Spector v. Diaz
| Decision Date | 11 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 12–5288–SJO (PLA),CV 12–5288–SJO (PLA) |
| Citation | 115 F.Supp.3d 1121 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Phillip Spector, Petitioner, v. Ralph M. Diaz, Respondent. |
Charles M. Sevilla, Law Office of Charles Sevilla, San Diego, CA, Dennis P. Riordan, Donald M. Horgan, Riordan and Horgan, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
Lawrence M. Daniels, CAAG–Office of Attorney General of California, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent.
ORDER ACCEPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition, the other records on file herein, the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and petitioner's objections to the report and recommendation. The Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the report and recommendation to which objections have been made. The Court accepts the recommendations of the magistrate judge.
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable S. James Otero, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05–07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be dismissed with prejudice.
On September 20, 2004, petitioner was charged with murder, in violation of California Penal Code section 187(a). (Clerk's Transcript ["CT"] 1104). He was also alleged to have personally used a firearm within the meaning of California Penal Code sections 12022.5 and 12022.53. (Id. at 1105). He was tried by jury, but, on September 17, 2007, the jury declared that it was unable to reach a verdict. (Id. at 5416–17, 5513–14).
Petitioner was retried in 2008. (See id. at 5844). On April 13, 2009, after deliberating for nine days, the second jury found petitioner guilty of murder and found that he personally used a firearm. (Id. at 6457).1 On May 29, 2009, the trial court sentenced him to state prison for a term of fifteen years to life for the murder, plus the middle term of four years for the firearm enhancement. (Id. at 6516–20).
Petitioner filed a direct appeal. (See Respondent's Notice of Lodging Nos. 6, 7, 9). On May 2, 2011, the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's conviction in a published opinion. (Lodgment No. 10; People v. Spector, 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 31 (2011) ). Twice thereafter, the court of appeal modified its opinion, but did not change its judgment. (Lodgment Nos. 11, 13). Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied without citation to authority on August 17, 2011. (Lodgment Nos. 14–15). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on February 21, 2012. (Lodgment Nos. 16–17).
On June 18, 2012, petitioner filed the instant federal Petition and supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities ("Points & Auth."). (Docket Nos. 1, 2). On October 12, 2012, respondent filed an Answer and a supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities ("Answer"). (Docket No. 13). Petitioner filed a response ("Reply") on November 9, 2012. (Docket No. 16).
This matter is deemed submitted and is ready for a decision.
The facts underlying petitioner's conviction are set forth in the California Court of Appeal's published opinion affirming his conviction. (Lodgment No. 10 at 2–26). The court of appeal's statement of facts, summarized below, is reasonably supported by the record.2
On February 2, 2003, petitioner, a successful and highly influential record producer, met Lana Clarkson at the House of Blues in Hollywood. Prior to meeting Clarkson, petitioner had been drinking alcohol steadily for hours at various establishments. He arrived at the House of Blues near its 2:00 a.m. closing time. He was allowed entry into the club's exclusive Foundation Room. Clarkson, an actress who had worked in film and television for more than a decade, was working at the House of Blues as a hostess and as a security officer for the Foundation Room.
Petitioner, who was noticeably intoxicated, asked Clarkson to have a drink with him. After obtaining permission from her manager to do so, Clarkson agreed to sit with petitioner, but did not drink. The two talked, as petitioner continued to consume alcohol. When petitioner finished his last drink, he asked for more alcohol, but was refused another drink because the club was getting ready to close for the night.
As the club was closing, petitioner asked Clarkson if she needed a ride, and Clarkson replied that she did, in fact, need a ride. Petitioner then invited Clarkson to his home in Alhambra. Although Clarkson initially declined the offer, she eventually agreed to accompany petitioner to his home. As she entered petitioner's car, she told Adriano De Souza, petitioner's driver, that she was coming over only for a drink. They left the House of Blues parking area at approximately 2:20 a.m.
Petitioner and Clarkson arrived at his Alhambra home sometime around 3:00 a.m. They entered the home, while De Souza waited outside in the car, ready to take Clarkson home when she was ready to leave. Two hours later, De Souza heard a sharp noise. Shortly thereafter, petitioner opened the back door of his house and walked outside. De Souza, believing he was being summoned to take Clarkson home, approached petitioner and saw that petitioner was holding a revolver in his right hand. When he saw De Souza, petitioner declared, "I think I killed somebody." There was blood visible on petitioner's right index finger.
De Souza peered into the house and saw Clarkson's slumped body and saw that there was blood on her face. When De Souza asked petitioner what had happened, petitioner shrugged his shoulders but he did not say anything. De Souza fled from the house and called the police to report what had happened and what petitioner had said when he exited his home.
When the police arrived in response to De Souza's call, they found Clarkson's body slumped in a chair near the back door of petitioner's house. Underneath one of Clarkson's legs, police found a revolver. Clarkson had been shot once. The bullet went through her neck and head, having first entered through her mouth. She and petitioner were the only two people inside the house when Clarkson was shot.
Petitioner subsequently was arrested and charged with murder. At trial, he sought to show that Clarkson was an emotionally unstable person who either intentionally or accidentally shot herself in petitioner's home. In an effort to support this defense theory, petitioner presented several scientific experts who essentially testified that the evidence of the blood spatter and blood transfer at the crime scene was consistent with a self-inflicted wound
.3 The defense also presented evidence to suggest that Clarkson was a frustrated actress, and introduced emails authored by Clarkson and lay testimony that, in the defense's view, suggested that she had contemplated suicide or was suicidal.
For its part, the prosecution presented its own scientific experts who essentially testified that the evidence of the blood spatter and blood transfer at the crime scene, as well as certain wounds
on Clarkson, were consistent with a homicide, not a suicide. The prosecution also offered evidence to counter petitioner's theory that Clarkson was suicidal. In particular, the prosecution offered testimony showing that Clarkson had secured, and made plans to apply for, several modeling and acting jobs. Additionally, the prosecution presented other evidence of Clarkson's work, personal activities, and plans that, according to the prosecution's theory, were irreconcilable with a person bent on committing suicide.
In addition to numerous expert witnesses from both sides, the jury also heard testimony about petitioner's prior incidents involving his use of firearms against women. Specifically, five women who had either personal or work-related interactions with petitioner in the past each testified to having been threatened and held hostage by petitioner at gun point. In each such instance, petitioner had been drinking heavily. And, in several of the incidents to which the witnesses testified, petitioner, holding a gun, threatened to kill the women if they tried to leave.
1. The trial judge deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to an impartial judge by allowing the prosecutor to introduce a videotape from petitioner's first trial containing testimonial statements by the trial judge. (Petition at 5).
2. The trial judge violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him by allowing the prosecutor to introduce into evidence the trial judge's testimonial statements from petitioner's first trial. (Petition at 5).
3. The prosecutor deprived petitioner of his right to due process and a fair trial by arguing that the trial judge was a prosecution witness. (Petition at 6).
4. The prosecutor deprived petitioner of his right to due process and a fair trial by attacking defense counsel's integrity and arguing that petitioner used his wealth to purchase false testimony. (Petition at 5).
The Petition was filed after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("the AEDPA"). Pub.L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Therefore, the Court applies the AEDPA in its review of this action. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997).
Under the AEDPA, a federal court...
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