Speigner v. McGhee
Decision Date | 07 May 1975 |
Citation | 55 Ala.App. 384,316 So.2d 215 |
Parties | In re James E. SPEIGNER v. Robert McGHEE, d/b/a McGhee Electrical Company. Ex parte Robert McGHEE, d/b/a McGhee Electrical Company. Civ. 457. |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
N. T. Braswell, III, Montgomery, for appellant.
B. B. Rowe, Enterprise, for appellee.
James E. Speigner, the plaintiff in the trial court and respondent here, filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Dale County seeking workmen's compensation benefits for injury to his back allegedly incurred while in the employ of Robert McGhee, d/b/a McGhee Electrical Company, defendant below and petitioner here. After a trial, plaintiff was awarded temporary total benefits for an additional period of time. Defendant seeks review of that judgment in this court by writ of certiorari.
The primary contention of petitioner is that he never had notice of respondent's alleged injury as required by Title 26, Section 294, Code of Alabama 1940, as Recompiled 1958.
Title 26, Section 294, Code of Alabama 1940, as Recompiled 1958, provides as follows:
'Every injured employee or his representative shall, within five days after the occurrence of an accident give or cause to be given to the employer written notice of the accident, and the employee, if he fails to give such notice, shall not be entitled to physician's or medical fees, nor any compensation which may have accrued under the terms of articles 1 and 2 of this chapter, unless it can be shown that the party required to give such notice had been prevented from doing so by reason of physical or mental incapacity, other than minority, or fraud or deceit, or equal good reason, but no compensation shall be payable unless such written notice is given within ninety days after the occurrence of the accident, or where death results, within ninety days after the death.'
Respondent testified that he did not inform petitioner of his injury in writing, but did orally tell him on two occasions he was injured on the job; once, by telephone during the evening of the day he was injured, which he stated was March 19, 1973; second, in a face to face conversation with petitioner on March 23, 1973 when petitioner came to the job site. Petitioner testified that he did not remember either of the two conversations with respondent.
The evidence shows that respondent worked for petitioner as a painter and carpenter and had been working for him about three months. At the time of the alleged injury, petitioner had a painting and repair contract at Ft. Fucker, Alabama. On the day in question, respondent and two other employees were unloading a fifty-five gallon drum full of mineral spirits from the bed of a truck. Respondent was on the ground and the other two employees were in the truck. The drum slipped and respondent tried to catch it and it fell to the ground. He said in the process he was knocked to his knees and he felt a sharp pain in his lower back as if a knife had been stuck in it. He said he went inside a shed and laid down on a stack of lumber for some time. He did not do much work the remainder of the day. Mr. Paul, one of the workmen assisting respondent, testified that respondent commented after the drum fell that he had hurt his back. The other employee, Mr. McVay, testified that he could tell that respondent was hurt. That evening respondent called petitioner at his home in Montgomery and informed him of his injury. There were only three employees working for petitioner on the Ft. Rucker job, with no foreman or supervisor.
On March 23, 1973, which was a Friday, petitioner came to Ft. Rucker to pay his employees for the week's work and respondent again, so he testified, informed petitioner of his injury and asked what he should do about it. Petitioner never did tell him what to do about it.
Mr. Paul testified that on March 23, 1973 in Ft. Rucker he heard respondent report the accident and his injury to petitioner.
In the absence of written notice of an injury incurred on the job, does the notice presented by the factual situation in this case satisfy the requirements of Section 294, Supra? We think it does. It should be noted that the written complaint was filed within three months of the alleged injury but it has been held that this is not the kind of notice envisioned by Section 294. Alabama Marble Co. v. Jones, 217 Ala. 300, 116 So. 147.
A similar question was presented to this court in B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Martin, 47 Ala.App. 244, 253 So.2d 37, cert. den., 287 Ala. 726, 253 So.2d 45.
'Assignments of error 10 and 18 are addressed to the failure of notice to appellant, as required by Title 26, Section 294 of the Alabama Code.
'There is no dispute that written notice was not given. The question to be decided then is--did appellant have such actual knowledge of the accident and injury of appellee as to remove the necessity of, or to substitute for the statutory requirement of written notice. The case of Ex parte Stith Coal Co., 213 Ala. 399, 104 So. 756, first established that written notice was not required if the employer had actual knowledge of the injury and circumstances out of which it arose. The court stated therein the following:
'With the above words in mind, we think any reasonable definition of actual knowledge by appellant of appellee's injury is satisfied by the evidence adduced before the trial court.
'We will briefly enumerate some of the information possessed by appellant. . . .
In our recent case of Beatrice Foods Company v. Clemons, 54 Ala.App. 150, 306 So.2d 18, we were again faced with the question of adequate notice to the employer of the alleged accident and injury. We there said:
'The primary issue presented for our consideration is whether the evidence supports the finding of the trial court that there was actual knowledge by the employer of the accident and injury sufficient to remove the requirement of written notice as provided by Title 26, Sec. 294 of the Alabama Code.
'Though the statute requiring written notice to the employer of the occurrence of an accident within 90 days remains in the Code, judicial construction thereof has, to a great extent, abrogated its literal application. . . .
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