Speight v. Speight

• Decision Date: 10 April 1935
• Docket Number: No. 312.,312.
• Citation: 208 N.C. 132,179 S.E. 461
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: SPEIGHT et al. v. SPEIGHT.

179 S.E. 461

208 N.C. 132

SPEIGHT et al.

v.SPEIGHT.

No. 312.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 10, 1935.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pamlico County; Cranmer, Judge.

Action by K. C. Speight and another against Carrie B. Speight, administratrix of the estate of W. W. Speight, deceased. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal.

Error.

Civil action to establish plaintiffs' alleged interests in the estate of W. W. Speight, deceased.

On January 8, 1934, W. W. Speight of Pamlico county died intestate, leaving him surviving his widow, Carrie B. Speight, defendant herein, and two sons by a former marriage, K. C. and M. L. Speight, plaintiffs herein. About sixty days prior to his death, the deceased executed to his wife a deed in due form for a tract of land and included therein, "also all the personal property that i own of every kind and description, including household and kitchen property, choses in action, notes and mortgages, etc. Always reserving to said party of the first part the complete use and control of said property during his natural life."

The court held, as a matter of law, that this deed conveyed all of the grantor's property, both real and personal, to the granteenamed therein. The sufficiency of the deed to convey the land is no longer mooted.

Plaintiffs appeal, assigning as error the refusal of the court to hold that the deed in question is void on its face as to the personal property therein described.

Ward & Ward, of New Bern, for appellants.

L. I. Moore and T. O. Moore, both of New Bern, for appellee.

STACY, Chief Justice.

It has been the consistent holding in this jurisdiction, following the decision in Graham v. Graham's Adm'rs (1823) 9 N. C. 322, that a reservation of a life estate in personal chattels, in a deed attempting to convey them in remainder, reserves the whole estate, and the limitation over is void. Morrow v. Williams, 14 N. C. 203; Hunt v. Davis, 20 N. C. 36; Newell v. Taylor, 56 N. C. 374; Dail v. Jones, 85 N. C. 221, 222; Outlaw v. Taylor, 168 N. C. 511, 84 S. E. 811.

It is quite clear, we think, that the deed in question falls within the principle established by these decisions. A reservation for life of "the complete use and control" of personal chattels is a reservation for life of said chattels. 25 C. J. 1039; 17 R. C. L. 617; 11 R. C. L. 473.

Speaking to the question in a case where the "use" of a slave was attempted to be reserved for the life of the bargainor in a bill of sale, Sutton v. Hollowed, 13 N. C. 185, Hall, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said:

"The cases on this subject are not altogether reconcileable. Parol gifts by delivery, reserving life estates, are contradictory and inconsistent in the nature of things. Property cannot be delivered, and retained at the same time. If there is a delivery, there can be no reservation of a life estate. Of this kind were the cases of Duncan v. Self, 5 N. C. 466, and Vass v. Hicks, 7 N. C. 493.

"At common law, there could not be a limitation of personal chattels, after a life estate created by deed. It was also held, that in a gift or limitation of slaves, after a life estate reserved by the donor, the limitation was not good; because the life estate might be lawfully reserved, and the limitation over on that account was too remote, and this was in conformity (as was supposed) with the principle before laid down, that there could...