 1560, but, after hearing, remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to retain the bill pending the determination of proceedings to be brought in the state court in conformity with the opinion rendered, 323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101.
Petitioner thereupon sought a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court for Hartford County, Connecticut. The Superior Court held that the tax was applicable to petitioner but invalid under the Commerce Clause. 15 Conn.Supp. 205. The Supreme Court of Errors of the State of Connecticut likewise held that petitioner was subject to the tax but it declined to pass on the effect of the Commerce Clause. Spector Motor Co. v. Walsh, 135 Conn. 37, 70, 61 A.2d 89, 105. On a motion asking it to dissolve its original injunction, the United States District Court declined to do so. 88 F.Supp. 711. It reviewed the recent decisions and held that, applying the Act to petitioner, as required by the interpretation of it by the state courts, such application violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, acting through the same majority as on the previous occasion, reversed. One judge dissented for the reasons stated by the district judge and by the judge who had dissented on the former appeal. 181 F.2d 150. We granted certiorari because of the fundamental nature of the issue and the apparent conflict between the judgment below and previous judgments of this Court. Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 340 U.S. 806, 71 S.Ct. 49. The case was argued twice at this term.
The United States District Court had jurisdiction over this case in the first instance because of the uncertainty of the adequacy of a remedy in the state courts, and it did not lose that jurisdiction by virtue of the later clarification of the procedure in the courts of Connecticut. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 57 S.Ct. 377, 81 L.Ed. 605; Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288, 41 S.Ct. 272, 65 L.Ed. 638.
The vital issue which remains is whether the application of the tax to petitioner violates the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. We come to that issue now with the benefit of a statement from the state court of final jurisdiction showing exactly what it is that the State has sought to tax. The all-important 'operating inci- dence' of the tax is thus made clear.3 After full consideration and with knowledge that its statement would be made the basis of determining the validity of the application of the tax under the Commerce Clause, that court said:
135 Conn. at pages 56—57, 61 A.2d at pages 98—99.
The incidence of the tax is upon no intrastate commerce activities because there are none. Petitioner is engaged only in interstate transportation. Its principal place of business is in Illinois. It is authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission to do certain interstate trucking and by the Connecticut Public Utilities Commission to do part of such interstate trucking in Connecticut. Petitioner has filed with the Secretary of State of Connecticut a certificate of its incorporation in Missouri, has designated an agent in Connecticut for service of process and has paid the state fee required in that connection. It has not been authorized by the State of Connecticut to do intrastate trucking and does not engage in it. See Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, Com'r of District of Columbia, 241 U.S. 252, 253—254, 36 S.Ct. 583, 584, 60 L.Ed. 984.
Petitioner's business is the interstate transportation of freight by motor truck between east and west. When a full truckload is to be shipped to or from any customer in Connecticut, petitioner's over-the-road trucks go directly to the customer's place of business. In the case of less-than-truckload shipments, pickup trucks operated by petitioner gather the freight from customers for assembly into full truckloads at either of two terminals maintained within the State. 'The pickup trucks merely act as a part of the interstate transportation of the freight.' 135 Conn. at page 44, 61 A.2d at page 93.
The tax does not discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce. Neither the amount of the tax nor its computation need be considered by us in view of our disposition of the case. The objection to its validity does not rest on a claim that it places an unduly heavy burden on interstate commerce in return for protection given by the State. The tax is not levied as compensation for the use of highways4 or collected in lieu of an ad valorem property tax.5 Those bases of taxation have been disclaimed by the highest court of the taxing State. It is not a fee for an inspection or a tax on sales or use. It is a 'tax or excise' placed unequivocally upon the corporation's franchise for the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate transportation in the State. It serves no purpose for the State Tax Commissioner to suggest that, if there were some intrastate commerce involved or if an appropriate tax were imposed as compensation for petitioner's use of the highways, the same sum of money as is at issue here might be collected lawfully from petitioner. Even though the financial burden on interstate commerce might be the same, the question whether a state may validly make interstate commerce pay its way depends first of all upon the constitutional channel through which it attempts to do so. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 67 S.Ct. 274, 91 L.Ed. 265; McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 64 S.Ct. 1023, 88 L.Ed. 1304.
Taxing power is inherent in sovereign states, yet the states of the United States have divided their taxing power between the Federal Government and themselves. They delegated to the United States the exclusive power to tax the privilege to engage in interstate commerce when they gave Congress the power 'To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States * * *.' U.S.Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. While the reach of the reserved taxing power of a state is great, the constitutional separation of the federal and state powers makes it essential that no state be permitted to exercise, without authority from Congress, those functions which it has delegated exclusively to Congress. Another example of this basic separation of powers is the inability of the states to tax the agencies through which the United States exercises its sovereign powers. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 425—437, 4 L.Ed. 579; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 445—449, 6 L.Ed. 678; Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 63 S.Ct. 1137, 87 L.Ed. 1504.
The answer in the instant case has been made clear by the courts of Connecticut. It is...
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