Spector v. State
| Decision Date | 22 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 61,61 |
| Citation | 289 Md. 407,425 A.2d 197 |
| Parties | Allen B. SPECTOR, Maurice R. Wyatt and Donald H. Noren v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Russell J. White, Towson, for appellant Noren.
H. Russell Smouse, Baltimore (George F. Pappas, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant Wyatt.
Paul Mark Sandler, Baltimore (Raymond Daniel Burke and Freishtat, Schwartz & Sandler, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant Spector.
Gerald C. Ruter, Asst. State Prosecutor, Towson (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Deborah K. Handel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Gerald D. Glass, State Prosecutor, Towson, on the brief), for appellee.
Argued before SMITH and COLE, JJ., FREDERICK J. SINGLEY, Jr. and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Retired Specially Assigned Judges, and JAMES C. MORTON, Jr., C. AWDRY THOMPSON and EDWARD O. WEANT, Jr., Specially Assigned Judges.
We shall here affirm the judgments entered against Allen B. Spector, Maurice B. Wyatt, and Donald H. Noren on three charges of bribery in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol., 1980 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 23. 1
On September 13, 1973, May 14, 1974, and May 24, 1974, the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene issued orders effecting a moratorium on connections of sewers for new buildings in certain areas of Baltimore County. Samuel Gorn, Richard Davison, and Bernard Rome were developers adversely affected by the moratorium. They sought relief from the Board of Review of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene in the form of exceptions to the moratorium.
Spector, Wyatt, and Noren are members of the bar. At the times here relevant Noren was an Assistant Attorney General of Maryland whose duties included representation of the Environmental Health Administration, a part of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, in the matter of such exceptions before the Board of Review. Spector and Wyatt were practicing lawyers in Baltimore City. 2 Spector was a member of the Baltimore City Council.
Three indictments were returned against Spector, Wyatt, and Noren by the Grand Jury of Baltimore City. The first count of the first indictment charged that Spector and Wyatt "on or about September 5, 1974, ... did unlawfully, willfully, and corruptly pay a bribe, reward, fee, and testimonial, to wit: two thousand five hundred dollars ... to Donald H. Noren, being then and there an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Maryland ... for the purpose of influencing him in the performance of his official duties in violation of Article 27, Section 23, Annotated Code of Maryland ...." The second count charged Noren with having on the same day "unlawfully, willfully and corruptly receive(d) a bribe" in that amount from Spector and Wyatt "in the performance of his official duties" in violation of Art. 27, § 23.
The second indictment in similar language charged Spector and Wyatt with having paid a bribe to Noren in the amount of $1,500 on October 27, 1974. It likewise charged Noren in language similar to the first indictment with having received that sum at that time.
The third indictment in similar language charged that on February 10, 1975, Spector and Wyatt paid the sum of $1,650 to Noren as a bribe. It likewise charged Noren with receiving such an amount as a bribe at that time.
The statute in question, Art. 27, § 23, provides in pertinent part:
If any person shall bribe or attempt to bribe ... any officer or employee of the State ... in order to influence any such officer or person in the performance of any of his official duties; and if ... any officer or any employee of the State ... shall demand or receive any bribe ... for the purpose of influencing him in the performance of his official duties, or for neglecting or failing to perform the same, every such person so bribing or attempting to bribe any of such officers or persons, and every such person so demanding or receiving any bribe ... shall be deemed guilty of bribery ....
The defendants elected a court trial. The case was heard in the Criminal Court of Baltimore by Macgill, J. 3
Each of the defendants was sentenced to two years in the care of the Department of Correction on each of the counts. Sentence was suspended in each instance and each defendant was placed on two years unsupervised probation. In addition, a fine of $5,000 on each of the three counts was levied on each of the defendants.
An appeal was promptly noted to the Court of Special Appeals. Since pursuant to Maryland Rule BV16 we had suspended each of these attorneys from the practice of law by reason of these convictions, we issued a writ of certiorari ex mero motu to the Court of Special Appeals because a by-pass of that court would expedite the ultimate disposition of these proceedings.
The appellants claim (1) that since each of the indictments was "couched in (the) generic terms of the statute, alleging payments to 'influence official duties', (they) were denied apprisal of the specific charges against them, guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, when the trial court did not grant demands for bills of particular, which requested disclosures of the specific official duty(ies) or act(s) of Noren which Wyatt and Spector allegedly sought to influence"; (2) that in order to sustain a conviction of bribery pursuant to Art. 27, § 23 "the State must prove the specific official act(s) or duty(ies) of Noren, which Wyatt and Spector allegedly sought to influence, in that it is the essential element of quid pro quo that distinguishes the specific criminal intent underlying bribery from the mens rea of other related crimes, such as accepting an unlawful gratuity," which it is contended the State failed to do; (3) that if, "assuming arguendo the State is not required to prove the specific act sought to be influenced, there was (no) legally sufficient evidence of a corrupt agreement to sustain a conviction of bribery"; and (4) that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 735 "when it did not fully apprise Defendants of their right to trial by jury on the first day of trial, although such advice was rendered during a pre-trial proceeding."
The trial judge said from the bench in making his findings of fact:
I must reach my conclusions on the evidence whether by way of testimony, or by way of documents which have been admitted for my consideration.
As the State has said in this case the evidence, or these cases, there are three of them being tried together in effect, the evidence it relies on to establish these cases is circumstantial.
Circumstantial evidence is not weaker, or of a lesser quality than other kinds of evidence. In these cases, and as I said before, these cases have been consolidated for trial, the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt, and I do not think that it is even disputed, that Mr. Noren, at the time of the incidents described, was an officer or employee of the State, an Assistant Attorney General. I think that the evidence also, in each case, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Noren received payments of money which were derived from the three applicants or developers who testified, and that he received these payments from Mr. Wyatt and these payments were part of the sums received by Judge Spector, as fees from each of the applicants. So, in each case, Mr. Noren, the public official, received something of value derived from the matters pending before the Department which he represented. These facts, of course, do not make him guilty of bribery, nor do they make Judge Spector or Mr. Wyatt guilty of bribery. To find one or more of these defendants guilty of bribery, it must be established beyond a reasonable doubt that the moneys were paid and received pursuant to a corrupt agreement. The State contends that various incidents described in the evidence show, circumstantially, that there was such a corrupt agreement in each instance.
Before detailing the circumstantial evidence in these cases, on which, as I understand it, the State is relying, I should point out that in these cases, as in others, each specific incident or detail, in itself, cannot be considered separately. All incidents or details, considered cumulatively, are what matter.
Each of the three associations, or what I will call developers, and I will refer to them by the names of the parties who testified as their representatives, the evidence shows were placed in serious or desperate financial straits by the imposition of the sewer hook-up moratorium on May 14, 1974. According to the evidence each day the moratorium remained in effect as to them their financial conditions worsened. The first two, Mr. Gorn and Mr. Davison, engaged lawyers who resorted to orthodox legal proceedings to get relief for their clients. Colonel Rome tried the same avenues on his own. The first two, without abandoning the counsel they had retained, turned in addition to Judge Spector. None of the three, I think it is significant to say, could recall precisely who referred Judge Spector's name to them. Mr. Gorn, if you believe this part of his testimony, retained Judge Spector simply to keep him posted as to what was going on. Peculiarly, however, according to Mr. Gorn, he retained Mr. Spector on a contingent fee basis, contingent on his securing relief from the moratorium and while seeking of that relief was in the hands of other counsel. Judge Spector labeled this fee an "annual retainer." Mr. Davison went to see Judge Spector because he felt that since Judge Spector was a city councilman, "He knew his way around in the bureaucracy and could expedite things." Colonel Rome was advised that a stipulation had to be prepared with Mr. Noren before he could get a hearing. He testified that he had difficulty getting together with Mr. Noren. Finally, he retained Judge Spect...
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